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The three main essays in this thesis focus on exploring the relationship between bank 
competition and financial stability. Chapter one gives an introduction to the literature on bank 
competition and stability. Chapter two addresses the question “are competitive banking 
systems more stable?” This chapter is a replication of the work of Schaeck, Cihak, and Wolfe 
(2009) and it re-analyses the authors’ original data. In addition, this chapter provides various 
robustness tests by comparing currently available data from the same (as the authors’) or 
alternative data sources and extending the sample period. In doing so, it fails to confirm 
Schaeck et al. (2009) conclusion that competition promotes stability. 
The third and fourth chapters focus on the question: “what is the effect of bank 
competition on stability?” These two chapters undertake two major meta-regression analyses 
to identify the effect of competition on stability. The third chapter is a replication of 
Zigraiova and Havranek (2016). It is comprised of two validation exercises. The first is a 
pure replication of the authors’ analysis using their data and code. This analysis exactly 
reproduces the authors’ results, confirming their finding of a small effect from bank 
competition on financial stability. The second exercise recodes the same 31 studies using the 
same categories considered by the original authors. The results from the re-coded data 
confirm their main conclusions.  
The fourth chapter updates the list of studies that estimate the relationship between 
bank competition and financial stability. There are a total of 35 additional studies with 762 
estimates. The results using the new data confirm a small negative effect from bank 
competition on stability.  
xi 
 
The fifth chapter addresses the final research question, “how does bank competition 
affect stability?” This chapter uses bank-level data from the USA during the period 2000-
2017. It computes multiple competition and stability measures to examine how each 
competition measure is associated with each stability measure. The relationship between bank 
competition and stability is found to vary based on the measures, and estimation method, 
used. The results generally support the competition-fragility hypothesis, but there are 
































This form is to accompany the submission of any thesis that contains research reported in co-
authored work that has been published, accepted for publication, or submitted for publication. A 
copy of this form should be included for each co-authored work that is included in the thesis. 
Completed forms should be included at the front (after the thesis abstract) of each copy of the thesis 




Please indicate the chapter/section/pages of this thesis that are extracted from co-authored work and 
provide details of the publication or submission from the extract comes:  
 The forthcoming Critical Finance Review paper "Are Competitive Banking Systems Really More 
Stable?" is extracted from Chapter two of the thesis.     
 
Please detail the nature and extent (%) of contribution by the candidate:  
The candidate did all the analytical work, working with the data and writing the programming code. 
The write-up of the chapter was entirely done by the candidate. The supervisors provided overall 
guidance but did none of the actual work. So in terms of Chapter Two, the applicant did 90% of the 
work. In terms of the paper that was submitted to the journal Critical Finance Review, the applicant 
did a third (33%) of the work, with the supervisors doing all of the writing and most of the organisation 
of the manuscript that was submitted to the journal. 
 
 
Certification by Co-authors: 
If there is more than one co-author then a single co-author can sign on behalf of all 
The undersigned certifys that: 
 The above statement correctly reflects the nature and extent of the PhD candidate’s 
contribution to this co-authored work  
 In cases where the candidate was the lead author of the co-authored work he or she wrote the 
text 
 








Until the 1970s, banking sectors were generally highly regulated with tight restrictions. 
Banking sectors were mainly confined to a few players within the geographical boundaries of 
countries. There was limited competition between banks, and a minimum of bank failures. The 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation promotes financial 
liberalization with the aim of developing domestic financial markets, banks and accelerate the 
economic growth of countries (Levine, 2001). Starting in the 1980s, many countries introduced 
liberalization and competition to their financial systems. Financial liberalization reduced barriers 
to entry, allowed foreign banks to participate in domestic markets, reduced restrictions on 
opening branches, minimized deposit interest rate ceilings, and introduced derivative and foreign 
currency trading (Hellmann, Murdock, & Stiglitz, 2000). Subsequently, significant bank failures 
were reported in many parts of the world (Vives, 2001).  
Figure 1.1 shows number of crises that started in a given year from 1970 to 2010 
(reproduced from Laeven and Valencia (2012)). It shows occurrence of multiple banking crises 
after financial liberalization. Latin American crisis was the major crisis in 1980s. In 1990s, 
banking crisis in transition economies, Tequila crisis and East Asian financial crisis were the 
significant bank failures. Then in late 2000s, 24 countries faced the global financial crisis and it 




Figure 1.1: Banking Crisis Cycles  
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
 
To explain more details on banking crises in chronological order, in 1980s, the non-
performing loans were estimated to be more than 30 percent of the total loan portfolios in Sub-
Saharan African countries and many banks declared insolvency (Caprio & Klingebiel, 2002). 
Latin American countries also experienced a financial crisis in early 1980s. They had large 
external debt obligations and the collapse of global commodity prices combined with high and 
volatile interest rates in USA, contributed to banking and sovereign debt crises in Latin America 
(Reinhart & Rogof, 2013). USA suffered from savings and loan crisis in 1984 and more than 
1000 thrift institutions failed (Curry & Shibu, 2000). In late 1980s Nordic countries experienced 
banking crises due to the lack of internal risk management controls and due to the absence of 
prudential regulatory supervision in the post-liberalization period (Drees & Pazarbasioglu, 1995). 
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Japanese financial system had a real estate price boom and a stock market boom in the mid 
1980s and Japan had experienced a burst of asset bubbles in 1992. The decline in real estate price 
led to a collapse in collateral backed loans in banks. In addition to that, the decrease in stock 
prices reduced the value of bank’s equity capital and created instability in the banking system 
(Bordo & Jeanne, 2002). During the same time period, Eastern European banking sector faced 
problems with the collapse of Soviet union (Reinhart & Rogof, 2013). Many Central and Eastern 
European countries and few other transition economies suffered from heavy non-performing 
loans they had from their socialist period. During the transition period, removal of subsidiaries 
for state enterprises reduced their profitability and the capacity to pay back the outstanding loans. 
That formed significant bank runs in many transition economies (Tang, Zoli, & Klytchnikova, 
2000). Mishkin (1999) explains the financial system instability due to Tequila crisis in 1994-
1995 which was created an asset and liability mismatch in bank borrowers’ balance sheet. With 
the devaluation of the Mexican peso, dollar denominated loan values increased, while the value 
of domestic currency based assets did not. This resulted in defaults of loan repayments by the 
borrowers, which created a credit risk in the banking system. A similar phenomenon occurred in 
East Asian economies. Financial liberalization injected excessive foreign direct investments and 
during the period from 1997 to 1998, currency devaluation in many East Asian economies 
resulted in currency mismatches, illiquidity, and leverage issues in banks (Mulder, Perrelli, & 
Rocha, 2012). More recently, the falling housing prices in US initiated the sub-prime crisis in 
2007. Less creditworthy borrowers defaulted their loans which led to vulnerabilities in the 
financial system  (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008). Later, it spread to European banks and to a global 




Table 1.1  
Global Banking Crises, 1890 – 2008 
Years of bunching in 
banking crises 
Affected countries Comments 
1890 - 1891 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Portugal, UK, and US Argentina defaults and there are runs on all 
Argentine banks (see della Paolera and 
Taylor (2001); Baring Brothers faces 
failure 
1907 - 1908 Chile, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, US A fall in copper prices undermines the 
solvency of a trust company (quasi bank) 
in New York 
1914 Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, France, India, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, UK, and US 
The outbreak of WWI 
1929 - 1931 Advanced: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, US 
  
Emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico 
Real commodity prices collapse by about 
51% during 1928–1931. Real interest rates 
reach almost 13% in the US 
1981 - 1982 Emerging markets: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Congo, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Mexico, the Philippines, Turkey, and 
Uruguay 
Between 1979 and 1982, real commodity 
prices fall about 40%. US real interest 
rates hit about 6% - their highest readings 
since 1933.  
The beginning of the decade - long debt 
crisis in emerging markets 
1987 - 1988 Many small, mostly low-income countries, Sub-Saharan Africa 
particularly hard hit 
The tail-end of a nearly decade-long debt 
crisis 
1991 - 1992 Advanced: Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Japan, Sweden  
 
Others: Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic 
Real estate and equity price bubbles in the 
Nordic countries and Japan burst; many 
transition economies cope with 
liberalization and stabilization 
1994 -  1995 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and Paraguay 
 
Others: Azerbaijan, Croatia, Cameroon, Lithuania, Swaziland 
The Mexican ‘‘tequila’’ crisis deals the 
first blow to the surge in capital inflows to 
emerging markets since the early 1990s 
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Years of bunching in 
banking crises 
Affected countries Comments 
1997 - 1998 Asia: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Vietnam  
 
Others: Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mauritius, Russia, 
Ukraine 
The second and last blow to capital flows 
to emerging markets 
2007 - 2008 Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Spain, UK, US 
and others 
The US subprime real estate bubble - and 
other real estate bubbles in advance 
economies 
















Reinhart and Rogof (2013) also present at the history of global banking crises from 1890 
to 2008. Table 1.1 reproduce the same table from Reinhart and Rogof (2013). This table 
emphasize that countries experienced a crisis events as a group and there is a contagion effect of 
banking crisis to other countries (refer Table 1.1).  
The academic literature investigates the relationship between financial liberalization and 
banking crises and present mixed evidence towards the effect financial liberalization 
(Angkinand, Sawangngoenyuang, & Wihlborg, 2010; Cubillas & González, 2014; Demirgüç-
Kunt & Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Minsky, 1992; Noy, 2004). According 
to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), the majority of historical crises are related to financial 
liberalization. In a liberalized financial system, bank managers are allowed to undertake flexible 
business operations. They are eager to invest in risky assets to get high returns, which leads to 
increased indebtedness (Minsky, 1992). In another perspective, Noy (2004) explains that 
financial liberalization will contribute to a banking crisis as a result of inefficient regulatory 
supervision. Angkinand et al. (2010); Laeven and Valencia (2010) also confirm the importance 
of effective regulatory supervision in a liberalized financial system. In a counter argument, 
financial liberalization reduces the entry barriers and promotes competition in the banking 
systems. Competition brings numerous benefits to the banking sector. The pressure of 
competitiveness brings innovation, resource allocation efficiency, and improvements in 
productivity (Berger & Humphrey, 1997; Ranciere, Tornell, & Westermann, 2006). Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (2005) argue that liberalization is not inherently good or bad, but depends 
on the macroeconomic environment. In an unfavourable macroeconomic environment, 
competition can cause financial instability (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998). Noy (2004)  
finds that an increase in competition would reduce the monopoly power and decrease the profit 
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margins of existing banks making them more unstable. In another yet similar perspective, 
Hellmann et al. (2000) find that competition leads to deterioration of the prudent banking 
business in the presence of moral hazard leading to excessive risk taking. Due to this, researchers 
and policy makers moved to another direction of investigation which is to observe the connection 
between bank competition and financial system stability. 
However, to analyse this phenomenon there needs to be a reliable measurement of 
competition which does not exist. Measures of competition have evolved over time. In the early 
1990s, empirical researchers used structural measures of competition. Structural measures 
mainly relate to the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis (Berger, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Levine, & Haubrich, 2004). Based on the SCP hypothesis, concentration is considered as the 
“structure” and the “conduct” is competition. Greater concentration is accompanied by a 
decrease in competition (Bikker & Haaf, 2002b). Concentration is commonly measured using the 
concentration ratio and/or the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  
Later, researchers argued that concentration is inappropriate for measuring the degree of 
competition. If market competition leads a bank to exit due to a failure or a merger, then it 
increases the concentration ratio. In such circumstances, a high concentration ratio can give a 
misleading impression of less competition in the market (Beck, 2008; Bikker & Haaf, 2002b; 
Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Schaeck et al., 2009). Subsequently, non-structural measures were 
introduced to assess competition. The Lerner index, H-statistic, and the Boone indicator are the 
most prominent, non-structural measures of competition
1
. 
                                                          
1
 For a detail discussion of non-structural measures, see Chapter five.  
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According to the World Bank, financial stability is the absence of bank runs, 
hyperinflation or a crash in stock markets (The World Bank, 2016). Stability is specifically about 
the strength of the financial system to handle adverse shocks. Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
collect data on financial crises from 1970-2011 and identify 147 banking crises events. A 
banking crisis is considered as “systemic” when there are significant signs of financial distress in 
the financial system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or 
bank liquidations) accompanied by significant intervention measures (Laeven & Valencia, 2008). 
The interconnectedness of the financial system raises the possibility that banking crises can spill 
over to other components of the financial system. As a result, banking crises often occur 
simultaneously with sovereign debt or currency crises (Laeven & Valencia, 2012). 
  In the literature, the impact of crises are identified as a decline in output growth, a 
decline in investments, an increase in debt, or an increase in fiscal cost (Hutchison & Noy, 2005; 
Joyce & Nabar, 2009; Laeven & Valencia, 2012). It is generally agreed that banking crises 
generate a more severe impact on economic growth than currency or debt crises (Cerra & 
Saxena, 2008). Banking crises account for a loss of annual growth of approximately 3 to 3.5 
percent of GDP. In addition to that, banking crises associated with currency or debt crises slow 
down economic growth and change the scope of future development prospects (Demirgüç-Kunt 
& Detragiache, 2005). The combined effect of banking and currency crises can account for up to 
13 to 18 percent of GDP.  
On average, the duration of banking crises or twin crises is within the range of 3 to 4 
years (Hutchison & Noy, 2005; Laeven & Valencia, 2012). The results of Laeven and Valencia 
(2012) find that  on average, the output loss is 33 percent of GDP and the increase in public debt 
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is 21 percent of GDP in  advanced economies
2
 (Laeven & Valencia, 2012). The severity of the 
crisis in advanced economies depends on the interconnectedness of financial institutions (Cerra 
& Saxena, 2008). Given the economic significance of banking crises, regulators and policy-
makers have questioned whether more (or less) competition in the banking sector would be 
desirable. 
Theoretical views on bank competition and stability differ. The competition-fragility 
hypothesis holds that an increase in competition leads to a decline in bank profits. As a 
consequence, banks' risk preferences increase to the point where they do not sufficiently 
safeguard themselves (Allen & Gale, 2004; Keeley, 1990; Marcus, 1984). In contrast, the 
competition-stability hypothesis argues that competition promotes financial stability. When there 
are a few large banks, the operations of banks are very complex and more difficult to supervise. 
Further, they receive “too-big-to-fail” subsidies from the regulatory authorities. This encourages 
risk-taking behaviour. On the flip side, competition in lending results in lower interest rates 
charged on loans. Low interest rates attract low-risk taking borrowers and reduce the amount of 
non-performing loans. There are less adverse selection and moral hazard issues in competitive 
banking systems. Together, these arguments support the competition-stability hypothesis (Boyd 
& De Nicolo, 2005; Boyd, De Nicolo, & Jalal, 2006; Jiang, Levine, & Lin, 2017; Schaeck & 
Cihak, 2014; Schaeck et al., 2009).  
1.2 Research Questions 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between bank competition and 
financial stability. This broader research aim is narrowed down to three specific research 
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questions. The first question is “are competitive banking systems really more stable?” The 
competition-stability hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between bank competition and 
stability. This thesis addresses this question by performing a replication of a study that finds 
more competitive banks are less likely to experience systemic crises (Schaeck et al., 2009). The 
second question is “what is the effect of bank competition on stability?” Meta-analysis is used to 
aggregate the results from the empirical literature to come up with an overall estimate of the 
effect of bank competition on stability. The final question is “how does bank competition affect 
stability?” The question is addressed using bank-level data from the US for the period 2000-
2017.  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter two replicates the work of Schaeck et al. (2009) titled “Are Competitive Banking 
Systems More Stable?” The replication begins by reproducing key findings using the authors’ 
data and code. It then updates the control variables of the study with currently available data 
from the same and alternative data sources. The analysis then extends the sample period to 1980-
2011 (from 1980-2005) and re-estimates the key models. Finally, alternative measures of 
competition and financial stability are used to see whether the conclusions of Schaeck et al. 
(2009) are robust to these changes.  
The literature gives conflicting results about the relationship between bank competition 
and financial stability. Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) do a meta-regression analysis (MRA) to 
collect empirical results from the literature on competition and stability. When the different 
estimates are aggregated and analysed, they find an overall negative but small effect of 
competition on stability. Chapter three replicates Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) using their data 
and code, obtaining identical results. Subjectivity can play an important role in categorizing 
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various variables. Accordingly, the chapter proceeds by re-coding the same studies as Zigraiova 
and Havranek (2016) to determine whether this affects the results.  
Chapter four uses the same specifications as the third chapter, but applies these to a 
different sample of studies to estimate how bank competition effect financial stability. It collects 
762 estimates from 35 studies to address the research question, “what is the effect of bank 
competition on stability?”  
Chapter five builds on the lessons learned from chapters three and four. Those chapters 
found that results can vary depending on the measures used for competition and stability. 
Chapter five computes multiple competition and stability measures using bank-level data from 
the USA over the period 2000-2017. The bank-level competition measures are H-statistic, the 
Lerner index, and the Boone indicator. The stability measures include two types. Z-score, non-
performing loans, and distance-to-default are bank-level stability measures. Logistic R-squared 
and the change in conditional value at risk are systemic stability measures.  
The final chapter concludes by summarizing key findings from all the chapters. 
1.4 Key Findings 
This section presents key findings from each chapter. The replication of Schaeck et al. 
(2009) finds that, using the authors’ data and code, bank competition, as measured by H-statistic, 
is positively associated with stability. However, when the data are updated with currently 
available data from the same and alternative data sources, the results of Schaeck et al. (2009) 
cannot be reproduced. The H-statistic is always statistically insignificant at the 5 percent level. 




As a robustness test, Chapter 2 uses Z-score as an alternative measure of stability. The 
effect of H-statistic on stability continues to be statistically insignificant. In addition to statistical 
insignificance, the estimated effects for H-statistic are small in terms of economic significance. 




 percentile is associated with a reduction in the 
probability of systemic crisis by 0.1 percentage points. A similar change in H-statistic is 
associated with a reduction in the inverse probability of default (Z-score) by 0.17 percentage 
points. Chapter 2 includes the Lerner index and the Boone indicator as additional competition 
measures. Both these measures remain insignificant in the analysis.  
Chapter 3 replicates Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) and finds that the pure replication 
results match the original results reported by the authors. The mean partial correlation between 
competition and stability is estimated to be insignificant in both statistical and economic terms. 
Chapter 3 recodes the same 31 studies used by Zigraiova and Havranek (2016), using the same 
study and data characteristics, to see if subjectivity in coding produces different results. While 
the results are not identical, the overall conclusion is the same.  
Chapter 4 repeats the analysis by collecting a new sample of more recent studies on 
banking competition and financial stability. It analyses 35 additional studies, with 762 additional 
estimates. The results are largely the same as Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) with respect to the 
estimated relationship between competition and stability. Chapters 3 and 4 also find that there 
are systematic differences in estimated competition effects depending on the specific measures 
used for competition and stability. 
The results of chapter five confirm the findings of the previous two chapters. It finds that 
the relationship between bank competition and stability varies depending on the competition and 
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stability measures used. When Z-score is used to measure stability, all the competition measures 
are estimated to be negatively associated with stability. A similar relationship is observed when 
distance-to-default is used to measure stability. However, the results are not statistically 
significant. Somewhat different results obtain when non-performing loans are used to measure 
financial stability. In this case, the Lerner index and the Boone indicator are estimated to be 
positively associated with stability. Despite these differences, the associated economic 
significance for all the competition measures is very small. When the analysis turns to systemic 
stability, none of the estimated competition variables are statistically significant.  
1.5 Implications and Contribution of the Research 
There has been much interest among policymakers and researchers as to whether bank 
competition influences the stability of the financial system. This thesis undertakes an extensive 
analysis and investigates three research questions related to this subject.  
The results suggest that there is only a very small association between bank competition 
and financial stability. It does not find evidence to support the view that more competitive 
banking systems are less likely to experience crises. An implication of this finding is that the 
competitive structure of the banking sector does not hold the key to improving financial stability. 
As such, the findings from this thesis will hopefully encourage researchers to look elsewhere for 






In 2009, Klaus Schaeck, Martin Cihak, and Simon Wolfe (henceforth SCW) published a 
paper in the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking entitled “Are Competitive Banking Systems 
More Stable. SCW examined the relationship between the competitive conduct of banking 
systems and financial stability. They estimated the relationship between the competitiveness of 
the banking system and the risk of a systemic crisis with the intention of providing empirical 
evidence for conflicting views on bank competition and financial stability. This chapter 
replicates SCW and examines whether competition in the banking system contributes to financial 
stability or instability. 
The replication consists of six parts; (a) re-analysis of the data using the dataset provided 
by the authors of the paper, (b) updating of their dataset using multiple sources such as World 
Development Indicators, International Financial Statistics, Global Development Index Database, 
Deposit Insurance Database, Global Financial Development database, and DataMarket, (c) re-
analysis with an extended sample period, (d) re-analysis using a different measure of stability, (e) 
re-analysis using alternative measures of bank competition, and (f) re-analysis excluding the 
effect of the global financial crisis (GFC). A summary of the findings follows.  
SCW use Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic as a measure of bank competition and find 
that (i) more competitive banking systems are less likely to experience a systemic crisis, and (ii) 
increased competition in the banking system is associated with greater stability. Findings of the 
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replication exercise in this chapter confirm the authors’ findings using their data. This chapter 
then proceeds by updating data from the same data sources used by SCW, as well as using other 
sources that provide data for the same variable. This allows making a comparison between the 
values of the variables and at the same time to increase the number of data points.  
The updated values of data are different compared to SCW’s dataset. When the data are 
updated with recently published data, SCW’s conclusions are no longer valid and the H-statistic 
variable is always statistically insignificant. The associated t-statistic drops from 2 to 1 using the 
updated data. In contrast, the bank concentration variable confirms SCW’s findings and shows 
that more concentration is associated with greater stability. This suggests that if SCW had 
conducted their analysis with more recently published data, they would not have come to the 
same conclusion about competition and financial stability that they presented in their paper.  
The inclusion of alternative measures of competition and stability finds that the 
relationship between bank competition and stability varies based on the selected measure. There 
is no consistency in the results and all the competition measures are statistically insignificant, 
with the associated t-statistics substantially small (<1) in most cases. While the concentration 
variable confirms SCW’s conclusion and is positively associated with financial stability, the 
results are statically insignificant in half of the regressions.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 explains the theoretical 
and empirical views on bank competition and financial stability. Section 2.3 discusses the 
original paper of SCW. Section 2.4 explains the econometric approach of SCW. Section 2.5 
presents the replication results. Section 2.6 updates control variables from various data sources 
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and presents regression results based on updated data. Section 2.7 re-estimates regressions using 
data for an extended sample period. Section 2.8 re-estimates the models using Z-score as an 
alternative measure of stability. Section 2.9 estimates the effect size of the H-statistic. Section 
2.10 re-estimates the models using the Lerner index and Boone indicator as alternative measures 
of competition. Section 2.11 performs the analysis by excluding the global financial crisis 
episodes. Section 2.12 summarizes the conclusions.  
2.2 Theoretical and Empirical Views on Bank Competition and Financial Stability 
There are two opposing theoretical views on bank competition and financial stability. 
One view holds that more competition is associated with financial instability. The increase in 
competition leads to a decline in bank profits and, consequently, the bank’s preference for risk 
increases. This makes them more vulnerable to financial shocks, which increases the risk of bank 
failure (Allen & Gale, 2004; Keeley, 1990; Marcus, 1984). 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)  introduce an alternative explanation for how more 
competition can lead to greater stability. In a less competitive banking system, failure of a large 
bank may easily spill over to other financial institutions, creating instability in the entire 
financial system. To prevent this situation, regulatory authorities implement policies to protect 
large banking institutions (Mishkin, 2006). However, these policies encourage risk-taking 
behaviour of large banks and increase the probability of failure. A similar view is provided by 
Caminal and Matutes (2002) who claim that there is a higher probability of bankruptcy in a 
monopolist environment compared to a competitive environment. Increasing competition reduces 
the power of individual players and thus reduces the risk of failure.  
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Traditionally empirical researchers have used structural measures as proxy measures of 
bank competition. Structural measures mainly relate to the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
paradigm (Berger et al., 2004). Based on the SCP paradigm, concentration is considered as 
“structure” and the “conduct” is competition. This approach measures the influence of 
concentrated banking structures on competitive conduct (Bikker & Haaf, 2002b). The most 
common measures of “structure” are concentration ratios and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI).  
More recently, researchers have argued that concentration is an inappropriate measure of 
competition because a high concentration ratio does not necessarily indicate a lack of 
competition. The concentration ratio is computed by using the market share of the largest banks, 
which does not indicate the competitiveness of the banks (Beck, 2008; Bikker & Haaf, 2002a; 
Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Schaeck & Cihak, 2014; Schaeck et al., 2009). Therefore, recent 
literature uses non-structural measures to gauge the competition.  
The most common non-structural measures are the H-statistic, the Lerner index, and the 
Boone indicator (Agoraki, Delis, & Pasiouras, 2011; Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, & Zhu, 2014; 
Schaeck & Cihak, 2014; Yeyati & Micco, 2007). These measures consider the reaction of banks’ 
outputs to their inputs (Beck, 2008). There are pros and cons for each of these measures and 
none of them are perfect measures of competition
3
. 
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2.3 Discussion of the Original Paper 
Schaeck et al. (2009) has been cited 479 times in Google Scholar and 127 times in Web 
of Science (June 2018). It is an improved version of their International Monetary Fund working 
paper. SCW conduct an empirical analysis of the likelihood and timing of a banking crisis and its 
relationship with the competitive character of the banking system. Their study suggests that 
policy makers should promote competition in the banking system because there is a positive 
association between bank competition and financial stability. SCW’s paper focuses on three 
main areas:  Firstly, use of H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) as a better 
measurement of competition. Secondly, application of duration analysis with time-varying 
covariates to assess the timing of crises. And thirdly, simultaneous incorporation of the 
concentration ratio and the H-statistic to capture both “bank conduct” and “bank structure”. 
SCW’s sample consists of 45 countries from 1980 to 2005 (Refer Appendix 5).  The 
dependent variable of the study is a dummy variable that takes value “1” if a given country had 
experienced a systemic crisis in a particular year or “0” otherwise. The main explanatory 
variables are the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic and the three-bank concentration ratio. The 
H-statistic measures market power by the extent to which a change in input prices is reflected in 
the equilibrium revenues of the bank (Bikker & Haaf, 2002a). The thee-bank concentration is the 
proportion of assets held by the three largest banks of the country.  
Additionally, SCW include control variables for growth of the gross domestic production 
(GDP), inflation, real interest rate, depreciation in the foreign exchange rate, terms of trade, 
credit growth as macroeconomic controls, and a moral hazard index to capture the increasing risk 
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as a result of deposit insurance scheme. SCW use a set of dummy variables as controls for legal 
origin of countries, and regional dummies to control for different economic development in 
Africa, Latin America, the group of 10 (G10), and other economies. They find that more 
competitive banking systems are less vulnerable to a systemic crisis, and that the time to crisis 
increases in a competitive environment. Bank concentration also decreases the probability of a 
crisis and increases the time to crisis. Their results confirm that competition and concentration 
are different characteristics of banking system.  
2.4 Econometric Approach  
SCW use two estimation methods in their paper: duration models and binary choice 
(logit) models.   
2.4.1 H-Statistic 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic is extensively used as a measure of competition in 
many studies: Bikker and Haaf (2002a); Bolt and Humphrey (2015); Casu and Girardone (2006); 
Claessens and Laeven (2004); Leon (2015); Matthews, Murinde, and Zhao (2007); Maudos and 
Solís (2011); Molyneux, Lloyd-Williams, and Thornton (1994); Schaeck et al. (2009); Yeyati 
and Micco (2007). 
The H-statistic measures the extent to which input prices are incorporated in bank 
revenues, either from interest or from all sources (total). The H-statistic is estimated as follows: 
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                              ,                                  (2.1) 
where Pit is the ratio of interest revenue to total assets (proxy for output price), W1 is the ratio of 
interest expenses to total deposits and money market funding (as a proxy for the input price of 
deposits), W2 is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets (as a proxy for the price of labour), 
and W3 is the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to total assets (as a proxy for 
the price of fixed capital), with i denoting bank i and t denoting time t. Y1 is a control variable for 
the ratio of equity to total assets, Y2 controls for the ratio of net loans to total assets, and Y3 is the 
log of total assets to capture size effects. D is a vector of year dummies for 1998–2005 (the 
dummy for 1998 is dropped to avoid perfect collinearity). All non-dummy variables are entered 
in equation (2.1) in logs. The H-statistic is calculated as β1i + β2i + β3i (Claessens & Laeven, 
2004; Schaeck et al., 2009).  The estimation method of H-statistic is diverse in the literature. 
Claessens and Laeven (2004); Schaeck et al. (2009) estimated the equation (2.1) using two 
estimation methods. They have employed OLS with time dummies and GLS with time dummies. 
The OLS estimation is inefficient and produces invalid standard errors when the errors are 
nonspherical. The common nonspherical errors are heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The 
GLS produced efficient coefficients and robust standard errors with the presence of nonspherical 
error structures. This chapter follows the estimation method of Schaeck et al. (2009). Olszak, 
S´witala, and Kowalska (2013) used random effects and fixed effects GLS and Pawlowska 




An alternative approach to estimating H-statistic uses a different dependent variable:  
                                                                                      
                                           ,       (2.2) 
where Rit is the ratio of total revenue to total assets (as a proxy for output price), W1 is the ratio 
of interest expenses to total deposits and money market funding (as a proxy for the input price of 
deposits), W2 is the ratio of personnel expense to total assets (as a proxy for the price of labour), 
and W3 is the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to total assets (as a proxy for 
the price of fixed capital), with i denoting bank i and t denoting time t. Y1 is a control variable for 
the ratio of equity to total assets, Y2 controls for the ratio of net loans to total assets, and Y3 is the 
log of total assets. D is a vector of year dummies for 1998–2005. Equation (2.2) is also estimated 
using OLS with time dummies and GLS with fixed effects and time dummies.  
The overall H-statistic is the average of the four estimation models
4
. The sum of the 
elasticities of revenue with respect to input prices is negative for monopolist, equal to 1 for a 
competitive price-taking firm and within the range of 0 to 1 for monopolistic competition. Some 
studies criticize the use of H-statistic as a measure of competition.  
Bikker, Shaffer, and Spierdijk (2012) argue that the price equation is inappropriate for 
measuring competitive conduct, and that the relationship between the H-statistic and the 
competition is subjective to the selected cost function. Shaffer and Spierdijk (2015) demonstrate 
that higher values of the H-statistic may not reflect more competitive market conditions, and 
                                                          
4
 Schaeck et al. (2009) employed four different estimation methods and averaged the values of H-statistic to 
produce an estimate of the true value of H-statistic (page 715 – footnote 9). 
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there can be situations where the H-statistic is positive for a monopoly. As a result, this chapter 
considers other measures of competition in the later sections.  
2.4.2 Duration analysis   
Duration models with time-varying covariates model the time to transition from a stable 
banking system to a systemic banking crisis. When there is no crisis event for a particular 
country, then the full time span is considered for the analysis (i.e., a right-censored spell). 
Duration models are also able to take into account multiple crisis events per country. A positive 
sign indicates a longer time period until a country experiences a crisis event, hence greater 
stability. Diallo (2015); Schaeck et al. (2009) estimate the relationship between competition and 
stability using the duration model.  
2.4.3 Logit analysis  
Logit estimation is widely used in the literature to estimate the probability of 
experiencing a banking crisis (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache, 1998, 2005). SCW also employ the logit model where the estimation is run for a 
pooled sample.   
                                                                         ,                                               
                                                                                                                   (2.3) 
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where P(i,t) is a dummy variable that takes the value “1” when a banking crisis occurs in 
country i at time t or “0” otherwise, β is the vector of coefficients, and X(i,t) is a matrix of 
explanatory variables. F(β′X(i, t)) is the cumulative probability distribution function for the 
logistic distribution evaluated at β’X(i,t) (Schaeck et al., 2009). 
In the logit model, the coefficients estimate the effect of a change in the explanatory 
variables on the probability that a banking crisis occurs.  The effect of a change in one 
variable depends on the values of all the explanatory variables. While the sign of the 
coefficient indicates the direction of the change, the size depends on the slope of the 
cumulative distribution function, which in turn depends on the value of B′X(i,t). A variable 
that positively contributes to stability will have a negative coefficient in the logit estimation, 
indicating a lower probability of experiencing a crisis. 
2.5 Replication of SCW 
SCW generously provided their data and Stata do files to re-produce their results. The 
dependent variable in SCW’s study is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a particular 
country in a particular year met one of the following four criteria: (i) emergency measures 
such as deposit freezes or bank holidays are implemented, (ii) large-scale bank 
nationalizations take place, (iii) nonperforming assets reach at least 10% of total assets, or (iv) 
fiscal cost of the rescue operations reach 2% of gross domestic production (GDP) (Schaeck et 
al., 2009). SCW obtain their data on bank crises from Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 




2.5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics published by SCW and the recalculated summary 
statistics using data provided by SCW. The reproduction exercise produces the same summary 
statistics, except GDP growth (lagged by one period) and the rate of inflation. Details of all the 
variables are given in Appendix 1
5
. The regression results of Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show that the 
data provided by SCW enable close matching of their regression results. As the data provided by 
SCW enabled close reproduction of their results, and as the summary statistics for GDP growth 
and the rate of inflation were substantially different from what they reported in their paper, this 
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 Data and Codes to reproduce the results of Tables 2.1 through 2.17 are available on 





 Summary Statistics 
 
Original  Replication 
 
N Mean Std. dev N Mean Std. dev 
GDP growth (lag) 734 3.4505 3.3066 734 -0.0131 3.7523 
Inflation 734 15.0287 43.5508 734 1.8835 1.1701 
Real interest rate 734 1.1214 18.5509 734 1.1214 18.5509 
Depreciation 734 2.188 3.0281 734 2.188 3.0281 
Terms of trade 734 4.0984 2.0101 734 4.0984 2.0101 
Credit growth 734 11.2683 28.7674 734 11.2683 28.7674 
Moral hazard index 734 1.3058 0.7231 734 1.3058 0.7231 
German legal origin 734 0.0886 0.2843 734 0.0886 0.2843 
French legal origin 734 0.3965 0.4895 734 0.3965 0.4895 
Scandinavian legal origin 734 0.0831 0.2762 734 0.0831 0.2762 
British legal origin 734 0.3910 0.4884 734 0.3910 0.4883 
Africa dummy 734 0.1267 0.3329 734 0.1267 0.3329 
Other dummy 734 0.4482 0.4977 734 0.4482 0.4977 
Latin America dummy 734 0.2057 0.4045 734 0.2057 0.4045 
G10 dummy 734 0.2193 0.4141 734 0.2193 0.4141 
Concentration 734 0.6734 0.1617 734 0.6734 0.1617 
H-statistic (H1) 707 0.3224 0.207 707 0.3224 0.207 
H-statistic (H2) 707 0.2915 0.2228 N/A 
Private credit/GDP 684 0.4485 0.3081 684 0.4485 0.3081 
Foreign ownership 444 0.1499 0.1708 444 0.1499 0.1708 
Government ownership 723 0.4697 0.3304 723 0.4697 0.3304 




Original  Replication 
 
N Mean Std. dev N Mean Std. dev 
Entry restrictions 663 7.0573 1.5958 663 7.0573 1.5958 
Capital regulatory index 663 6.2054 1.5667 663 6.2054 1.5667 
Official supervisory 
power 663 10.6991 2.4318 663 10.6991 2.4318 
Private monitoring index 511 8.1037 1.2379 511 8.1037 1.2379 
Note. The left side of the table reports the original results of Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 1 
in SCW (page 718) and the right side of the table reports the replication results from authors’ 
data. N/A = the data to reproduce the alternative H-statistic is not available in the authors’ 
dataset.  
2.5.2 Replicating results in paper with provided data 
The main results of the SCW’s paper are presented in Table 3 (pages 722-723). SCW’s 
Table 3 shows the results obtained with the duration model in columns (1) – (4) and logit model 
in columns (5) – (8). Columns (1) and (4) report coefficients of other control variables apart from 
H-statistic and concentration. Columns (2) and (6) include the H-statistic into the model. Bank 
concentration ratio is added to the model in columns (3) and (7).  Finally, an interaction term 
between H-statistic and Concentration is added to columns (4) and (8).  
Table 2.2 presents a comparison of the original paper and the replication of the duration 
models. The estimated coefficient results of the replication closely match SCW’s results. The H-
statistic in columns (2) is a positive coefficient of 1.6977 and is significant at the 10 percent 
significance level. The H-statistic in column (3) is also a positive coefficient of 2.3482 and is 
significant at the 5 percent significance level. It shows that the inclusion of the concentration 
variable increases the coefficient value of the H-statistic. A statistically significant positive 
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coefficient value of H-statistic indicates that the time to crisis increases with greater competition 
and it supports the view that competition increases banking system stability.  
The concentration variable in column (3) shows a positive coefficient of 3.0834 and is 
significant at the 1 percent significance level. It indicates that survival time is greater in a more 
concentrated banking system. Both H-statistic and concentration are statistically significant. This 
led SCW to conclude that these two variables are not the same and describe different 
characteristics of banking systems, with the H-statistic capturing the effect of competition, and 
concentration capturing the market share of large banks in the banking system.  
In addition to the main explanatory variables, other control variables also describe the 
time to crisis. When there is a decrease in real interest rate, terms of trade, and credit growth, it is 
associated with an increase in time to crisis. Depreciation of the exchange rates increases the 
expected time to crisis. The moral hazard index shows that deposit insurance schemes decrease 
the time to crisis. Countries with French legal origin indicate that they are more likely to 
experience a crisis compared to countries with British legal origin. African countries tend to 
experience more crises compared to the G10 countries. Countries from other parts of the world, 
other than African and Latin American regions, are also likely to experience more crises 





 Replication of Key Duration Models with Authors’ Data 
Variable 
Column (2) Column (3) 
Original Replication Original Replication 
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-1.1901*    
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(0.9700)       




(0.9595)        
Observations 701 701 701 701 
Note. This table reports the original results of SCW and the replication results of Columns (2) 
and (3) of Table 3 in SCW (page 722-723). The dependent variable is the log of time to crisis. 
The numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, 
clustered on country. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent 
significance levels.  
Table 2.3 compares logit estimates from the original paper with their respective 
replications
6
. H-statistic and Concentration are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The 
negative coefficient values of H-statistic and Concentration indicate that the probability of a 
banking crisis is smaller for more competitive and more concentrated banking systems. Lagged 
values of GDP growth, inflation, terms of trade, and French legal origin are also statistically 
significant in the logit estimation model. GDP growth decreases the probability of crisis. 
Inflation and terms of trade indicate increase the probability of a crisis. Countries with French 
                                                          
6
 SCW report heteroscedasticity robust standard errors for their logit estimates. Table 2.3 follows the same 
procedure to report the results. However, in subsequent analysis this chapter uses cluster robust standard errors when 
estimating logit models. In most cases this reduced standard errors, enhancing statistical significance. 
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legal origin have a greater probability of experiencing crises compared to countries with British 
legal origin.  
Both Tables 2.2 and 2.3 find that competition is positively associated with greater 
financial stability.  Bank concentration is also positively associated with financial stability. Beck 
et al. (2006); Demsetz and Strahan (1997) also support the view that more concentrated banking 
systems can diversify their risk and be more stable. The replication results match the reported 
results of SCW and confirm SCW’s findings using their data. 
Table 2.3 
 Replication of Key Logit Models with Authors’ Data 
Variable 
Column (6) Column (7) 
Original Replication Original Replication 

























































Column (6) Column (7) 
Original Replication Original Replication 













































































Observations 707 707 707 707 
Note. This table reports the original results and the replication results of Columns (6) and (7) of 
Table 3 in SCW (page 722-723). The dependent variable takes the value 1 if there has been a 
systemic crisis for that country in that year, and 0 otherwise. The numbers in parentheses below 
estimated coefficients are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, as per SCW’s analysis. *, **, 
and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent significance levels.  
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2.6 Updating the Control Variables  
The next step of the replication exercise is to update the values of control variables to 
examine if substituting updated values gives the same results. The Data Appendix in SCW 
provided the data sources they used for their data collection. For example, SCW use World Bank 
Development Indicators (WDI) to obtain values for GDP growth, inflation, and terms of trade. 
They use International Financial Statistics (IFS) for depreciation.  
This chapter uses the same data sources as SCW to update their variables, as well as 
some alternative data sources. Van-Bergeijk (2016) reports that macroeconomic data are 
continuously being updated and different versions can differ substantially. This chapter also 
finds that there are substantial differences between the original data provided by SCW and the 
updated data. For example, Inflation for Brazil in 1980 is 4.5% in SCW’s data. But, it is 87.3% 
from the currently reported value from the same data source WDI. To maintain the accuracy of 
data, another alternative data source is considered. Inflation for Brazil in 1980 is 91.2% in IFS. 
That value is different from both the original dataset and WDI, but still closer to the latter. In 
updating the data, several problems were encountered. First, SCW’s original dataset contains 
values for variables for which corresponding values are not available in either the updated, same 
data source or alternative data sources. This leads to a reduction in the number of observations in 
the updated dataset. The second problem is that the same source no longer provides the historical 
data. In such instances, an alternative data source was used if possible. 
Table 2.4 presents the differences in the original and updated data. It reports descriptive 
statistics for various data sources using a common set of observations to ensure that any 
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differences presented in the Table 2.4 are mainly due to changes in the variable values. In this 
case, to be included in the table, the observation must fulfil two criteria; (i) the observation has 
been used in the estimation of column (3) of Table 3 in SCW (page 722-723), and (ii) the 
observation is available in the updated data. This assures that differences are not due to changes 
in observations from different countries or different time periods. 
The top panel of Table 2.4 reports descriptive statistics for lagged GDP growth from 
three data sources: SCW’s original dataset, WDI, and IFS.  There are 699 common observations 
from all three data sources. An asterisk indicates that this is the data source used by SCW. The 
original dataset of SCW produces a mean lagged GDP growth rate of -0.0197%. For the same 
observations, WDI and IFS data provide a mean lagged GDP growth rates of 3.556% and 
3.679%, respectively. This shows differences in the original and updated data. This is a common 
problem for all the control variables in Table 2.4. Data from alternative sources give similar 
values compared to the updated values from the same source used by SCW. This confirms that 
the original data reported by SCW and current data from the same data source are not 
compatible. Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 investigate whether SCW’s findings are maintained when 
the regressions are re-estimated with the updated control variables.  
Table 2.4 
 Descriptive Statistics for Original and Updated Data (Common Observations) 
Variable Data Source N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP growth (lag) 
Original 699 -0.0197 3.731 -17.333 25.572 
WDI* 699 3.556 3.399 -13.128 21.829 
IFS 699 3.679 3.797 -8.857 52.554 
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Variable Data Source N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Inflation 
Original 691 1.854 1.166 -4.257 6.439 
WDI* 691 15.085 45.013 -0.929 625.802 
IFS 691 15.169 44.896 -4.410 620.840 
DataMarket 691 15.085 45.013 -0.929 625.802 
Depreciation 
Original 332 2.835 2.546 -4.760 8.868 
IFS* 332 0.083 0.250 -0.282 3.219 
WDI 332 0.083 0.250 -0.282 3.219 
DataMarket 332 0.083 0.250 -0.282 3.219 
Terms of trade 
Original 404 4.626 0.197 3.931 5.305 
WDI* 404 0.312 10.945 -46.653 67.797 
DataMarket 404 1.409 15.754 -63.605 169.845 
Real interest rate‡ 
Original 591 2.159 16.931 -312.233 41.110 
WDI 591 7.231 9.505 -35.078 76.428 
DataMarket 591 7.225 9.505 -35.078 76.428 
Credit growth‡ 
Original 698 108.092 282.845 -811.882 3393.340 
WDI 698 15.887 93.366 -1605.175 541.081 
GFDD 698 15.759 93.416 -1605.175 541.081 
Moral hazard 
index‡ 
Original 544 1.664 0.259 0.000 1.940 
DID 544 0.289 2.774 -11.862 4.618 
Note. The values in the table make a comparison of descriptive statistics across different data 
sources. “Original” refers to the data provided by SCW. The other data sources are World 
Development Indicators (WDI), International Financial Statistics (IFS), Global Financial 
Development Database (GFDD), Deposit Insurance Database (DID), and DataMarket. Table 2.4 
reports descriptive statistics for various data sources using a common set of observations. This 
ensured that differences were due to different values across data sources, and not because 
different observations were used to calculate the descriptive statistics. An asterisk indicates that 




‡ indicates a different data source use to update the data. The reasons are given below. 
Real interest rate: SCW state that they calculated real interest rates as “nominal interest rate 
minus the rate of inflation” and data sourced from International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
However, IFS reports various interest rates and inflation rates. The available interest rates are 
Central Bank policy rate, money market rate, Treasury bill rate, deposit rate, lending rate and 
government bond rates. The available inflation rates are consumer price index and GDP deflator. 
Not knowing the exact rates used by SCW to calculate their real interest data, researcher instead 
used the variables identified as “real interest rate” in WDI and DataMarket databases when 
updating the data. 
Credit growth: Credit growth is based on the domestic credit to the private sector. SCW used IFS 
data in their paper. However, these data are not currently available from IFS. Therefore, WDI 
and GFDD databases are used when updating the data. 
Moral hazard index: SCW obtained data for their moral hazard index from Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002). These data were updated by Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2014). The 
updated values for this variable are collected from this latter source. 
 
2.6.1 Re-estimating the key models for common observations 
Table 2.5 reports a comparison of estimated results using original and updated data from 
the same data source for the same time period (1980-2005). This table uses updated control 
variables with SCW’s H-statistic and concentration values. These results are based on common 
observations. SCW’s paper reports results from 701 observations for the duration models and 
707 observations for the logit models. However, when setting common observations, the number 
of observations drops to 222 for the duration models and 218 for the logit models. The H-statistic 
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in three of the columns (2, 6, and 7) using the 
original data. However, when re-estimated with the updated data, the statistical significance of 
the H-statistic disappears. The coefficient values report the same sign as the original data, 
however the average of the associated t-statistics drops from 2 to 1. For example, the t-statistic of 
H-statistic is 2.17 in panel A - column (2). It drops to 1.23 in panel B - column (2).  Note that 
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any differences in estimates are exclusively due to updating the variables, and not due to 
differences in the composition of the samples, since the observations are the same. Turning to the 
concentration variable, it is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level using either the 
original or the updated data.  
 
Table 2.5 
 Replication of Key Models Using Updated Data (Same Source) /Common Observations 
Variable 
Duration models Logit models 
(2) (3) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Original data 
H-statistic 
2.7960** 
(1.2908)         
1.9825 











Observations 222 222 218 218 
Panel B: Updated data – Same sources 
H-statistic 
3.9171 
(3.1742)         
     3.3610 











Observations 222 222 218 218 
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Note. The column headings indicate that the respective estimates refer to estimating the models 
in Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) from Table 3 in SCW (page 722 and 723). Only the competition 
and concentration coefficients are reported. All datasets used in the table consist of subsamples 
of the observations used to estimate the original specifications in SCW. The table consists of two 
panels. Panel A uses SCW’s original dataset and panel B uses updates variable values from the 
same data sources as SCW. Both panels use the identical set of observations. Note that there are 
variables values that are available in SCW’s original dataset, for which updated values are not 
available; and variables for which current values are available, but for which values are missing 
in SCW’s original dataset. For this reason, the number of observations in each panel is less than 
the original number of observations used by SCW. The numbers in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, clustered on country. *, **, and ***, indicate 
significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent significance levels.  
Table 2.6 repeats the same exercise as Table 2.5. Table 2.5 limits the data collection to 
the same data sources used by SCW. Table 2.6 collects data from alternative sources to increase 
the number of observations. The data source is decided based on the maximum number of 
observations. This table also uses a common set of observations for data collected from multiple 
sources. There are 474 observations for the duration models and 479 observations for the logit 
models. Panels A and B use the same set of observations.  
Panel A, using the original data before updating, shows coefficient values of the H-
statistic variable that are of the expected sign and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, 
confirming the view that competition increases stability. The updated data from multiple sources 
also produce estimated coefficients of the same sign and similar size compared to the original 
data. However, in none of the columns is H-statistic statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
The concentration variable is statistically significant in both panels. The coefficient values of H-





Replication of Key Models Using Updated Data (Multiple Sources) /Common Observations 
Variable 
Duration models Logit models 
(2) (3) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Original data 
H-statistic 
2.5688** 
(1.1370)         
2.6843** 











Observations 474 474 479 479 
















Observations 474 474 479 479 
Note. The column headings of the table indicate that the respective estimates refer to estimating 
the models in Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) from Table 3 in SCW (page 722 and 723). Only the 
competition and concentration coefficients are reported. Panel A uses SCW’s original dataset. 
Panel B expands the number of data sources, choosing the one that maximizes the number of 
observations available for estimation. Both panels use identical sets of observations. Note that 
there are variable values that are available in SCW’s original dataset, for which updated values 
are not available; and variables for which current values are available, but where values were 
missing in SCW’s original dataset. For this reason, the number of observations in each panel is 
less than the original number of observations used by SCW. The numbers in parentheses below 
estimated coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, clustered on country. *, **, and ***, 




2.6.2 Re-estimating the key models for maximum observations 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present results for common observations in order to focus on the effect 
of data updating with identical observations. This section re-estimates the models using all 
available observations. Table 2.7 presents results in two panels. Panel A reports estimation 
results from the same data source used by SCW. Panel B reports results from multiple data 
sources.  
Strikingly, H-statistic is now statistically insignificant in both panels A and B. Further, 
the estimated coefficient values are relatively small compared to previous results in Table 2.2 
and 2.3. However, the results show the same relationship between competition and stability. For 
example, in Column (2) of Table 2.2, SCW’s reported coefficient value of H-statistic is 1.6977. 
The associated coefficient estimates are 0.9160 and 0.2551 in panels A and B, respectively. The 
associated t-statistic is 1.93 in Table 2.2, compared to t-statistics less than 1 in both panels of 
Table 2.7. In contrast, the results for the concentration variable continue to confirm SCW’s 





 Replication of Key Models Using Updated Data: 1980-2005 
Variable 
Duration models Logit models 
(2) (3) (6) (7) 
















Observations 327 327 331 331 
















Observations 679 679 682 682 
Note. The column headings indicate that the respective estimates refer to estimating the models 
in Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) from Table 3 in SCW (page 722-723). Only the competition and 
concentration coefficients are reported. Panels A and B are identical to panel B in Tables 2.5 and 
2.6, except that all available observations are used, even if the observations were not included in 
SCW’s original analysis. The numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients are cluster 
robust standard errors, clustered on country. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, 
and 1-percent significance levels.  
Overall, the results for H-statistic using the updated data have the same sign as the 
original estimates. However, the estimated coefficients are smaller in absolute value and 
statistically insignificant. Therefore, the updated data fail to confirm that more competition leads 
to greater financial stability. The concentration variable is consistent with the findings reported 
by SCW, with coefficient sizes of approximately the same size, and statistically significant.  
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2.7 Estimation of Results with an Extended Sample Period  
The previous sections of this chapter used data from the same sample period of 1980-
2005 as SCW. Since updated data from the same data sources and multiple sources failed to 
confirm the findings of SCW with respect to competition, the next step is to extend the sample 
period to year 2011. This step focuses on three areas: Firstly, it uses updated control variables 
from multiple sources for the period 1980-2011. Secondly, it updates H-statistic and the 
concentration variable from the GFDD database. The GFDD database provides country-level 
concentration values from 1996 and H-statistic values from 2010. Therefore, the estimations use 
SCW’s concentration values for 1980-1995 and SCW’s H-statistic values for 1980-2009. 
Thirdly, it updates the dependent variable from the Laeven and Valencia (2012) Systemic 
Banking Crises Database.  
The estimation results are presented in Table 2.8. The results are presented in three 
panels. All three panels use updated control variables from multiple sources. Table 2.8 considers 
various combinations of ways to incorporate the updated H-statistic and concentration values. 
Panel A uses the same values of H-statistic and Concentration as SCW throughout the entire 
sample period 1980-2011. Panel B uses two sets of constant values for both H-statistic and 
Concentration. For the first time period from 1980-2009, it uses SCW’s (constant) H-statistic 
values. For the second time period, it uses an average, country level H-statistic value calculated 
from the updated data for the time period 2010-2011. With respect to Concentration, it uses 
SCW’s (constant) concentration values from 1980-1995 for the first period. For the second 
period, it uses country-level averages from 1996-2011. Panel C uses SCW’s constant H-statistic 
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for 1980-2009, and time-varying, H-statistic values for 2010-2011. For Concentration, it uses a 
constant concentration for 1980-1995, and time-varying values for 1996-2011.  
The estimated coefficients of H-statistic are small and statistically insignificant in all 
three panels. The concentration variable has the same sign in all three panels, and implies that 
Concentration positively contributes to financial stability. However, the size and statistical 
significance of the coefficients are different. Panel A reports statistically significant 
Concentration coefficients at the 1 percent level. In Panel B, it shows a weak statistical 
significance. It is small and insignificant in panel C.  
The estimated coefficients for H-statistic are relatively small compared with SCW’s 
reported values, and the associated t-statistics are less than 1. The results for the concentration 
variable are mixed, with no way of identifying which set of results from panel A, B, or C is best.  





Replication of Key Models Using Updated Data: 1980-2011 
Variable 
Duration models Logit models 
(2) (3) (6) (7) 
















Observations 803 803 802 802 
















Observations 803 803 802 802 
















Observations 803 803 802 802 
Note. The column headings indicate that the respective estimates refer to estimating the models 
in Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) from Table 3 in SCW (page 722-723). Only the competition and 
concentration coefficients are reported. All three panels of estimates use multiple sources to 
achieve maximum number of observations with updated data. The values of the control variables 
across the three panels are identical and used updated values from multiple sources. The values 
for H-statistic and Concentration differ as follows: Panel A uses SCW’s (constant) values for the 
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entire time period (1980-2011). Panels B and C accommodate the availability of updated H-
statistic and Concentration data for the years 2010-2011 and 1996-2011, respectively. Panel B 
uses two sets of constant values for each variable. For H-Statistic, it uses SCW’s value for 1980-
2009 and the country average of H-statistic for 2010-2011. For Concentration, it uses SCW’s 
value for 1980-1995, and the country average of Concentration for 1996-2011. Panel C uses 
SCW’s H-Statistic for 1980-2009 and the time-varying H-statistic for 2010-2011. For 
Concentration, SCW’s Concentration for 1980-1995 and the time varying Concentration for 
1996-2011. The numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients are cluster robust standard 
errors, clustered on country. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent 
significance levels.  
2.8 Z-score as a Measure of Financial Stability  
The dependent variable of SCW’s paper is a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
if a systemic crisis is observed in a particular year, and zero otherwise. SCW get the data from 
the systemic crisis database produced by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005). Since there is 
no unique measure to capture financial stability, the next step of the analysis is to use an 
alternative measure of financial stability. Z-score is one of the common measures used in the 
literature to measure the financial stability.  
Z-score is a bank-level risk measure that estimates the inverse probability of default at the 
individual level of banks. Increases in Z-score indicate a lower probability of default, and thus 
more financial stability. The measure compares a bank’s capital buffer and returns, with return 
volatility (Boyd, Graham, & Hewitt, 1993; Boyd & Runkle, 1993).  
As a measure of country-level stability, a number of studies use an aggregated bank-level 
Z-score (The World Bank, 2016; Uhde & Heimeshoff, 2009; Yeyati & Micco, 2007). This 
section follows that approach and uses country-level Z-scores to estimate the relationship 
between competition and stability. Z-score is estimated as follows: 
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 ;       (2.4) 
where ROA is country-level return on assets; Equity, and Assets are country-level aggregates; 
stdev(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA; i denotes country i  and t denotes time t.  
GFDD provides country-level Z-scores using aggregated bank-level data. Data are 
available for 1999-2015. Therefore, the subsequent empirical analysis focuses on the period 
1999-2015. Because of the probability nature of the Z-score data, fractional response regression 
is employed to estimate the results.  
Table 2.9 presents the results using Z-score as the stability measure. There are two panels 
in the table. Panel A uses two sets of H-statistic and concentration values. SCW’s constant H-
statistic values are used for the first period of 1999-2009. For the second time period of 2010-
2015, an average country-level H-statistic is calculated. The concentration variable uses two, 
country-level average values for 1999-2007 and 2008-2015. Panel B uses a constant H-statistic 
for 1999-2009, and time-varying H-statistic values for 2010-2015; and time-varying 
concentration values for the entire 1996-2015 period.  
Column (1) of both panels A and B estimate a specification with just H-statistic and 
column (2) includes both H-statistic and Concentration. A positive coefficient estimate of H-
statistic and Concentration indicates that the variable is positively associated with financial 
stability. In panel A, the estimated coefficients for H-statistic are negative, while being positive 
in panel B. The concentration variable indicates a positive relationship in both panels. However, 
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the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant. The results of Table 2.9 demonstrate that 
when using an alternative measure of stability, SCW’s conclusions are not supported. 
Table 2.9 
 Replication Using Z-Score as the Stability Measure: 1999-2015 
Variable 
Panel A: Constant H-statistic and Concentration values: two 
periods 









Observations 384 384 










Observations 384 382 
Note. This table uses Z-score as the dependent variable. All other control variables remain the 
same. Only the competition and concentration coefficients are reported. Constant and time-
varying values of H-statistic and Concentration are used for estimations. The values of H-statistic 
and Concentration differ as follows: Panel A uses two sets of constant variables for H-statistic 
and Concentration. For H-statistic, it uses the SCW’s (constant) H-statistic value for the period 
1999-2009, and the country average of H-statistic for 2010-2015. For Concentration, it uses the 
country averages for 1999-2007 and 2008-2015, respectively. Panel B maximizes the use of time-
varying values. For H-statistic, it uses the SCW’s (constant) H-statistic value for the period 1999-
2009, and the time-varying values of H-statistic for 2010-2015. For Concentration, it uses time-
varying values over the entire, 1999-2015 period. The numbers in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, clustered on country.  
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2.9 Estimation of the Effect Size  
The discussion up to this point has mainly focused on the statistical significance of H-
statistic and Concentration. This section examines the estimated economic significance of these 
variables. Table 2.10 uses estimates from the logit model in Table 2.8, panel B, column (7); and 
the fractional logistic regression model of Table 2.9, panel A, column (2). In Table 2.8, the 
probability denotes the probability of a systemic crisis. In Table 2.9, the probability denotes the 
inverse probability of default of a country's banking system. To measure economic significance, 
the table considers an increase in the respective variables from their 25
th




In panel A, an increase in H-statistic from its 25
th
 percentile to 75
th
 percentile value is 
associated with a reduction in the probability of a crisis of 0.0010. The direction of the effect is 
consistent with the view that more competition is associated with greater stability. In panel B, the 
same size change in H-statistic is associated with a reduction in the inverse probability of default 
by 0.0017, also consistent with the view that more competition is associated with financial 
instability. The small sizes of these effects indicate an economic insignificance that is consistent 
with their statistical insignificance in Tables 2.8 and 2.9.   
In contrast, the estimated effects for Concentration are much larger compared to H-
statistic. In panel A, an increase in the concentration variable from its 25
th
 percentile to 75
th
 
percentile value is associated with a reduction in the probability of a crisis of 0.0196. This is 
economically as well as statistically significant given the generally low probability of a crisis 
occurring in a given year. In contrast, the same size change in panel B reports an increase in the 
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inverse probability of default of 0.0171, which is opposite in sign to the effect in panel A. 
However, the estimates on which these effects are calculated are statistically insignificant in 
Table 2.9, so that the opposite effects may be accounted for by the imprecision of the underlying 
estimates.   
 
Table 2.10 







Values of H-statistic and Concentration 
 Obs. H-statistic Concentration 
Panel A: Probability of a crisis (from Table 2.8, Panel B, Column 7) 
25
th
 Percentile 803 0.0257 0.0371 
50
th
 Percentile 803 0.0254 0.0283 
75
th





) --- -0.0010 -0.0196 
Panel B: Inverse probability of a default (from Table 2.9, Panel A, Column 2) 
25
th
 Percentile 384 0.1107 0.1020 
50
th
 Percentile 384 0.1102 0.1058 
75
th





) --- -0.0017 +0.0171 
Note. The predicted probabilities for panel A are derived from the estimated logit model of Table 
2.8, Panel B, Column (7). The dependent variable in that equation is the dummy variable 
indicating an occurrence of a systemic crisis. The predicted probabilities for panel B are derived 
from the estimated fractional logit model of Table 2.9, Panel A, Column (2). The dependent 
variable in that equation is the country’s Z-score. All probabilities are calculated at the mean 
values of the regression covariates, except for the variable of interest (H-statistic or 










2.10 Alternative Competition Measures 
In the literature, H-statistic, Lerner index, and Boone indicator are all common measures 




2.10.1 Lerner index 
The Lerner index is a bank-level competition measure that measures market power of the 
bank. The “price” of the bank is calculated as the bank’s total revenue over assets. Marginal 
costs are obtained from an estimated trans-log cost function with respect to the output of the 
bank. Increases in the Lerner index indicate less competition. The degree of competition is a 
decreasing function of the index, which takes values between 0 and 1. In the case of perfect 
competition, the Lerner index equals 0. Under pure monopoly, the Lerner index equals 1 (Beck, 
De Jonghe, & Schepens, 2013; Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss, 2009; Diallo, 2015; Fernández de 
Guevara, Maudos, & Pérez, 2007; Fu, Lin, & Molyneux, 2014; Leon, 2015; Maudos & Solís, 
2011).  
The Lerner index is not a perfect measure of competition. Spierdijk and Zaouras (2016) 
find the interpretation of the Lerner index is valid only when firms maximize their revenue 
subject to a minimum profit constraint. Aggregated country-level Lerner index data are available 
from GFDD from 1996-2015. The bank-level Lerner index is computed as: 
                                                          
7





    –    
   
 ,                        (2.5) 
where P is the ratio of total revenue to total assets, and MC is the marginal cost of bank i in year 
t.  
2.10.2 Boone indicator 
The Boone indicator is based on relative profit differences (Boone, 2008). It is calculated 
as the elasticity of profits to marginal costs (Boone, 2008; Duygun, Shaban, & Weyman-Jones, 
2015). More efficient banks, or banks with low marginal costs, are able to maintain high profits 
compared to their less efficient rival firms. Higher (less negative) values of Boone indicate less 
competitiveness in the banking industry (Diallo, 2015; S. Kasman & A. Kasman, 2015; Leon, 
2015; Schaeck & Cihak, 2008, 2014).  Both H-statistic and the Lerner index are price-based 
measures, while the Boone-indicator is a profit-based measure. The problem with the Boone 
indicator is that the efficiency may not be immediately reflected in short term profits, and the 
Boone indicator ignores this (Leon, 2015). The calculation of bank-level Boone indicator is as 
follows: 
                                         (2.6) 
where     measures profit of bank i at time t,   is the Boone indicator, and     is marginal cost.  
Schaeck and Cihak (2010) use average cost as a proxy for marginal cost since marginal 
cost is not directly observable. GFDD provides the values of the Boone indicator for each 
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country by following Schaeck and Cihak (2010) approach. Aggregated Boone indicator values 
for each country are available from 1999 to 2015.  
2.10.3 Correlations between H-statistic, Lerner index, Boone indicator, and            
Concentration 
The literature has used H-statistic, the Lerner index, the Boone indicator, and 
Concentration as alternative measures of competition. Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic 
measures the transmission of input costs to revenue. The Lerner index captures market power 
based on price. The Boone indicator measures competition based on efficiency.  And 
Concentration is the market share of the largest banks in the market. Therefore, it is worthwhile 





 Pairwise Correlations for the Three Competition Variables and Concentration 
 H-statistic Lerner Boone Concentration 
H-statistic 
 









p-value = 0.095 
Obs = 245 
 







p-value = 0.476 
Obs = 270 
-0.0073 
p-value = 0.843 
Obs = 735 
 








p-value = 0.003 
Obs = 270 
0.0113 
p-value = 0.760 
Obs = 732 
0.0286 
p-value = 0.656 
Obs = 245 
 
0.0968 
p-value = 0.008 
Obs = 756 
0.0092 
p-value = 0.881 







Obs = 757 
Note. Number of pairwise observations differ because the availability of updated, time-varying 
observations. The updated data availability is as follows: H-statistic: 2010-2015; Lerner: 1996-
2015; Boone: 1999-2015; Concentration: 1996-2015. 
Table 2.11 provides pairwise correlations for all four measures. The availability of data is 
different for the four measures. H-statistic is available for 2010-2015, the Lerner index for 1996-
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2015, the Boone indicator for 1999-2015, and Concentration for 1996-2015. This leads to a 
variation in the number of observations for the respective pairwise correlations.  
Increases in the Lerner index and the Boone indicator are associated with a decrease in 
competition. In contrast, an increase in the H-statistic is associated with greater competition. 
Therefore, a negative correlation should exist between H-statistic / Boone and H-statistic/ Lerner. 
Table 2.11 confirms the expected signs of the correlations. However, the correlation values are 
small in size and not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. These results are consistent 
with the findings of Leon (2015) and suggest that these measures may be capturing different 
aspects of competition. 
The pairwise correlations with Concentration, H-statistic and the Boone indicator show a 
statistically significant, positive correlation. The Lerner index also shows a positive correlation, 
though it is statistically insignificant. These correlations seemingly contradict the negative 
relationship between H-statistic / Boone and H-statistic / Lerner. To be consistent, Boone and 
Lerner should show an inverse relationship with Concentration. However, correlation is not 
always transitive (Giles, 2015). As a result, the pairwise correlation between Concentration and 
H-statistic does not necessarily determine the sign of the correlation between Concentration and 
the Lerner index or Concentration and the Boone indicator. 
One possible reason for this is that the respective correlations are based on different sets 
of observations. To address this problem, the Lerner index, the Boone indicator, and 
Concentration were restricted to cover the same time period as H-statistic (2010-2015). When 
this is done, while the signs of the correlations remain the same, the correlations for Lerner / 
54 
 
Concentration and Boone / Concentration both become statistically insignificant, with the Boone 
/ Concentration correlation decreasing in size by an order of magnitude. This highlights the time-
varying nature of the relationships between the respective measures of competition.   
2.10.4 Estimation of the results with alternative measures 
To estimate the relationship between competition and stability, the Lerner index and the 
Boone indicator values are substituted for H-statistic in the Column (2), (3), (6) and (7) 
specifications of Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Everything else is held constant. Panel A reproduces the 
estimates of the coefficients for H-statistic and Concentration from Tables 2.2 and 2.3
8
. Panels B 
and C use constant values for the Lerner and Boone variables for the entire time period (1980-
2005), where Lerner and Boone are equivalent to their average value over the periods 1996-2005 
and 1999-2005, respectively.  
Table 2.12 summarizes the estimated results from the duration and logit models. Panels B 
and C replaces the H-statistic with Lerner index and Boone indicator. If the alternative measures 
for competition are consistent with the H-statistic, the respective coefficients would need to have 
an opposite sign. The coefficient of Lerner reports the correct sign only in column (2). The 
coefficients of Boone report the correct sign in columns (6) and (7). However, the results are 
statistically insignificant in both panels. These results indicate that SCW’s conclusions rely 
entirely on using H-statistic as a measure of competition. If they had used a different measure of 
competition, they would not have come to the same conclusion. 
                                                          
8
 Table 2.3 reports heteroscedasticity robust standard errors by following SCW’s procedure. However, Table 2.12 
uses cluster robust standard errors when estimating logit models. In most cases this reduced standard errors and it 





Replication of Key Models Using Alternative Competition Variables: 1980-2005 
Variable 
Duration models Logit models 
(2) (3) (6) (7) 
 Panel A: Original data 
H-statistic 
1.6977* 
(0.8804)         
2.3482** 











Observations 701 701 707 707 
















Observations 701 701 707 707 
















Observations 701 701 707 707 
Note. The column headings indicate that the respective estimates refer to estimating the models 
in Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) from Table 3 in SCW (page 722-723). Only the competition and 
concentration coefficients are reported. Panel A reproduces the estimates from Tables 2.2 and 
2.3. Panels B and C use the identical set of observations, so that the only difference across panels 
for a given specification is that a different competition variable has been used (Lerner or Boone 
instead of H-statistic). Panels B and C use constant values for these variables for the entire time 
period (1980-2005), whereas Lerner and Boone are set equal to their average value over the 
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periods for which data are available: i.e. 1996-2005 and 1999-2005, respectively. The numbers 
in parentheses below estimated coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, clustered on 
country. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent significance levels.  
 
Table 2.13 
Replication of Key Models Using Alternative Competition Variables: 1980-2011 
Variable 
Duration models Logit models 
(2) (3) (6) (7) 
















Observations 803 803 802 802 
















Observations 803 803 802 802 
Note. The column headings indicate that the respective estimates refer to estimating the models 
in Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) from Table 3 in SCW (page 722-723). Only the competition and 
concentration coefficients are reported. Panels A and B use constant values for these variables 
for the entire time period (1980-2011), whereas Lerner and Boone are set equal to their average 
value over the periods for which data are available: i.e.1996-2011 and 1999-2011, respectively. 
The numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, 




Table 2.13 estimates the relationship between competition and stability by using 
alternative competition measures, extending the sample period to 2011, and updating all the 
other control variables. Panel A reports the estimation results using the Lerner index, and panel 
B reports results using the Boone indicator. The coefficients confirm that increased competition 
has a positive association with the financial stability. However, the results are statistically 





















 Replication of Key Models Using Updated Data and All the Competition Variables: 1980-2011 
Variable 
Duration models Logit models 
(2) (3) (6) (7) 


































Observations 803 803 802 802 






































Duration models Logit models 
(2) (3) (6) (7) 


































Observations 803 803 802 802 
Note. Table 2.14 uses the same data, variables, and estimation procedures as in Table 2.8 except 
that it adds the competition variables Lerner and Boone to the respective specifications. Only the 
competition and concentration coefficients are reported. The values of the control variables 
across the three panels are identical. The values for H-statistic and Concentration in each of the 
three panels are the same as in Table 2.8 (refer note there). The values for Lerner and Boone are 
set as follows: Panel A uses constant values for these variables for the entire time period (1980-
2011), where Lerner and Boone are set equal to their average value over the periods for which 
data are available: i.e.1996-2011 and 1999-2011, respectively. Panel B uses two sets of constant 
values for each variable. Lerner uses the 1996 value for 1980-1996 and the country average for 
1997-2011. Boone uses the 1999 value for 1980-1999, and the country average for 2000-2011. 
Panel C uses the time-varying values for these variables whenever possible. The Lerner variable 
uses the 1996 value for 1980-1996 and time-varying values for 1997-2011; while the Boone 
variable uses the 1999 value for 1980-1999, and time-varying values for 2000-2011. Note that 
increases in H-statistic are associated with more competition while increases in Lerner and 
Boone are associated with less competition. The numbers in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, clustered on country. *, **, and ***, indicate 
significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent significance levels.  
Table 2.14 repeats the analyses of Table 2.8. The Lerner and Boone variables are added 
to the respective specifications, while everything else is held constant. Panel A uses constant 
Lerner and Boone values for the whole period of 1980-2011. Average values for the Lerner and 
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Boone variables are calculated over the entire period for which data are available. Panel B uses 
two sets of constant values for Lerner and Boone. The Lerner variable uses the 1996 value for 
1980-1996 and the country average for 1997-2011; while the Boone variable uses the 1999 value 
for 1980-1999, and the country average for 2000-2011.  Panel C uses a combination of a constant 
value and a time varying value. The Lerner variable uses the 1996 value for 1980-1996 and time-
varying values for 1997-2011; while the Boone variable uses the 1999 value for 1980-1999, and 
time-varying values for 2000-2011.  
H-statistic is statistically insignificant in all three panels, with the coefficient values for 
H-statistic being relatively small compared to SCW’s reported values. If increased competition is 
associated with greater financial stability, the estimated coefficient values for Lerner and Boone 
need to be negative in columns (2) and (3), and positive in columns (6) and (7). In panel A, the 
estimated coefficients for Lerner and Boone display the correct sign.  However, the coefficients 
for Lerner are not statistically significant. The coefficient for Boone is significant at the five 
percent significance level only in column (3).  
In Panel B, the signs of the coefficients reverse, suggesting that an increase in 
competition is positively associated with financial fragility, though only one of the estimated 
coefficients for Lerner (column 3) is significant at the 5 percent level. The results in panel C also 
show the same signs as in panel B, with none of the coefficients significant at the 5 percent level. 
The concentration variable shows statistically significant results in panel A. However the 
results are puzzling. In column (3), concentration is associated with greater financial stability, 
while in column (7) concentration is associated with decreased stability. Both of the respective 
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coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In panel B the concentration 
variable is significant at the 10 percent level, and suggests that increased concentration leads to 
greater stability. In panel C it is insignificant in both columns (3) and (7). 
Table 2.15 repeats the analysis of Table 2.9, adding Lerner and Boone variables into the 
respective specifications, with everything else held constant. The values of H-statistic and 
Concentration are the same as in Table 2.9. Panel A uses two constant values each for Lerner and 
Boone:  country averages for the periods 1999-2007 and 2008-2015 for each of the variables. 







 Replication Using Z-Score as the Dependent Variable and Additional Competition Variables: 
1999-2015 
Variable 
Panel A: Constant values: two 
periods 
Panel B: Mixed constant and 
time-varying values 


































Observations 384 384 376 374 
AIC 228.4416 230.1708 223.3076 223.6320 
SIC 295.6025 301.2824 290.1106 294.2686 
Note. Table 2.15 uses the same data, variables, and estimation method as Table 2.9. The only 
exception is that it adds the competition variables Lerner and Boone to the respective 
specifications. The values of the control variables across the panels A and B are identical. 
Only the competition and concentration coefficients are reported. The values for H-statistic 
and Concentration in each of the panels are the same as in Table 2.9 (see note there). The 
values for Lerner and Boone are set as follows. Panel A uses two sets of constant variables for 
each variable. For both Lerner and Boone, it uses the country average of these variables for 
the periods 1999-2007 and 2008-2015, respectively. Panel B uses the time-varying values of 
these variables for the entire period. Note that increases in H-statistic are associated with more 
competition while increases in Lerner and Boone are associated with less competition. The 
numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, 
clustered on country. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent 
significance levels.  
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The results show that the estimated coefficients of time-varying Lerner are highly 
significant in columns (3) and (4). The estimated Lerner index coefficients indicate that 
increased competition contributes to financial stability. The estimated results for Boone are 
similar to those of Lerner, but the results are statistically insignificant. The estimated coefficients 
for H-statistic are also statistically insignificant. The results for Concentration remain unchanged 
with the addition of the Lerner and Boone variables. The estimated coefficients for 
Concentration are statistically significant in Table 2.15 at the 1 percent level of significance. The 
estimates indicate that greater concentration is associated with more stability.   
2.11 Exclusion of the Global Financial Crisis Period 
Calderon and Schaeck (2016) describe the impact of government aid programmes on 
competition in the banking sector during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) period. They find 
that governments supported banks in terms of liquidity support, recapitalizations, and 
nationalizations. These government aid programmes contributed to an increase in bank 
competition. Furthermore, they influenced the relationship between competition and stability.  
To eliminate the impact of massive bailout programmes, Section 2.11 excludes the GFC 
period and re-estimates the key models for 1980-2007. Table 2.16 repeats Table 2.8 and restricts 
the sample period up to 2007. H-statistic is always statistically insignificant. The estimated 
coefficients for the concentration variable are consistent with a positive association between 
concentration and financial stability, with all the coefficients being significant at the 5 percent 




Exclude GFC: Replication of Key Models Using Updated Data: 1980-2007 
Variable 
Duration models Logit models 
(2) (3) (6) (7) 
















Observations 731 731 732 732 
















Observations 731 731 732 732 
















Observations 731 731 732 732 
Note. The column headings indicate that the respective estimates refer to estimating the models 
in Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) from Table 3 in SCW (page 722-723). Only the competition and 
concentration coefficients are reported. All three panels of estimates use multiple sources to 
achieve maximum number of observations with updated data. The values of the control variables 
across the three panels are identical. All three panels use SCW’s (constant) H-statistic values for 
the entire period (1980-2007). Three types of Concentration variables used in three panels. Panel 
A uses SCW’s (constant) values for the entire time period (1980-2007). Panel B uses SCW’s 
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value for 1980-1995, and the country average of Concentration for 1996-2007. Panel C uses 
SCW’s value for 1980-1995, and time-varying values for 1996-2007. The numbers in 
parentheses below estimated coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, clustered on country. 




 Exclude GFC: Replication of Key Models Using Additional Competition Measures: 1980-2007 
Variable 
Duration models Logit models 
(2) (3) (6) (7) 


































Observations 731 731 732 732 































Duration models Logit models 
(2) (3) (6) (7) 






Observations 731 731 732 732 


































Observations 731 731 732 732 
Note. The column headings indicate that the respective estimates refer to estimating the models 
in Columns (2), (3), (6) and (7) from Table 3 in SCW (page 722-723). Only the competition and 
concentration coefficients are reported. All three panels of estimates use multiple sources to 
achieve maximum number of observations with updated data. The values of the control variables 
across the three panels are identical. The values for H-statistic and Concentration in each of the 
three panels are the same as in Table 2.16 (refer note there). The values for Lerner and Boone are 
set as follows: Panel A uses constant values for these variables for the entire time period (1980-
2007), where Lerner and Boone are set equal to their average value over the periods for which 
data are available: i.e. 1996-2007 and 1999-2007, respectively. Panel B uses two sets of constant 
values for each variable. Lerner uses the 1996 value for 1980-1996 and the country average for 
1997-2007. Boone uses the 1999 value for 1980-1999, and the country average for 2000-2007. 
Panel C uses the time-varying values for these variables whenever possible. Lerner uses the 1996 
value for 1980-1995 and the time varying values for 1996-2007. Boone uses the 1999 value for 
1980-1998, and the time varying values for 1999-2007. Note that increases in H-statistic are 
associated with more competition while increases in Lerner and Boone are associated with less 
competition. The numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients are cluster robust standard 
errors, clustered on country. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent 
significance levels.  
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Table 2.17 incorporates the two alternative competition variables, Lerner and Boone, in 
the estimation equations of Table 2.16. H-statistic is everywhere insignificant. Likewise, Lerner 
and Boone never achieve statistical significance at the 5 percent level, with one exception (panel 
A, column 3). Furthermore, the respective coefficients provide conflicting estimates of the 
relationship between competition and financial stability. In contrast, estimates for the 
concentration variable confirm previous results and suggest that greater concentration is 
generally associated with increased stability.  
2.12  Conclusion 
This chapter provides a comprehensive replication of Schaeck et al. (2009) paper, “Are 
competitive banking systems more stable?” The replication consists of six steps. Firstly, this 
chapter re-estimates the results with the authors’ data. The re-estimation results closely match the 
published estimates of the original. The second step of the replication updates the control 
variables using multiple data sources. The results of this analysis find that competition, as 
measured by the H-statistic, is not statistically significant when using more recent data. 
However, the results for the concentration variable confirm SCW’s conclusion that greater 
concentration increases financial stability.  
Thirdly, this chapter expands the sample period of study. The analysis with the extended 
sample period considers various aspects: updated data from multiple sources; comparison of the 
results using constant H-statistic and concentration variables, and time-varying values of H-
statistic and Concentration. The results do not support SCW’s conclusions using any of these 
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methods. H-statistic is statistically insignificant and the associated t-statistics decrease 
substantially from an average of over 2 to less than 1.  
Fourthly, the use of Z-score as a stability measure is explored. This chapter finds that 
both H-statistic and Concentration are statistically insignificant when Z-score is used as the 
stability measure. The fifth step adds the Lerner index and the Boone indicator as alternative 
competition measures. The estimated results using these alternative measures of competition are 
consistent with previous findings of the chapter. However, the associated estimates are 
statistically insignificant at the 5 percent level in most of the regressions. The concentration 
variable shows a statistically significant, positive association between concentration and 
financial stability in 5 out of 8 estimations. 
Finally, this chapter removes the effect of the GFC and re-estimates the results. The 
competition measures are statistically insignificant at the 5 percent level except in one 
estimation. The concentration variable continues to be positively associated with financial 
stability.  
In summary, this extensive replication of SCW’s paper produces a substantial body of 
evidence that does not support SCW’s conclusion that competitive banking systems are more 
financially stable. However, it does confirm their result that concentration of the banking system 







Competition in the banking system has been a focal point of interest among researchers 
and policy makers. Some researchers argue that competition contributes to adverse shocks in the 
financial system while others argue that it is protective against adverse shocks. Theoretical and 
empirical views on bank competition and financial stability present conflicting views and do not 
provide clear guidance on the relationship between bank competition and financial stability.  
The competition-fragility hypothesis states that greater competition leads to instability of 
the financial system (Allen & Gale, 2004; Keeley, 1990; Marcus, 1984). It argues that more 
concentrated and less competitive banking systems are more stable, with the associated profits 
providing a buffer against financial instability. Greater concentration provides an incentive 
against excessive risk taking. An alternative view is provided by (Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005).  
They argue that greater concentration leads to financial instability. With less competition, banks 
charge firms higher interest rates. Higher borrowing costs make firms financially vulnerable, 
which in turn increases their default risk. All this feeds back into the banking system in the form 
of non-performing loans. The empirical evidence is mixed with respect to the two views, so that 
there is no clear conclusion on the validity of the competition-fragility or competition-stability 
hypotheses.  
Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) conduct a Meta-Regression Analysis (MRA) to bring 
together the empirical literature on the relationship between bank competition and financial 
stability. They analyze 598 estimates across 31 studies. Zigraiova and Havranek (Z&H hereafter) 
find evidence of publication bias. After they control for publication bias, they estimate an 
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economically insignificant relationship between competition in the banking sector and financial 
stability. 
The purpose of this chapter is to perform a pure replication and a verification of 
Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) Journal of Economic Survey paper, “Bank Competition and 
Financial Stability: Much Ado about Nothing?” The pure replication uses the same data and code 
that Z&H used for their paper, having posted it at the website: http://meta-
analysis.cz/competition/. The aim of the pure replication is to verify that their data and code 
produce the estimates reported in their paper. The verification exercise is different in that it goes 
back to the original studies and recodes the variables. The aim of the verification is to investigate 
the degree to which coding subjectivity affects the results. It checks whether independent coders 
would produce data that allows one to confirm Z&H’s empirical conclusions. 
This chapter finds that the pure replication results closely match Z&H’s estimates. There 
is a very small effect associated with bank competition on financial stability, and it is statistically 
insignificant. It also finds evidence of publication bias, with journals seemingly preferring to 
publish estimates supporting the competition-fragility hypothesis. Data re-coding produced some 
differences, mainly in the categorizations of the countries included in the respective studies. This 
affected the associated calculation of partial correlation coefficients, which produced slightly 
different results. However, in the end, the results support Z&H’s conclusion that there is only a 
small effect from bank competition on financial stability. Subsequent robustness checks also find 
publication bias in the literature and confirm the baseline conclusion. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the dataset. Section 3.3 
discusses the replication procedure and Section 3.4 explains the heterogeneity in the literature. 
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Section 3.5 applies Bayesian Model Averaging to handle model uncertainty. Section 3.6 
calculates best practice estimates for the competition-stability hypothesis. Section 3.7 undertakes 
robustness checks. Section 3.8 discusses some corrections to the estimates. Section 3.9 re-
estimates the effect of competition-stability omitting quadratic effects, and Section 3.10 
summarizes the conclusions. 
3.2 The Dataset of Competition-Stability Estimates 
Z&H collected 598 estimates from published and unpublished studies. They searched for 
relevant studies with the Google Scholar and RePEC search engines, using different 
combinations of the following four keyword pairs: Competition-Stability, Competition-Fragility, 
Concentration-Stability and Concentration-Fragility (Zigraiova & Havranek, 2016).  
The literature uses a variety of measures for competition. Some measures are increasing 
in greater competition, and others decrease as competition increases. For example, a large 
concentration ratio indicates less competition, while a large H-statistic value indicates high 
competition. The same issues arise with measures of financial stability. A large value of Z-score 
indicates high stability, while a large value of the non-performing loan ratio indicates less 
stability. As a result, the sign of the coefficient estimate needs to be adjusted to reflect the 
relationship between bank competition and stability.  
To assess the strength and relationship of the competition-stability estimates, Z&H 
transformed all the reported estimates into partial correlation coefficients (PCCs). The partial 
correlation coefficient measures the correlation between dependent and independent variable, 
holding all other variables constant. That is, the effects of all other factors are partialled out, 
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leaving only the contribution of the independent variable (Doucouliagos, 2011). The formulas of 
PCC and standard error of PCC (SEPCC) are as follows: 
     
  
   
     
                (3.1) 
      
         
       
 
   
                (3.2) 
where t is the t-statistic of the estimated coefficient, df is the degrees of freedom of the 
estimation, and i identifies the i
th
 estimated coefficient.  
3.3 Pure Replication vs. Verification 
Pure replication uses data and codes published by Z&H to mimic their analysis step by 
step. Part of their STATA code used to produce tables and figures is available at the website:  
http://meta-analysis.cz/competition/. This replication exercise uses their codes to reproduce 
Table 3.1 to Table 3.5.1. The code for the remaining tables was unavailable at the website and 
had to be written based on the description given in the paper
9
.  
In verification (as opposed to pure replication) the same 31 studies are re-coded. Z&H 
collect 35 variables from each study. This chapter collects 33 variables from the original 31 
studies and takes two variables from Z&H’s dataset.  Z&H collected their recursive impact factor 
values and number of citations in July 2014 and the current value of these variables are different 
from the original case. Therefore, this chapter uses the same recursive impact factor values and 
number of citations used by Z&H.  
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3.3.1 Diversity of the estimated competition coefficient  
There is substantial heterogeneity of estimates in the literature on banking competition 
and financial stability, with no evidence of convergence in studies over time. Figure 3.1 shows 
the median PCCs corresponding to the estimated effects of bank competition on financial 
stability reported in individual studies. The horizontal axis presents the year when the study first 
appeared in Google Scholar. Figure 3.1A is based on Z&H’s dataset, while Figure 3.1B uses the 
re-coded data from the verification exercise. Figures 3.1A and 3.1B both present a similar 





Figure 3.1A: The Median PCC Estimates of Bank Competition 
and Financial Stability  
Note. The median PCC values are taken from the data 
published by Zigraiova and Havranek (2016). 
Figure 3.1B: The Median PCC Estimates of Bank Competition 
and Financial Stability  
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Figure 3.2A: Variability in the Estimated Competition 
Coefficients across Individual Studies 
Note. The figure shows a box plot of the PCCs of the 
competition coefficient estimates from the data published by 
Zigraiova and Havranek (2016). 
 
Figure 3.2B: Variability in the Estimated Competition 
Coefficients across Individual Studies 
 
Note. The figure shows a box plot of the PCCs of the 
competition coefficient estimates from the re-coded data.
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Figures 3.2A and 3.2B show forest plots of the PCCs of competition coefficient estimates 
reported in 31 studies. Figure 3.2A is produced from the authors’ data, while Figure3.2B is based 
on the re-coded data. There is a wide dispersion, both within and between studies in Figures 
3.2A and 3.2B. Note that the coding differences have produced some differences.  For example, 
“Study ID-13” examines the impact of bank concentration on financial stability. The finding of 
this study suggests that there is a positive effect from bank concentration on fragility. Coders of 
MRA should code this as competition leads to stability. Z&H coded “Study ID-13” as 



















Estimates of the Competition Effect for Different Country Groups 
Country 
Group 
Unweighted Weighted No of 
estimates 
Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI 
Panel A 
All −0.001 −0.025  0.023 −0.012 −0.035 0.011 598 




0.001 −0.022 0.023 −0.019 −0.051 0.012 194 
Panel B 
All 0.009 -0.015 0.033 -0.001 -0.025 0.023 598 




0.006 -0.023 0.035 -0.012 -0.054 0.030 154 
Note. The table presents the mean PCCs of competition coefficient estimates for all estimates, 
estimates from developed (OECD) countries, and developing and transition (non-OECD) 
countries. The left side of the table presents unweighted mean values and 95% confidence 
intervals. The confidence intervals around the mean are constructed using standard errors 
clustered at the study level. On the right side of the table, estimates are weighted by the inverse 
number of estimates per study. Panel A presents PCC estimates from the data published by 
Zigraiova and Havranek (2016). Panel B presents PCC estimates from the re-coded data. *, **, 
and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent significance levels. 
 
 
Table 3.1 presents estimates of the competition effect for three groups of estimators. 
Panel A is a pure replication from Z&H’s data. Panel B uses data from re-coding. In both panels, 
the first row presents the effect for all 598 estimates and the second and third rows show the 
effect for two subgroups: developed countries (member countries of the Organization for 
Economic Corporation and Development- “OECD”) and developing and transition countries 
(non-OECD countries).  
78 
 
In panel A, there are 201 estimates from developed countries and 194 estimates from 
developing and transition countries, with the remaining 203 estimates belonging to a mixed 
category of developed, developing and transition countries. Panel B reports 149 estimates from 
developed countries and 154 estimates from developing and transition countries. The verification 
exercise identified differences in country categorization. For example, Albania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovakia and Slovenia are included in “Study ID-1” for the sample period 1998-2005. Z&H 
coded “Study ID-1” under the group of non-OECD countries.  However, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia were OECD members during the sample period of the study.  
Therefore, “Study ID-1” should be classified as belonging to the mixed category. Due to such 
differences, the mean values of the PCCs and 95% confidence intervals are somewhat different 
in panels A and B. 
Table 3.1 reports unweighted and weighted mean values of PCCs and 95% level 
confidence intervals. The weighted estimates weight the respective estimates using the inverse of 
the number of estimates reported per study. This serves to assign approximately the same weight 
to all studies even though some studies have more estimates than others. This gives equal 
importance to each study of the selected sample and eliminates selection bias (Mansournia & 
Altman, 2016).  
The unweighted and weighted mean values of PCCs in panels A and B are close to zero. 
As per the guidelines for the interpretation of PCCs published by (Doucouliagos, 2011), when 
the effect size is less than 0.07 it is considered to be a small effect. The estimated, overall effect 
for all 598 estimates in panel A indicates that competition is negatively associated with financial 
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stability, but the effect size is small (< 0.07). Further, the effect size is statistically insignificant 
for all three groups in panel A.  
The results are slightly different in panel B. The unweighted mean values of the PCC 
estimates competition to be positively associated with financial stability. The weighted mean 
values of the PCCs show competition to negatively influence stability for all estimates, and for 
estimates from developing and transition countries. Panel B reports statistically significant effect 
sizes at the 5 percent level for the developed country category. 
Figure 3.3A presents the distribution of PCCs for the full set of competition coefficient 
estimates. The PCCs are symmetrically distributed around zero with a mean value of -0.0009. 
The median PCC value is 0.0010. There are 21 published studies, with 376 estimates from these 
published studies. The mean value of the PCC from published estimates is 0.0116. This indicates 
that published studies report slightly larger estimates compared to unpublished studies. 
Figure 3.3B also displays a symmetric distribution around zero. The distribution of PCCs 
ranges from -0.3168 to 0.4835. The solid vertical line (PCC = 0.0090) denotes the mean of all 
PCCs. The dashed lines denote the mean of the median PCCs as 0.0179. The mean PCC value 
for estimates reported in studies published in peer-reviewed journals is 0.0120.  
Figures 3.3A and 3.3B are similar but not identical due to coding differences. The mean 
value of PCCs in Figure 3.3A is -0.0009, while it is 0.0090 in Figure 3.3B. There is a 0.0108 
(0.0090-(-0.0009)) difference in mean values for all estimates in Figures 3.3A and 3.3B.  
Likewise, there are differences in median and mean PCC values for the published studies. These 
differences occur as a result of differences in estimated PCCs arising from recoding the data. 






Figure 3.3A: The Distribution of PCC Estimates 
Note. The figure shows a histogram of the PCCs of the 
competition coefficient estimates from the data published by 
Zigraiova and Havranek (2016). The solid vertical line (black 
line) denotes the mean of all the PCCs. The dashed lines denote 
the mean of the median PCCs of all estimates (green dash line) 
and the mean of the PCCs of published studies (red dash line).  
Figure 3.3B: The Distribution of PCC Estimates 
Note. The figure shows a histogram of the PCCs of the 
competition coefficient estimates from the re-coded data. The 
solid vertical line (black line) denotes the mean of all the 
PCCs. The dashed lines denote the mean of the median PCCs 
of all estimates (orange dash line) and the mean of the PCCs of 
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3.3.2 Testing for publication bias 
Doucouliagos and Stanley (2013) find publication bias in empirical studies. Publication 
bias arises when the probability of publishing an estimate depends on its sign or statistical 
significance. Funnel plots are commonly used to assess publication bias. When the funnel plot is 
asymmetrical, publication bias is likely (Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997).   
 Figure 3.4 shows four funnel plots of PCC estimates. These are all symmetrical, 
suggesting the absence of publication bias. Funnel plots 3.4A1 and 3.4B1 present individual PCC 
values for all competition coefficient estimates. Funnel plots 3.4A2 and 3.4B2 present study 





Figure 3.4A1: PCC of All Estimates 
Note. The figure shows a funnel plot of the PCCs of the 
competition coefficient estimates from the data published by 
Zigraiova and Havranek (2016). The dashed vertical line 
denotes the mean value the PCC of all the estimates. 
 
 
Figure 3.4B1: PCC of All Estimates 
Note. The figure shows a funnel plot of the PCCs of the 
competition coefficient estimates from the re-coded data. The 
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Figure 3.4A2: Median Values of PCC Estimates 
Note. The figure shows a funnel plot of the median values of 
PCCs of the competition coefficient estimates from the data 
published by Zigraiova and Havranek (2016).The dashed 











Figure 3.4B2: Median Values of PCC Estimates 
Note.  The figure shows a funnel plot of the median values of 
PCCs of the competition coefficient estimates from the re-
coded data. The dashed vertical line denotes the mean value the 
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3.3.3 Funnel asymmetry tests 
The Funnel Asymmetry Test (FAT) is another technique used to explore publication bias. 
The FAT examines the relationship between coefficient estimates and their standard errors. 
When there is no publication bias, there is no correlation between the coefficient of estimates 
(PCC) and their standard errors (Doucouliagos & Stanley, 2013; Egger et al., 1997; Stanley, 
2007). The equation for the FAT test is as follows; 
                          ,            (3.3) 
Where       is the partial correlation coefficient of the competition coefficient,           is the 
standard error of the PCC,    is the mean PCC corrected for publication bias,   is the degree of 
publication bias, and    is the error term. 
Table 3.2 presents the result of the FAT. Panel A is a pure replication from Z&H’s data 
and Panel B is a verification of Z&H’s results based on re-coded data. In both panels, 
unweighted regression results are reported at the top, and weighted regressions (by inverse of 
number of estimates per study) are reported at the bottom. The FAT results are presented for two 
groups. One group considers all estimates and the other group considers estimates from 
published studies. Fixed effects estimation and instrumental variable estimation techniques are 
considered for the assessment. The null hypothesis for the FAT is        Panels A and B reject 
the null hypothesis that there is no publication bias at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels of 
significance. As per the guideline of (Doucouliagos & Stanley, 2013):  
    is statistically significant and within the range of            there is a 
substantial selectivity   
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    is statistically significant and          there is severe selectivity.  
Accordingly, panels A and B indicate a substantial degree of selectivity.  The 
instrumental variable estimates for published studies indicate severe selectivity. The negative 
coefficients suggest that sample selection favors negative estimated effects of competition and 
financial stability. The effect after controlling for publication bias (    is close to zero.  
Table 3.2  




FE FE_Published Instrument Instrument_Published 
SE (publication bias) -1.671** -1.898** -1.614*** -2.291*** 
Constant (effect 
beyond bias) 
0.044** 0.073** 0.043*** 0.086*** 
No of estimates 598 376 598 376 
No of studies 31 21 31 21 
Weighted Regressions FE FE_Published   
SE (publication bias) -1.568*** -1.636***   
Constant (effect 
beyond bias) 
0.034*** 0.044***   
No of estimates 598 376   






FE FE_Published Instrument Instrument_Published 
SE (publication bias) -1.744** -1.859** -1.561*** -2.218*** 
Constant (effect 
beyond bias) 
0.055*** 0.071** 0.050*** 0.083*** 
No of estimates 598 376 598 376 
No of studies 31 21 31 21 
Weighted Regressions FE FE_Published   
SE (publication bias) -1.625*** -1.619***   
Constant (effect 
beyond bias) 
0.045*** 0.041***   
No of estimates 598 376   
No of studies 31 21   
Note. The table presents the results of FAT. Panel A presents FAT results from the data 
published by Zigraiova and Havranek (2016). Panel B presents FAT results from the re-coded 
data. The standard errors are clustered at the study level. Panels A and B present unweighted and 
weighted regressions. Fixed effects estimation technique used study dummies and instrumental 
variable estimation technique used the logarithm of the number of observations as the 
instrumental variable.  *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent 
significance levels. 
 
In Table 3.2,           measures the standard error of the estimated     . As different 
estimated PCCs have different standard errors, it follows that the error term suffers from 
heteroscedasticity. To correct this, equation (3.3) is divided by           to enable a weighted 
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least squares estimate of the respective parameters (Stanley, 2007).  This transformation creates 
the following new equation: 
                          ,        (3.4) 
where    is the t-statistic,    is the mean PCC corrected for publication bias, and    measures the 
degree of publication bias. 
Table 3.3 presents heteroscedasticity-corrected FAT results. Panel A shows results using 
Z&H’s dataset, with panel B showing results using the re-coded data. In each panel, regressions 
weighted by PCC precision are reported on top, and regressions weighted by both precision and 
the inverse of the number of estimates per study are reported at the bottom. FAT results are 
presented for two groups. One group considers all estimates, and the other group considers 
estimates from just published studies. Fixed effects estimation and instrumental variable 
estimation techniques are used. The null hypothesis of the FAT is         
Panels A and B reject the null hypothesis of no publication bias in most cases, with 
estimates suggesting the presence of moderate publication bias. The presence of publication bias 
is strong in published studies compared to unpublished studies. Overall, there is evidence of 
negative publication bias, suggesting that journals are favorable towards results supporting the 
competition-fragility hypothesis. Both panels show the bias-corrected effect (“effect beyond 
bias”, cf. 1/SE) is less than 0.07. Except for the first column, most results are statistically 











FE FE_Published Instrument Instrument_Published 
1/SE (effect beyond 
bias)  
0.005 0.065 0.019** 0.053*** 
Constant (publication 
bias) 
-0.757 -4.000* -1.706** -3.344*** 
No of estimates 598 376 598 376 
No of studies 31 21 31 21 
Weighted by 
precision and No. of 
observations 
FE FE_Published   
1/SE (effect beyond 
bias) 
0.013 0.056**   
Constant (publication 
bias) 
-1.539** -4.339**   
No of estimates 598 376   




FE FE_Published Instrument Instrument_Published 
1/SE (effect beyond 
bias)  
0.005 0.062 0.018* 0.050*** 
Constant (publication 
bias) 
-0.491 -3.833 -1.343** -3.152*** 
No of estimates 598 376 598 376 




precision and No. of 
observations 
FE FE_Published   
1/SE (effect beyond 
bias) 
0.013 0.054*   
Constant (publication 
bias) 
-1.251 -4.190**   
No of estimates 598 376   
No of studies 31 21   
Note. The table presents the results of heteroscedasticity-corrected FAT. Panel A presents 
heteroscedasticity corrected FAT results from the data published by Zigraiova and Havranek 
(2016). Panel B presents heteroscedasticity corrected FAT results from the data re-coding. The 
standard errors are clustered at the study level. Fixed effects estimation technique used study 
dummies and instrumental variable estimation technique used the logarithm of the number of 
observations as the instrumental variable.  *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 
1-percent significance levels. 
 
3.4 Heterogeneity 
To explain the heterogeneity of estimated effects, 35 variables representing a number of 
study and estimate characteristics were coded from the original studies. Variable definitions are 
given in Appendix 2. In Table 3.4, panel A describes summary statistics of the variables from 
Z&H’s dataset, and panel B presents summary statistics of variables from the re-coded data. 
Panels A and B reports three figures: mean, standard deviation, and mean weighted by the 
inverse number of estimates reported per study. All variables are classified into eight groups: 
data characteristics, countries examined, design of the analysis, treatment of stability, treatment 
of competition, estimation method, control variables, and publication characteristics (Zigraiova 




Group 1: Data characteristics 
Data characteristics include PCCs, standard errors of PCCs, the logarithm of the number 
of observations used in the regression, the logarithm of the number of years (in the sample 
period), and the mean year of the sample period. The main difference in panels A and B is the 
mean value of PCCs. Z&H’s dataset has a negative mean value of -0.001, while the re-coded 
data has a positive mean value of 0.009.  
Group 2: Countries examined 
To address the diversity of countries included in study samples, three dummies are 
included as developed (OECD) countries, developing and transition (non-OECD) countries, and 
a mixed category which includes studies with both OECD and non-OECD countries. Panel A 
reports that approximately 33 percent of estimates are from each country group. Panel B reports 
50 percent of the estimates are from the mixed category of OECD and non-OECD countries, 25 
percent of the estimates are from the group of developed countries, and 26 percent are from the 
group of developing and transition countries. This difference in country categorizations was 
probably the biggest difference discovered during the verification exercise.  
Group 3: Design of the analysis 
The original studies differed in their estimation designs. This is captured by four dummy 
variables. Some studies estimate a nonlinear relationship between competition and stability. This 
is represented by the “quadratic” dummy. 12 percent of the total estimates are nonlinear 
estimates. Another dummy variable identifies if a study addresses the issue of endogeneity. A 
majority of estimates address endogeneity: 64 percent in panel A and 57 percent in panel B. The 
dummy variable “Macro” equals 1 if the competition-stability regression is estimated based on 
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aggregated, country-level data. The variable “Averaged” equals 1 if the competition-stability 
regression is estimated based on country-level data, but the country-level indicators are  
calculated as the average of bank-level data. 
Group 4: Treatment of stability 
Many different measures of financial stability exist. Seven dummy variables are used to 
capture the most common measures of stability. Z-score is a popular measure, with 45 percent of 
estimates using this measure of stability. Fourteen percent of the estimates use a crisis dummy as 
the dependent variable. All the other measures accounts for less than 10 percent of the total 
estimates. 
Group 5: Treatment of competition 
Five dummy variables are included to represent the use of different measures of 
competition. The Lerner index is the most commonly used competition measure, with 36 percent 
of estimates using this measure. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the next most 
commonly used measure, accounting for 27 percent of total estimates. 
Group 6: Estimation method 
Studies use a large number of different estimation procedures in estimating the 
relationship between competition and financial stability. This is captured by six different dummy 
variables for logit, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), fixed effects, random effects, generalized 
method of moments, and two-stage least squares estimations. More than 20 percent of the 




Group 7: Control variables 
When estimating the competition-stability relationship, studies use a variety of control 
variables. Three common types of control variables are controls for the regulatory and 
supervisory environment, the type of ownership of the bank, and the macroeconomic condition 
of the country. Panels A and B reveal that researchers commonly control for macroeconomic 
conditions when estimating the relationship between competition and stability. 
Group 8: Publication characteristics 
The number of citations, the year when the study first appeared in Google Scholar, the 
recursive impact factor values from RePEc, and whether the study is published in a peer-





Summary Statistics of Regression Variables 
 Panel A Panel B 
Variable Mean SD WMean Mean SD WMean 
Data characteristics       
PCC -0.001 0.090 -0.012 0.009 0.090 -0.001 
SEPCC 0.027 0.022 0.029 0.027 0.021 0.028 
Samplesize 7.835 1.615 7.760 7.844 1.598 7.776 
T 2.224 0.743 2.264 2.183 0.754 2.212 
Sampleyear 8.889 4.328 9.340 9.253 4.440 9.739 
Countries examined       
Developed 0.336 0.473 0.366 0.249 0.433 0.275 
Developing and transition 0.324 0.469 0.376 0.258 0.438 0.247 
Reference case: mixed 0.339 0.474 0.258 0.493 0.500 0.479 
Design of the analysis       
Quadratic 0.119 0.324 0.217 0.120 0.326 0.218 
Endogeneity 0.635 0.482 0.713 0.574 0.495 0.692 
Macro 0.256 0.437 0.133 0.171 0.376 0.140 
Averaged 0.120 0.326 0.085 0.027 0.162 0.056 
Treatment of stability       
Dummies 0.142 0.349 0.129 0.142 0.349 0.129 
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 Panel A Panel B 
Variable Mean SD WMean Mean SD WMean 
NPL 0.050 0.218 0.095 0.050 0.218 0.095 
Z_score 0.452 0.498 0.537 0.452 0.498 0.537 
Profit volatility 0.075 0.264 0.039 0.075 0.264 0.039 
Profitability 0.043 0.204 0.045 0.043 0.204 0.045 
Capitalization 0.069 0.253 0.040 0.069 0.253 0.040 
DtoD 0.065 0.247 0.047 0.065 0.247 0.047 
Reference case: other stability 0.104 0.305 0.069 0.104 0.305 0.069 
Treatment of competition       
H-statistic 0.090 0.287 0.098 0.090 0.287 0.098 
Boone 0.075 0.264 0.108 0.075 0.264 0.108 
Concentration 0.157 0.364 0.147 0.159 0.366 0.148 
Lerner 0.360 0.480 0.414 0.360 0.480 0.414 
HHI 0.266 0.442 0.197 0.266 0.442 0.197 
Reference: other competition 0.052 0.222 0.037 0.050 0.218 0.035 
Estimation method       
Logit 0.172 0.378 0.161 0.172 0.378 0.161 
OLS 0.137 0.344 0.115 0.166 0.372 0.138 
FE 0.229 0.421 0.136 0.251 0.434 0.163 
RE 0.067 0.250 0.043 0.072 0.259 0.050 
GMM 0.182 0.386 0.309 0.167 0.373 0.295 
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 Panel A Panel B 
Variable Mean SD WMean Mean SD WMean 
TSLS 0.149 0.356 0.110 0.122 0.328 0.077 
Reference: other method 0.064 0.244 0.126 0.050 0.218 0.115 
Control variables       
Regulation 0.239 0.427 0.282 0.237 0.426 0.272 
Ownership 0.166 0.372 0.271 0.186 0.389 0.289 
Global 0.794 0.405 0.764 0.844 0.363 0.781 
Publication characteristics       
Citations 2.045 1.222 1.790 2.045 1.222 1.790 
Firstpub 6.453 2.979 6.677 6.406 3.034 6.677 
IFrecursive 0.243 0.210 0.205 0.243 0.210 0.205 
Reviewed journal 0.629 0.484 0.677 0.629 0.484 0.677 
Note. The table presents summary statistics of regression variables. Panel A presents summary statistics from data published by 
Zigraiova and Havranek (2016). Panel B presents summary statistics from data re-coding. SD is the standard deviation and WMean is 






3.5 Results of Bayesian Model Averaging 
Table 3.4 gives a sense of the heterogeneity in the literature. Researchers use various 
dependent and explanatory variables when examining the relationship between bank competition 
and financial stability. This leads to model uncertainty. Z&H used Bayesian Model Averaging 
(BMA) to handle the model uncertainty problem. There are 35 explanatory variables. BMA runs 
multiple regressions with different subsamples of the 2
35 
possible combinations of explanatory 
variables.  
BMA calculates a posterior mean and a posterior standard deviation by weighting each 
model by its relative likelihood. It also calculates the posterior inclusion probability (PIP). The 
PIP indicates the probability of a specific variable being included in the true model. Eicher, 
Papageorgiou, and Raftery (2011) provide specifics on BMA and the strength of the variable’s 
effect based on the PIP value. The effect is considered to be a weak effect when the PIP lies 
within the range of 0.5 to 0.75, substantial when the PIP is between 0.75 to 0.95, strong when the 
PIP is between 0.95 to 0.99, and extremely strong when the PIP exceeds 0.99. 
Table 3.5.1 presents the results of the BMA analysis. The analysis uses the weighted 
estimates (by inverse number of estimates per study). Z&H employed Zellner’s g-prior for the 
“unit information prior”. This is the default option for the BMA program (Zeugner & 
Feldkircher, 2015).  For a model prior, Z&H chose “uniform”. This assigns a uniform model 
prior for the BMA exercise (Zeugner & Feldkircher, 2015). Table 3.5.1 uses Z&H’s data to 
reproduce the results. The right side of Table 3.5.1 reports regression results of OLS estimation. 
The OLS estimation includes 15 variables in the estimation equation. These 15 variables were 
selected because they were calculated to have PIPs greater than 0.5 in the BMA analysis. The 
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results of Table 3.5.1 show that the estimated coefficients are similar in sign and size for both the 
BMA and OLS estimation procedures. 
Table 3.5.1 organizes the diversity of the competition coefficient estimates by 
categorizing the variables into eight groups. The estimated coefficient of SEPCC (the publication 
bias variable) is negative and confirms the previous result that researchers prefer to publish 
results supporting the competition-fragility hypothesis. The associated PIP value is 1.000. The 
size of the sample is another important determinant, with larger samples estimated to reduce the 
size of the competition PCC by 0.037. The competition PCCs are also affected by the countries 
included in the study. Studies with developed countries (OECD countries) or developing and 
transition (non-OECD countries) are estimated to have larger PCCs than studies that use mixed 
samples. The largest PCCs are associated with studies using OECD countries.  
Literature suggests that the relationship between competition and stability may be non-
linear (Agoraki et al., 2011; Fernandez & Garza-Garciab, 2012; Jeon & Lim, 2013). BMA 
indicates that PCC values derived from quadratic estimates are 0.05 smaller than those from 
linear estimates. Among the various measures of stability, there is a high PIP value when a 
dummy variable is used to measure a financial crisis. Other measures of stability have small 
PIPs. When a dummy variable is used to measure financial stability, it increases the PCC value 
by 0.21.  
Among competition measures, H-statistic and the Boone indicator have high PIP values. 
Studies that use H-statistic are estimated to produce the largest PCC values. The estimation 
indicators for logit and OLS both have PIP values greater than 0.50. Logit and OLS estimations 
are estimated to produce smaller (more negative) estimates of the relationship between 
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competition and stability than other estimation methods. Studies that include regulatory controls 
estimate smaller competition effects than those that don’t. With respect to publication 
characteristics, number of citations, recursive impact factor, year of first publication, and 
reviewed journal all have PIPs in excess of 0.50. All but the last are associated with smaller PCC 
estimates.   
The results of OLS estimation are similar to the results of the BMA exercise. All the 
coefficient values are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, except the coefficient values 
for the standard error of the PCC and the dummy variable indicating that the study was published 
in a peer-reviewed journal. 
Table 3.5.1 
 Heterogeneity in the Estimates of the Competition Coefficient 
Response variable: Bayesian model averaging OLS 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value 
Data characteristics       
SEPCC -1.7883 0.2046 1.000 -1.194 0.651 0.067 
Samplesize -0.0367 0.0035 1.000 -0.024 0.009 0.007 
T 0.0005 0.0039 0.052    
Sampleyear 0.0000 0.0005 0.046    
Countries examined       
Developed 0.2015 0.0219 1.000 0.176 0.029 0.000 
Developing and transition 0.1072 0.0169 1.000 0.099 0.026 0.000 
Design of the analysis       
Quadratic -0.0533 0.0214 0.997 -0.044 0.013 0.001 
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Response variable: Bayesian model averaging OLS 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value 
Endogeneity 0.0100 0.0212 0.237    
Macro 0.0025 0.0124 0.070    
Averaged -0.0004 0.0047 0.040    
Treatment of stability       
Dummies 0.2115 0.0282 1.000 0.184 0.019 0.000 
NPL 0.0020 0.0060 0.132    
Z_score -0.0005 0.0027 0.063    
Profit volatility 0.0006 0.0051 0.037    
Profitability -0.0003 0.0030 0.035    
Capitalization 0.0001 0.0029 0.027    
DtoD -0.0013 0.0078 0.050    
Treatment of competition       
H-statistic 0.1083 0.0217 1.000 0.114 0.018 0.000 
Boone -0.0709 0.0313 0.897 -0.058 0.023 0.010 
Concentration -0.0815 0.0226 0.474    
Lerner 0.0036 0.0130 0.122    
HHI 0.0023 0.0108 0.085    
Estimation method       
Logit -0.1874 0.0230 1.000 -0.160 0.019 0.000 
OLS -0.0352 0.0244 0.756 -0.038 0.018 0.038 
FE 0.0113 0.0211 0.277    
RE 0.0018 0.0115 0.058    
GMM -0.0003 0.0029 0.040    
TSLS -0.0001 0.0030 0.032    
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Response variable: Bayesian model averaging OLS 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value 
Control variables       
Regulation -0.0321 0.0197 0.798 -0.036 0.014 0.010 
Ownership -0.0147 0.0175 0.481    
Global -0.0017 0.0058 0.116    
Publication characteristics       
Citations 0.0497 0.0092 1.000 0.046 0.009 0.000 
Firstpub 0.0219 0.0044 1.000 0.023 0.003 0.000 
IFrecursive 0.1060 0.0528 0.875 0.096 0.048 0.000 
Reviewed journal -0.0249 0.0186 0.725 -0.015 0.014 0.289 
Constant  -0.0004 NA 1.000 -0.118 0.086 0.169 
Studies   31   31 
Observations    598   598 
Note. The table presents BMA results and OLS estimation from data published by Zigraiova and 
Havranek (2016). Post. Mean is posterior mean, Post. SD is posterior standard deviation and PIP 
is posterior inclusion probability. OLS estimation includes explanatory variables with PIP greater 
than 0.5. The standard errors are clustered at the study level. The inverse number of estimates per 












OLS (Z&H’s variable 
selection criteria) 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-value 
Data characteristics          
SEPCC -1.8207 0.1947 1.0000 -1.4576 0.8458 0.085 -1.3625 0.9114 0.135 
Samplesize -0.0367 0.0051 1.0000 -0.0290 0.0143 0.042 -0.0258 0.0150 0.085 
T 0.0006 0.0039 0.0615       
Sampleyear 0.0034 0.0024 0.7402 0.0033 0.0034 0.324    
Countries examined          
Developed 0.0505 0.0091 0.9997 0.0528 0.0212 0.013 0.0678 0.0292 0.020 
Developing and transition -0.0012 0.0062 0.0753    -0.0094 0.0242 0.698 
Design of the analysis          
Quadratic -0.0487 0.0115 0.9977 -0.0260 0.0170 0.124 -0.0404 0.0194 0.038 
Endogeneity 0.0005 0.0039 0.0513       
Macro 0.0010 0.0099 0.0582       
Averaged 0.0570 0.0247 0.9052 0.0380 0.0263 0.149    
Treatment of stability          
Dummies -0.1562 0.0333 0.9990 -0.1759 0.0372 0.000 -0.1956 0.0401 0.000 










OLS (Z&H’s variable 
selection criteria) 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 









      
Profit volatility 0.0000 0.0042 0.0345       
Profitability -0.0006 0.0042 0.0529       
Capitalization -0.0001 0.0036 0.0350       
DtoD -0.1008 0.0269 0.9909 -0.0789 0.0353 0.025    
Treatment of competition          
H-statistic 0.1021 0.0167 1.0000 0.1051 0.0278 0.000 0.0976 0.0327 0.003 
Boone -0.0008 0.0061 0.0675    -0.0011 0.0221 0.962 
Concentration -0.0012 0.0066 0.0694       
Lerner 0.0318 0.0124 0.9546 0.0054 0.0155 0.728    
HHI 0.0023 0.0079 0.1168       
Estimation method          
Logit 0.1605 0.0270 1.0000 0.1737 0.0348 0.000 0.1800 0.0445 0.000 
OLS 0.0003 0.0038 0.0471    -0.0040 0.0247 0.871 
FE 0.0005 0.0043 0.0462       
RE 0.0888 0.0237 0.9955 0.0854 0.0434 0.049    
GMM 0.0059 0.0127 0.2232       










OLS (Z&H’s variable 
selection criteria) 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-value 
Control variables          
Regulation -0.0105 0.0157 0.3696    0.0032 0.0143 0.825 
Ownership -0.0318 0.0180 0.8219 -0.0304 0.0226 0.179    
Global 0.0385 0.0107 0.9862 0.0217 0.0178 0.224    
Publication characteristics          
Citations 0.0726 0.0088 1.0000 0.0586 0.0163 0.000 0.0613 0.0233 0.009 
Firstpub 0.0328 0.0041 1.0000 0.0260 0.0079 0.001 0.0231 0.0080 0.004 
IFrecursive 0.0007 0.0073 0.0437    -0.0748 0.0548 0.172 
Reviewed journal -0.1172 0.0115 1.0000 -0.0789 0.0237 0.001 -0.0782 0.0310 0.012 
Constant  -0.0012 NA 1.0000 -0.0292 0.1118 0.794 0.0216 0.1174 0.854 
Studies   31   31   31 
Observations    598   598   598 
Note. The table presents results from data re-coding. OLS estimation includes explanatory variables with PIP greater than 0.5. OLS 
(Z&H’s variable selection criteria) includes explanatory variables from Table 3.5.1. The standard errors are clustered at the study 
level. Post. Mean is posterior mean, Post. SD is posterior standard deviation and PIP is posterior inclusion probability. The inverse 
number of estimates per study is taken as the weight.
104 
 
Table 3.5.2 follows the same procedure as Table 3.5.1 except that it uses the re-coded 
data for the BMA analysis and OLS estimation. There are two OLS regressions in Table 3.5.2. 
The first OLS regression (“OLS”) includes all variables having a PIP value greater than 0.50 in 
Table 3.5.2. The second OLS regression (“OLS - Z&H’s variable selection criteria”) uses the 
same variables that were included in Z&H’s OLS regression of Table 3.5.1.  
3.5.1 Comparison of BMA results from Tables 5.1 and 5.2  
As noted previously, while generally similar, there are some differences in Z&H’s data 
and the re-coded data. These differences, in turn, produce somewhat different BMA and OLS 
results in Tables 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. In Table 3.5.1, there are 15 variables with PIP values greater 
than 0.5. Table 3.5.2 reports 17 variables with PIP values greater than 0.5. The characteristics 
sample size, developing and transition countries, Boone, OLS estimation, controls for regulation, 
and the recursive impact factor are significantly associated with estimated competition effect 
sizes in Table 3.5.1 (5 percent level) but not Table 3.5.2 (cf. “OLS - Z&H’s variable selection 
criteria”). Further, the variables mean value of the sample period (Sampleyear), estimation of 
competition and stability using country-level averages (Averaged), distance-to-default (DtoD), 
Lerner index, random effects estimation (RE), controls for bank ownership (Ownership), and 
controls for macroeconomic conditions (Global) all had PIP values greater than 0.5 using the re-
coded data and were selected for OLS estimation in Table 3.5.2 (cf. “OLS” results), but were not 
selected for OLS estimation in Table 3.5.1. While some of the estimated mean effects in the 
BMA analysis switched signs between Tables 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, of these, only Dummies and Logit 





















Figure 3.5A: Bayesian Model Averaging: Model Inclusion Probability 
Note. The figure illustrates results of BMA exercise. This is produced from Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) dataset. Columns 
represent individual models and rows represent explanatory variables. Explanatory variables are sorted by their PIP in descending 
order. The positive coefficient sign denoted by blue color, negative coefficients in red color and the excluded variables from a model 


















Figure 3.5B: Bayesian Model Averaging: Model Inclusion Probability 
Note. The figure illustrates results of BMA exercise. This is produced from re-coded data from same studies considered by Zigraiova 
and Havranek (2016). Columns represent individual regression models and rows represent explanatory variables. Explanatory 
variables are sorted by their PIP in descending order. The positive coefficient sign denoted by blue color, negative coefficients in red 
color and the excluded variables from a model is left blank.
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Figures 3.5A and 3.5B graphically illustrate the results of the BMA exercise. The top 
5000 models are represented, with most likely models ordered from left to right, and most 
frequently included variables ordered from top to bottom. The 5000 models cumulatively 
account for an inclusion probability of 84 percent in Figure 3.5A, and 90 percent in Figure 3.5B. 
Colors indicate the sign of the estimated mean effects (blue = positive, red = negative). 
Uncolored cells indicate that a variable was not included in the respective model.   
 
Figure 3.6A: 
Model Size and Convergence from Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) Dataset 
 
 
Figure 3.6B:  





Figures 3.6A and 3.6B report various diagnostics associated with the BMA analysis. The 
top panels of the figures illustrate the posterior expected model size. It is 16.7806 in Figure 3.6A. 
This means that, on average, 17 regressors are included in a given estimation model. In Figure 
3.6B, the posterior expected model indicates that 18 regressors are included, on average, in a 
given model. The bottom panels of the graphs illustrate the correlation between iteration counts 
and posterior model probability for the best 5000 models. The fact that the correlations are very 
close to one identify a high degree of convergence of the best 5000 models. 
3.6 Best Practice Estimates 
This section predicts the estimated effect of competition on financial stability from a 
hypothetical study that employs “best practice” in estimating the relationship between 
competition and stability. The explanatory variables used for the predictions are taken from the 
set of variables determined to be “important” in the BMA analysis of the previous section (i.e., 
having a PIP greater than 0.5). “Best practice” is determined by a subjective judgment of which 
variable values would be most preferred in an ideal study.   
For the continuous variables chosen for this exercise -- sample size, the recursive impact 
factor, number of citations, studies published in peer reviewed journal, controls for regulatory 
environment, and the Boone index -- Z&H used the sample maxima, as they judged that studies 
with larger values for these variables are higher quality studies. . Z&H assigned zero to SEPCC, 
as the ideal study would not have publication bias. Zero values were also assigned to dummy 
variable as a measure of stability, OLS estimation, Logit estimation, quadratic relationship 
between competition and stability, and H-statistic, as these were deemed not best practice. 
Sample means were used for all the other variables.  
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Table 3.6 shows weighted and unweighted PCCs based on the best practice estimates.  
Results are given in three panels. Panel A presents best practice estimates using Z&H’s dataset. 
The weighted explanatory variables are taken from Table 3.5.1 and the unweighted explanatory 
variables are taken from Table 3.8.1. Panel B selects variables from the re-coded data. Panel C 
also uses re-coded data, but the estimation is based on Z&H’s variable selection. The weighted 
variables for panels B and C are taken from Table 3.5.2 and the unweighted variables are from 
Table 3.8.2. 
Table 3.6 shows both weighted and unweighted, predicted values of PCCs, along with 
associated 95 percent confidence intervals. The columns named as “Diff.” show the difference 
between the best practice estimates and the sample estimates in Table 3.1. Results are presented 
for three groups: all estimates, developed countries, and developing and transition countries. The 
“Diff.” columns indicate that the best practice PCCs are generally larger than the PCC values of 
Table 3.1.  
With respect to the weighted estimates, panel A reports “small” effect sizes for the 
samples of all observations and estimates derived from developing and transition countries, 
where “small” is defined as a PCC value less than 0.07. Both predicted PCC values are 
statistically insignificant. In contrast, the best practice PCC for developed countries is medium-
sized and statistically significant. Unweighted estimation results are not too dissimilar from the 
weighted results, and are statistically significant for all three country categories.  
Panel B reports small effects (< 0.07) in most of the cases. The best-practice estimates are 
statistically significant in developed countries for both weighted and unweighted estimations. 
Panel C also generally finds small effects sizes, with none of the predicted values being 
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statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Overall, best-practice estimates find a positive, 
albeit small, relationship between bank competition and financial stability. 
Table 3.6 
Best-Practice Estimates of the Competition Coefficient 
 Weighted  Unweighted  
 Mean 95% CI Diff. Mean 95% CI Diff.  
Panel  A 
All 0.022 −0.022 0.066 0.034 0.038** 0.000 0.076 0.039 




0.019 −0.035 0.072 0.038 0.055** 0.011 0.099 0.054 
Panel B 
All 0.039 -0.010 0.088 0.040 0.006 -0.027 0.039 -0.003 




0.037 -0.013 0.087 0.049 0.045** 0.007 0.084 0.039 
Panel C 
All 0.024 -0.040 0.089 0.025 0.023 -0.055 0.100 0.014 
Developed 0.076* -0.003 0.154 0.056 0.057 -0.024 0.137 0.032 
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 Weighted  Unweighted  




-0.001 -0.073 0.071 0.011 0.036 -0.053 0.124 0.030 
Note. The table presents the mean PCCs of competition coefficient estimates for all competition 
coefficient estimates, those from developed (OECD) countries, and those from developing and 
transition (non-OECD) countries. The left side of the table reports weighted estimates by inverse 
number of estimates per study. The right side of the table presents unweighted mean PCCs of 
competition coefficient estimates. Panel A reports the mean PCCs by using Zigraiova and 
Havranek (2016) dataset. The explanatory variables are selected with PIP > 0.5, from Table 3.5.1 
and Table 3.8.1. Panel B reports mean PCCs by using data re-coding and the variables with PIP 
> 0.5 are taken from Table 3.5.2 and Table 3.8.2. Panel C reports mean PCCs by using data re-
coding and the variable selection is based on Z&H’s variable selection criteria. *, **, and ***, 
indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent significance levels.  
 
3.7 Robustness Checks 
Z&H presented four robustness checks in their study. This analysis follows suit and 
performs the same four checks. Section 3.7.1 reports a BMA exercise with alternative priors. 
Section 3.7.2 uses unweighted estimates with the baseline priors used in Tables 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. 
Section 3.7.3 reports results with OLS and fixed effects estimation methods. Finally, Section 
3.7.4 uses an inverse of the estimate variance as the weighting method to weight explanatory 
variables.   
3.7.1 Alternative BMA priors 
In their main estimates, Z&H chose Zellner’s g-prior for the unit information prior, and 
used the uniform model prior. As alternatives, Z&H selected the benchmark prior (BRIC) and 
the random model prior.   
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Tables 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 show the results based on BMA with the alternative priors. As 
before, the associated OLS regressions restrict variables to those having PIP values greater than 
0.5. Table 3.7.1 reports results using Z&H’s data. The results are very similar to the baseline 
BMA results of Table 3.5.1. Table 3.7.2 reports the results using the re-coded data, following the 
same procedures used for Table 3.5.2. The first OLS regression includes the 17 variables with 
PIP values more than 0.5 using the re-coded data. The second set of OLS results uses the 15 
variables selected from the BMA analysis based on Z&H’s data. The results of Table 3.7.2 are 
very similar to Table 3.5.2. 
 
Table 3.7.1 
 Results with Alternative BMA Priors 
Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value 
Data characteristics       
SEPCC -1.7526 0.2122 1.0000 -1.194 0.651 0.067 
Samplesize -0.0362 0.0036 1.0000 -0.024 0.009 0.007 
T -0.0003 0.0034 0.0373    
Sampleyear -0.0000 0.0004 0.0336    
Countries examined       
Developed 0.1975 0.0248 1.0000 0.176 0.029 0.000 
Developing and transition 0.1030 0.0188 1.0000 0.099 0.026 0.000 
Design of the analysis                                         
Quadratic -0.0517 0.0141 0.9882 -0.044 0.013 0.001 
Endogeneity 0.0159 0.0270 0.3039    
Macro 0.0028 0.0132 0.0672    
Averaged -0.0004 0.0043 0.0309    
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Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value 
Treatment of stability       
Dummies 0.2179 0.0315 1.0000 0.184 0.019 0.000 
NPL 0.0012 0.0047 0.0818    
Z_score -0.0004 0.0023 0.0426    
Profit volatility -0.0004 0.0043 0.0255    
Profitability -0.0002 0.0024 0.0236    
Capitalization 0.0000 0.0024 0.0185    
DtoD -0.0007 0.0060 0.0313    
Treatment of competition       
H-statistic 0.1074 0.0228 1.0000 0.114 0.018 0.000 
Boone -0.0637 0.0375 0.8017 -0.058 0.023 0.010 
Concentration -0.0182 0.0244 0.4181    
Lerner 0.0032 0.0128 0.0946    
HHI 0.0021 0.0107 0.0659    
Estimation method       
Logit -0.1883 0.0237 1.0000 -0.160 0.019 0.000 
OLS -0.0295 0.0265 0.6206 -0.038 0.018 0.038 
FE 0.0160 0.0258 0.3263    
RE 0.0020 0.0120 0.0522    
GMM -0.0002 0.0023 0.0272    
TSLS -0.0018 0.0031 0.0257    
Control variables       
Regulation -0.0313 0.0205 0.7623 -0.036 0.014 0.010 
Ownership -0.0129 0.0176 0.4015    
Global -0.0013 0.0051 0.0838    
Publication characteristics       
Citations 0.0476 0.0101 0.9999 0.046 0.009 0.000 
Firstpub 0.0207 0.0051 0.9999 0.023 0.003 0.000 
IFrecursive 0.0958 0.0622 0.7698 0.096 0.048 0.000 
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Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value 
Reviewed journal -0.0211 0.0198 0.6026 -0.015 0.014 0.289 
Constant  -0.0004 NA 1.0000 -0.118 0.086 0.169 
Studies   31   31 
Observations    598   598 
Note. The table presents BMA results and OLS estimation from data published by Zigraiova and 
Havranek (2016). Post. Mean is posterior mean, Post. SD is posterior standard deviation and PIP 
is posterior inclusion probability. OLS estimation includes explanatory variables with PIP greater 
than 0.5. The standard errors are clustered at the study level. The inverse number of estimates per 




Results with Alternative BMA Priors 
Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS OLS (Z&H’s variable 
selection criteria) 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-value 
Data characteristics          
SEPCC -1.8036 0.1952 1.0000 -1.4576 0.8458 0.085 -1.3625 0.9114 0.135 
Samplesize -0.0355 0.0060 1.0000 -0.0290 0.0143 0.042 -0.0258 0.0150 0.085 
T 0.0004 0.0033 0.0454       
Sampleyear 0.0032 0.0025 0.6767 0.0033 0.0034 0.324    
Countries examined          
Developed 0.0505 0.0094 0.9985 0.0528 0.0212 0.013 0.0678 0.0292 0.020 
Developing and transition -0.0013 0.0066 0.0671    -0.0094 0.0242 0.698 
Design of the analysis          
Quadratic -0.0484 0.0118 0.9950 -0.0260 0.0170 0.124 -0.0404 0.0194 0.038 
Endogeneity 0.0004 0.0037 0.0409       
Macro -0.0007 0.0100 0.0474       
Averaged 0.0522 0.0283 0.8306 0.0380 0.0263 0.149    
Treatment of stability          
Dummies -0.1596 0.0358 0.9978 -0.1759 0.0372 0.000 -0.1956 0.0401 0.000 
NPL 0.0001 0.0016 0.0266       
Z score -0.0000 0.0013 0.0271       
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Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS OLS (Z&H’s variable 
selection criteria) 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-value 
Profit volatility -0.0000 0.0036 0.0253       
Profitability -0.0005 0.0036 0.0390       
Capitalization -0.0001 0.0031 0.0257       
DtoD -0.0961 0.0323 0.9576 -0.0789 0.0353 0.025    
Treatment of competition          
H-statistic 0.1029 0.0169 1.0000 0.1051 0.0278 0.000 0.0976 0.0327 0.003 
Boone -0.0007 0.0057 0.0548    -0.0011 0.0221 0.962 
Concentration -0.0011 0.0064 0.0580       
Lerner 0.0305 0.0130 0.9311 0.0054 0.0155 0.728    
HHI 0.0018 0.0072 0.0928       
Estimation method          
Logit 0.1627 0.0285 1.0000 0.1737 0.0348 0.000 0.1800 0.0445 0.000 
OLS 0.0002 0.0033 0.0355    -0.0040 0.0247 0.871 
FE 0.0004 0.0037 0.0337       
RE 0.0904 0.0247 0.9932 0.0854 0.0434 0.049    
GMM 0.0081 0.0149 0.2670       
TSLS 0.0004 0.0045 0.0358       
Control variables          
Regulation -0.0094 0.0153 0.3252    0.0032 0.0143 0.825 
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Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS OLS (Z&H’s variable 
selection criteria) 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-value 
Ownership -0.0303 0.0189 0.7799 -0.0304 0.0226 0.179    
Global 0.0364 0.0129 0.9491 0.0217 0.0178 0.224    
Publication characteristics          
Citations 0.0712 0.0096 1.0000 0.0586 0.0163 0.000 0.0613 0.0233 0.009 
Firstpub 0.0322 0.0046 1.0000 0.0260 0.0079 0.001 0.0231 0.0080 0.004 
IFrecursive -0.0010 0.0085 0.0394    -0.0748 0.0548 0.172 
Reviewed journal -0.1162 0.0122 1.0000 -0.0789 0.0237 0.001 -0.0782 0.0310 0.012 
Constant  -0.0012 NA 1.0000 -0.0292 0.1118 0.794 0.0216 0.1174 0.854 
Studies   31   31   31 
Observations    598   598   598 
Note. The table presents results from data re-coding. OLS estimation includes explanatory variables with PIP greater than 0.5. OLS 
(Z&H’s variable selection criteria) includes explanatory variables from Table 3.7.1. The standard errors are clustered at the study 
level. The inverse number of estimates per study is taken as the weight. Post. Mean is posterior mean, Post. SD is posterior standard 
deviation and PIP is posterior inclusion probability.
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3.7.2 Unweighted regressions 
Table 3.8.1 reports BMA results for unweighted regressions based on Z&H’s dataset. 
There are 14 variables with PIP values greater than 0.5. These are subsequently included in the 
OLS estimation. Interestingly, the PIP value for the publication bias variable (SEPCC) is 
relatively low compared to previous BMA analyses, but it is still greater than 0.50. As the 
unweighted regressions produce somewhat different BMA/PIP values compared to the weighted 
regressions, different variable selections ensue.  
The following variables have PIP values equal to, or close to, 1.0000: sample size, 
developed countries, developing and transition countries, crisis as a dummy variable,  
profitability, H-statistic, Logit estimation, fixed effects estimation, two-stage least squares 
estimation (TSLS), controls for bank ownership, number of citations, the year when the study 
first appeared in Google Scholar, and the journal impact factor. Studies with a large sample size 
are associated with slightly lower effect size estimates. Studies of banking competition and 
financial stability using data from developed or developing and transition countries are 
associated with substantially higher effect sizes than studies that have a mix of countries. Studies 
that use a dummy variable as a measure of financial stability also tend to have larger effect sizes.  
Studies that measure stability by “profitability” have slightly lower estimates, while the use of H-
statistic to measure competition is associated with larger estimates. The BMA analysis suggests 
that studies that employ logit analysis tend to have lower effect sizes, while those that use panel 
fixed effects or correct for endogeneity (TSLS) tend to have somewhat higher estimates. Boyd et 
al. (2006); De Nicolo and Loukoianova (2007) recommend that studies include a variable for 
bank ownership controls in the competition-stability equation, and the BMA results provide 
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moderate support for this. Lastly, higher quality studies, as measured by citations, early 
publication date, and journal impact factor, tend to increase the competition coefficient.  
Table 3.8.1 
 Results for Unweighted Regressions 
Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value 
Data characteristics       
SEPCC -0.7259 0.5667 0.7003 -0.5768 0.7862 0.463 
Samplesize -0.0258 0.0082 1.0000 -0.0248 0.0092 0.007 
T 0.0008 0.0034 0.0735    
Sampleyear 0.0006 0.0015 0.1946    
Countries examined       
Developed 0.1530 0.0172 1.0000 0.1519 0.0175 0.000 
Developing and transition 0.1267 0.0172 1.0000 0.1156 0.0170 0.000 
Design of the analysis                                         
Quadratic 0.0012 0.0050 0.0755    
Endogeneity 0.0056 0.0110 0.2461    
Macro -0.0102 0.0161 0.3408    
Averaged -0.0000 0.0024 0.0219    
Treatment of stability       
Dummies 0.1861 0.0281 1.0000 0.1660 0.0176 0.000 
NPL 0.0138 0.0249 0.2739    
Z_score 0.0091 0.0167 0.2660    
Profit volatility 0.0176 0.0238 0.4350    
Profitability -0.0281 0.0232 0.6587 -0.0451 0.0246 0.066 
Capitalization 0.0101 0.0196 0.2437    
DtoD -0.0015 0.0080 0.0674    
Treatment of competition       
H-statistic 0.1294 0.0223 1.0000 0.1123 0.0173 0.000 
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Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value 
Boone -0.0021 0.0088 0.0873    
Concentration 0.0159 0.0244 0.3626    
Lerner 0.0136 0.0211 0.3566    
HHI 0.0103 0.0199 0.2488    
Estimation method       
Logit -0.1304 0.0303 0.9999 -0.1275 0.0121 0.000 
OLS 0.0000 0.0019 0.0214    
FE 0.0621 0.0134 1.0000 0.0503 0.0113 0.000 
RE 0.0128 0.0204 0.3355    
GMM 0.0000 0.0018 0.0221    
TSLS 0.0532 0.0132 0.9999 0.0515 0.0147 0.000 
Control variables       
Regulation 0.0002 0.0020 0.0281    
Ownership -0.0595 0.0096 1.0000 -0.0588 0.0289 0.042 
Global 0.0016 0.0054 0.1033    
Publication characteristics       
Citations 0.0377 0.0063 0.9996 0.0407 0.0087 0.000 
Firstpub 0.0179 0.0033 0.9997 0.0205 0.0029 0.000 
IFrecursive 0.0470 0.0419 0.6405 0.0490 0.0379 0.196 
Reviewed journal 0.0019 0.0080 0.0807    
Constant  -0.1269 NA 1.0000 -0.1263 0.0870 0.146 
Studies   31   31 
Observations    598   598 
Note. The table presents BMA results and OLS estimation from data published by Zigraiova and 
Havranek (2016). Post. Mean is posterior mean, Post. SD is posterior standard deviation and PIP 
is posterior inclusion probability. OLS estimation includes explanatory variables with PIP greater 




Results for Unweighted Regressions 
Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS OLS (Z&H variable 
selection) 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-value 
Data characteristics          
SEPCC -1.9396 0.4485 0.9949 -1.9260 1.1943 0.107 0.2945 1.5383 0.848 
Samplesize -0.0231 0.0065 0.9879 -0.0228 0.0125 0.069 -0.0075 0.0169 0.656 
T 0.0000 0.0015 0.0464       
Sampleyear 0.0078 0.0015 1.0000 0.0092 0.0034 0.006    
Countries examined          
Developed 0.0912 0.0145 1.0000 0.0802 0.0127 0.000 0.0578 0.0243 0.017 
Developing and transition 0.0940 0.0151 1.0000 0.0805 0.0226 0.000 0.0370 0.0220 0.093 
Design of the analysis          
Quadratic 0.0018 0.0063 0.1102       
Endogeneity 0.0587 0.0103 1.0000 0.0634 0.0133 0.000    
Macro 0.2082 0.0295 1.0000 0.1935 0.0588 0.001    
Averaged 0.1059 0.0275 0.9969 0.0884 0.0420 0.035    
Treatment of stability          
Dummies -0.2766 0.0337 1.0000 -0.2498 0.0251 0.000 -0.2333 0.0375 0.000 
NPL 0.0023 0.0089 0.0973       
Z_score 0.0004 0.0038 0.0525       
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Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS OLS (Z&H variable 
selection) 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-value 
Profit volatility 0.0017 0.0067 0.0939       
Profitability -0.0394 0.0206 0.8639 -0.0477 0.0244 0.050 -0.0378 0.0210 0.072 
Capitalization 0.0007 0.0048 0.0538       
DtoD -0.0003 0.0045 0.0477       
Treatment of competition          
H-statistic 0.0994 0.0132 1.0000 0.1001 0.0275 0.000 0.0785 0.0378 0.038 
Boone 0.0003 0.0037 0.0428       
Concentration 0.0012 0.0063 0.0690       
Lerner 0.0139 0.0167 0.4764       
HHI 0.0002 0.0039 0.0483       
Estimation method          
Logit 0.2462 0.0296 1.0000 0.2229 0.0145 0.000 0.2118 0.0389 0.000 
OLS 0.0742 0.0137 1.0000 0.0697 0.0151 0.000    
FE 0.0900 0.0151 1.0000 0.0863 0.0181 0.000 0.0124 0.0217 0.566 
RE 0.1025 0.0178 1.0000 0.1026 0.0457 0.025    
GMM 0.0019 0.0078 0.0880       
TSLS 0.0853 0.0136 1.0000 0.0868 0.0139 0.000 0.0074 0.0260 0.776 
Control variables          
Regulation 0.0004 0.0027 0.0532       
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Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS OLS (Z&H variable 
selection) 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-value 
Ownership -0.0368 0.0099 0.9927 -0.0331 0.0259 0.202 -0.0342 0.0305 0.263 
Global 0.0002 0.0027 0.0422       
Publication characteristics          
Citations 0.0096 0.0091 0.6251 0.0100 0.0076 0.186 0.0298 0.0179 0.096 
Firstpub 0.0024 0.0036 0.3731    0.0118 0.0064 0.063 
IFrecursive -0.0006 0.0062 0.0441    -0.0105 0.0552 0.849 
Reviewed journal 0.0000 0.0048 0.0799       
Constant  -0.0471 NA 1.0000 -0.0342 0.1030 0.740 -0.1044 0.1374 0.447 
Studies   31   31   31 
Observations    598   598   598 
Note. The table presents results from data re-coding. OLS estimation includes explanatory variables with PIP greater than 0.5. OLS 
(Z&H’s variable selection criteria) includes explanatory variables from Table 3.8.1. The standard errors are clustered at the study 
level. Post. Mean is posterior mean, Post. SD is posterior standard deviation and PIP is posterior inclusion probability.
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Table 3.8.2 reports BMA and OLS results for unweighted regressions using the re-
coded data. There are 18 variables with PIPs greater than 0.5. The OLS regression results are 
similar to the BMA results. The last three columns show OLS estimates from variable 
selection based on BMA analysis of Z&H’s data (cf. Table 3.8.1). Tables 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 
again confirm the presence of publication bias in the literature. 
3.7.3 Frequentist methods (all variables) 
Table 3.9.1 reports an analysis based on OLS and fixed effects estimation methods in 
which all possible variables are included in the estimation.  Table 3.9.1 uses the authors’ data. 
The left side of the table reports OLS results, and the right side of the table shows the results 
from panel fixed effects estimation. Note that some of the variables take on the same value 
for all estimates from the same study and thus cannot be included in fixed effects estimation. 
For example, measures of publication quality such as citations, first date of publication, and 
impact factor will be identical for every estimate from the same study.  
SEPCC is significant at the 10 percent level in the OLS regression, and the 5 percent 
level in the panel fixed effects regression. Both estimation methods confirm the presence of 
negative publication bias. Based on OLS estimation, the following variables are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level: sample size; OECD and non-OECD countries relative to 
estimates from studies with mixed countries; dummies as a measure of stability, H-statistic 
and Lerner index as measures of competition; logit and fixed effects among estimation 
methods; and citations, year of first publication and impact factor as measures of publication 
quality.  
Fixed effects estimation omits all the variables constant within studies. The results 
indicate that among data charactersitics, SEPCC is the statistically significant variable  at the 
5 percent level. Among variables characterizing analysis design, Macro is significant. None 
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of the variables providing different ways of measuring stability is significant (the reference 
group is all other ways of measuring stability), while all the variables measuring competition 
are significant (reference group is all other ways of measuring competition). Among 
estimation procedures, OLS, FE, and GMM are significant.  
 
Table 3.9.1 
 Results for Frequentist Methods 
Response variable OLS Fixed effects 
Competition effect Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-value 
Data characteristics       
SEPCC -1.5708 0.8567 0.067 -1.6234 0.6912 0.026 
Samplesize -0.0363 0.0110 0.001 0.0148 0.0212 0.491 
T 0.0141 0.0107 0.188 -0.0511 0.0268 0.067 
Sampleyear 0.0040 0.0033 0.222 0.0057 0.0032 0.082 
Countries examined       
Developed 0.1689 0.0211 0.000 -0.1020 0.0760 0.189 
Developing and transition 0.1008 0.0166 0.000 Omitted    
Design of the analysis       
Quadratic -0.0080 0.0204 0.694 -0.0071 0.0135 0.604 
Endogeneity 0.0240 0.0292 0.410 -0.0292 0.0163 0.084 
Macro -0.0040 0.0364 0.914 0.1882 0.0138 0.000 
Averaged -0.0023 0.0285 0.935 0.0226 0.0151 0.146 
Treatment of stability       
Dummies 0.2232 0.0373 0.000 Omitted    
NPL 0.0299 0.0259 0.250 0.0239 0.0232 0.310 
Z_score 0.0116 0.0249 0.641 0.0172 0.0228 0.456 
Profit volatility 0.0284 0.0206 0.168 0.0192 0.0214 0.378 
Profitability -0.0142 0.0269 0.600 -0.0048 0.0270 0.860 
Capitalization 0.0184 0.0240 0.443 0.0052 0.0254 0.838 
DtoD -0.0157 0.0337 0.641 0.0217 0.0284 0.452 
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Response variable OLS Fixed effects 
Competition effect Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-value 
Treatment of competition       
H-statistic 0.1629 0.0308 0.000 0.0577 0.0201 0.007 
Boone 0.0010 0.2071 0.970 0.0744 0.0112 0.000 
Concentration 0.0351 0.0356 0.324 0.0709 0.0346 0.050 
Lerner 0.0485 0.0188 0.010 0.0721 0.0189 0.001 
HHI 0.0444 0.0257 0.084 0.0654 0.0252 0.014 
Estimation method       
Logit -0.1481 0.0405 0.000 Omitted    
OLS -0.0022 0.0218 0.919 0.0225 0.0108 0.045 
FE 0.0624 0.0247 0.011 0.0392 0.0180 0.038 
RE 0.0317 0.0382 0.406 -0.0042 0.0182 0.819 
GMM 0.0014 0.0159 0.932 0.0437 0.0206 0.043 
TSLS 0.0393 0.0230 0.087 0.0223 0.0186 0.239 
Control variables       
Regulation -0.0184 0.0138 0.181 0.0062 0.0104 0.558 
Ownership -0.0341 0.0227 0.133 -0.0193 0.0311 0.539 
Global 0.0112 0.0176 0.524 0.2391 0.0152 0.125 
Publication characteristics       
Citations 0.0408 0.0146 0.005 Omitted    
Firstpub 0.0159 0.0067 0.017 Omitted    
IFrecursive 0.0890 0.0363 0.014 Omitted    
Reviewed journal -0.0042 0.0271 0.876 Omitted    
Constant  -0.1350 0.1124 0.230 -0.1026 0.1570 0.518 
Studies   31   31 
Observations    598   598 
Note. The table presents OLS and fixed effects estimations from data published by Zigraiova 
and Havranek (2016). The OLS and fixed effects include all the explanatory variables in the 
equation. The inverse number of estimates per study is taken as the weight. The standard 




Table 3.9.2 repeats the analysis with the re-coded data. While the publication bias 
variable SEPCC is significant in the OLS regression, it is insignificant in the panel fixed 
effects regression.  
In summary, the results from the frequentist regressions are generally consistent with 
the baseline results in Section 3.5. In most cases, SEPCC is statistically significant and 
confirms the presence of publication bias. 
Table 3.9.2 
Results for Frequentist Methods 
Response variable: OLS Fixed effects 
Competition effect Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-
value 
Data characteristics       
SEPCC -2.2989 0.7812 0.003 -5.0724 3.4733 0.155 
Samplesize -0.0429 0.0138 0.002 -0.0124 0.0279 0.660 
T 0.0188 0.0138 0.174 -0.0613 0.0332 0.074 
Sampleyear 0.0083 0.0036 0.023 0.0041 0.0009 0.000 
Countries examined       
Developed 0.0706 0.0276 0.011 0.0123 0.0133 0.361 
Developing and transition 0.0484 0.0269 0.072 0.1336 0.0897 0.147 
Design of the analysis 
 
      
Quadratic -0.0077 0.0175 0.659 -0.0090 0.0102 0.385 
Endogeneity 0.0453 0.0167 0.007 0.0100 0.0147 0.502 
Macro 0.1039 0.0463 0.025 0.3090 0.3192 0.341 
Averaged 0.0988 0.0317 0.002 -0.0669 0.0093 0.000 
Treatment of stability       
Dummies -0.2185 0.0331 0.000 Omitted    
NPL 0.0213 0.0278 0.443 0.0274 0.0254 0.288 
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Response variable: OLS Fixed effects 
Competition effect Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-
value 
Z_score 0.0158 0.0261 0.545 0.0145 0.0257 0.576 
Profit volatility 0.0128 0.0207 0.537 0.0167 0.0231 0.474 
Profitability -0.0084 0.0270 0.755 0.0000 0.0270 0.999 
Capitalization 0.0097 0.0245 0.693 0.0096 0.0269 0.723 
DtoD -0.0287 0.0398 0.471 0.0404 0.0300 0.188 
Treatment of competition  
H-statistic 0.1480 0.0349 0.000 0.0707 0.0218 0.003 
Boone 0.0429 0.0279 0.124 0.0828 0.0099 0.000 
Concentration 0.0414 0.0354 0.242 0.1011 0.0286 0.001 
Lerner 0.0543 0.0210 0.010 0.0793 0.0199 0.000 
HHI 0.0266 0.0234 0.255 0.0656 0.0251 0.014 
Estimation method       
Logit 0.2493 0.0501 0.000 Omitted    
OLS 0.0727 0.0269 0.007 0.0404 0.0113 0.001 
FE 0.0883 0.0354 0.012 0.0467 0.0165 0.008 
RE 0.1223 0.0440 0.005 0.0312 0.0178 0.090 
GMM 0.0321 0.0295 0.278 0.0385 0.0192 0.054 
TSLS 0.0735 0.0315 0.019 0.0312 0.0209 0.146 
Control variables       
Regulation -0.0069 0.0098 0.478 0.0178 0.0113 0.128 
Ownership -0.0222 0.020 0.268 -0.0066 0.0168 0.697 
Global 0.0075 0.0153 0.625 0.0088 0.0139 0.534 
Publication characteristics  
Citations 0.0535 0.0195 0.006 Omitted   
Firstpub 0.0171 0.0071 0.016 Omitted   
IFrecursive -0.0286 0.0584 0.624 Omitted    
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Response variable: OLS Fixed effects 
Competition effect Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-
value 
Reviewed journal -0.0681 0.0298 0.022 Omitted    
Constant  -0.0809 0.1132 0.475 0.1260 0.2934 0.671 
Studies   31   31 
Observations    598   598 
Note. The OLS and fixed effects estimations include all the explanatory variables in the 
equation. The inverse number of estimates per study is taken as the weight. The standard 
errors are clustered at the study level. 
 
3.7.4 Specifications weighted by inverse variance of the estimates 
Section 3.7.4 uses a different weighting mechanism to weight the explanatory 
variables. Previous weighted estimates were based on the number of estimates per study. In 
this section, the estimation method weights by the inverse of the variance of the estimates. 
Table 3.10.1 reports results using Z&H’s dataset. The BMA results are slightly different 
compared to the results in Z&H. However, the results from the OLS estimation are identical 
to their reported results. The high PIP of SEPCC again indicates negative publication. OLS 
also finds negative publication bias, but the associated coefficient is not significant. Overall, 





 Results for Specifications Weighted by Inverse Variance of the Estimates 
Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 




      
SEPCC -1.4214 NA 1.0000 -1.0152 0.9359 0.278 
Samplesize -0.0279 0.0039 1.0000 -0.0276 0.0067 0.000 
T 0.0030 0.0054 0.2974 0.0177 0.0097 0.069 
Sampleyear 0.0001 0.0007 0.0761 0.0043 0.0034 0.201 
Countries examined       
Developed 0.1266 0.0074 1.0000 0.1257 0.0158 0.000 
Developing and transition 0.0730 0.0065 1.0000 0.0729 0.0216 0.001 
Design of the analysis       
Quadratic 0.0006 0.0028 0.0760 0.0059 0.0120 0.620 
Endogeneity 0.0004 0.0032 0.0871 0.0060 0.0187 0.747 
Macro -0.0032 0.0069 0.2491 -0.0123 0.0190 0.519 
Averaged 0.0003 0.0022 0.0562 0.0010 0.0125 0.934 
Treatment of stability       
Dummies 0.2131 0.0268 1.0000 0.2346 0.0240 0.000 
NPL 0.0442 0.0095 0.9999 0.0427 0.0231 0.065 
Z_score 0.0384 0.0065 1.0000 0.0377 0.0192 0.049 
Profit volatility 0.0581 0.0075 1.0000 0.0576 0.0187 0.002 
Profitability 0.0135 0.0122 0.6226 0.0193 0.0153 0.207 
Capitalization 0.0408 0.0075 1.0000 0.0402 0.0228 0.078 
DtoD 0.0703 0.0105 1.0000 0.0776 0.0303 0.010 
Treatment of competition       
H-statistic 0.0795 0.0133 1.0000 0.0866 0.0309 0.005 
Boone 0.0000 0.0018 0.0358 0.0153 0.0155 0.323 
Concentration -0.0002 0.0029 0.0391 0.0084 0.0220 0.701 
Lerner -0.0000 0.0010 0.0354 0.0058 0.0055 0.297 
HHI 0.0000 0.0012 0.0386 0.0108 0.0091 0.234 
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Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS 
Competition effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff. SE p-
value 
Estimation method       
Logit -0.1248 0.0273 0.9998 -0.1366 0.0352 0.000 
OLS -0.0002 0.0018 0.0428 0.0111 0.0227 0.626 
FE 0.0697 0.0076 1.0000 0.0757 0.0207 0.000 
RE -0.0007 0.0068 0.0412 -0.0235 0.0619 0.704 
GMM 0.0002 0.0016 0.0413 -0.0004 0.0197 0.980 
TSLS 0.0504 0.0062 1.0000 0.0559 0.0218 0.010 
Control variables       
Regulation 0.0002 0.0013 0.0637 0.0049 0.0059 0.409 
Ownership -0.0026 0.0066 0.1797 -0.0255 0.0210 0.226 
Global 0.0004 0.0019 0.0776 0.0083 0.0143 0.561 
Publication characteristics       
Citations 0.0227 0.0074 0.9405 0.0282 0.0131 0.032 
Firstpub 0.0095 0.0031 0.9368 0.0050 0.0058 0.389 
IFrecursive -0.0006 0.0045 0.0472 -0.0131 0.0446 0.768 
Reviewed journal 0.0027 0.0083 0.1374 0.0108 0.0213 0.612 
Constant  -0.0004 0.0106 0.0414 -0.0845 0.0856 0.324 
Studies   31   31 
Observations    598   598 
Note. The table presents BMA results and OLS estimation from data published by Zigraiova 
and Havranek (2016). Post. Mean is posterior mean, Post. SD is posterior standard deviation 
and PIP is posterior inclusion probability. OLS estimation includes explanatory variables 
with PIP greater than 0.5. The standard errors are clustered at the study level. 
 
Table 3.10.2 reports results using the re-coded data. The results generally align with 
previous findings. Among other things, the BMA and OLS analyses find moderate support 
for the existence of negative publication bias.  The PIP value for SEPCC equals 1.000 in the 
BMA analysis, and the associated coefficient estimate is negative and significant at the 10 




 Results for Specifications Weighted by Inverse Variance of the Estimates 
Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS 








      
SEPCC -2.0504 NA 1.0000 -2.6040 1.3778 0.059 
Samplesize -0.0183 0.0029 0.9998 -0.0229 0.0086 0.008 
T -0.0006 0.0024 0.0872 0.0038 0.0092 0.677 
Sampleyear 0.0005 0.0014 0.1609 0.0044 0.0028 0.118 
Countries examined       
Developed 0.0801 0.0109 1.0000 0.0635 0.0203 0.002 
Developing and transition 0.0773 0.0113 1.0000 0.0681 0.0274 0.013 
Quadratic -0.0001 0.0017 0.0372 -0.0011 0.0133 0.933 
Design of the analysis       
Endogeneity 0.0039 0.0072 0.2847 0.0170 0.0082 0.038 
Macro 0.1038 0.0262 0.9994 0.1256 0.0617 0.042 
Averaged 0.0903 0.0156 1.0000 0.0646 0.0358 0.071 
Treatment of stability       
Dummies -0.2622 0.0294 1.0000 -0.2560 0.0326 0.000 
NPL 0.0471 0.0097 0.9999 0.0447 0.0187 0.017 
Z_score 0.0413 0.0062 1.0000 0.0409 0.0154 0.008 
Profit volatility 0.0606 0.0074 1.0000 0.0589 0.0156 0.000 
Profitability 0.0251 0.0111 0.9136 0.0252 0.0122 0.038 
Capitalization 0.0462 0.0074 1.0000 0.0457 0.0171 0.008 
DtoD 0.0764 0.0131 1.0000 0.0862 0.0203 0.000 
Treatment of competition      
H-statistic 0.0387 0.0188 0.8899 0.0596 0.0232 0.010 
Boone 0.0079 0.0133 0.3198 0.0407 0.0175 0.020 
Concentration -0.0007 0.0043 0.0578 -0.0027 0.0211 0.898 
Lerner -0.0001 0.0014 0.0409 0.0036 0.0103 0.728 
HHI -0.0002 0.0016 0.0439 0.0061 0.0094 0.518 
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Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS 




PIP Coeff SE p-
value 
Estimation method       
Logit 0.3012 0.0304 1.0000 0.3180 0.0361 0.000 
OLS 0.0490 0.0145 0.9894 0.0760 0.0224 0.001 
FE 0.0526 0.0148 0.9901 0.0798 0.0270 0.003 
RE 0.0789 0.0172 0.9984 0.1087 0.0351 0.002 
GMM 0.0047 0.0130 0.1972 0.0267 0.0240 0.264 
TSLS 0.0426 0.0143 0.9852 0.0634 0.0276 0.022 
Control variables       
Regulation 0.0010 0.0027 0.1440 0.0050 0.0051 0.332 
Ownership 0.0002 0.0017 0.0448 -0.0041 0.0147 0.779 
Global 0.0027 0.0050 0.2837 0.0078 0.0120 0.514 
Publicationcharacteristics       
Citations 0.0025 0.0055 0.2284 0.0149 0.0155 0.337 
Firstpub 0.0073 0.0027 0.9271 0.0043 0.0056 0.444 
IFrecursive -0.0238 0.0317 0.4360 -0.0728 0.0526 0.166 
Reviewed journal 0.0017 0.0059 0.1234 0.0078 0.0237 0.741 
Constant  0.0018 0.0143 0.0486 -0.0303 0.0963 0.753 
Studies   31   31 
Observations    598   598 
Note. The table presents BMA results and OLS estimation from data re-coding. Post. Mean is 
posterior mean, Post. SD is posterior standard deviation and PIP is posterior inclusion 
probability. OLS estimation includes explanatory variables with PIP greater than 0.5. The 
standard errors are clustered at the study level. 
 
3.8 Corrections to the Dataset  
When there is an interaction between an explanatory variable and another control 
variable, the competition effect depends not just on the estimated coefficient of the 
competition variable, but also on the value of the interacted control variable. Without further 
information about the control variable (say its sample mean), the interaction coefficients 
should not be included in the MRA. However, Z&H’s dataset includes 52 competition 
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measures where the competition variable interacts with another control variable. This section 
re-estimates the relationship between competition and stability by excluding these estimated 
effect sizes, reducing the total number of estimates to 546. Of these, 148 estimates are 
associated with developed countries, 152 with developing and transition countries, with the 
remaining 246 estimates belonging to the mixed country category.  
 
Table 3.11 
 Estimate of the Competition Effect for Different Country Groups 
Country 
group 
Unweighted Weighted No of 
estimates 
Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI 
All 0.013 -0.013 0.039 0.002 -0.021 0.025 546 




0.008 -0.021 0.037 -0.004 -0.041 0.034 152 
Note. The table presents the mean PCC of competition coefficient estimates for all estimates, 
estimates from developed (OECD) countries, and developing and transition (non-OECD) 
countries. The left side of the table presents, unweighted mean values and 95% confidence 
interval. In the right side of the table, estimates are weighted by inverse number of estimates 
per study. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent significance 
levels. 
 
Table 3.11 reports mean PCCs and their associated confidence intervals for weighted 
and unweighted estimates and the three country groups after correcting the dataset. The 
estimates find that the estimated competition effect is small (< 0.07). It is statistically 
insignificant for two of the country groupings (including the pooled sample of all estimates), 
while achieving statistical significance in the Developed country sample.  These results are 
consistent with previously reported findings. 
Table 3.12 reports the results of the FAT using the same dataset as Table 3.11. The 
null hypothesis of no publication bias is rejected at the 5 percent significance level in all 
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specifications. The findings are consistent across estimation method (unweighted versus 
weighted, FE and instrumental variable methods) and across all studies and just published 
studies.  
Table 3.12 
 Funnel Asymmetry Tests  
Unweighted 
Regressions 
FE FE_Published Instrument Instrument_Published 
SE (Publication 
bias) 
-1.822** -1.944** -1.633*** -2.352*** 
Constant (effect 
beyond bias) 
0.063*** 0.082*** 0.058*** 0.096*** 
No of estimates 546 332 546 332 
No of studies 31 21 31 21 
Weighted 
Regressions 
FE FE_Published   
SE (Publication 
bias) 
-1.615*** -1.607***   
Constant (effect 
beyond bias) 
0.048*** 0.044***   
No of estimates 546 332   
No of studies 31 21   
Note. The table presents the results of FAT. Top panel presents unweighted regressions and 
the bottom panel presents weighted regressions. The standard errors are clustered at the study 
level. Fixed effects estimation uses study dummies and instrumental variable estimation uses 
logarithm of the number of observations as the instrumental variable.  *, **, and ***, indicate 
significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent significance levels. 
 
 
Table 3.13 shows heteroscedasticity-corrected FAT results. The regression estimates 
weighted by precision indicate that the results of 1/SE (effect beyond bias) are statistically 
significant at 5 percent level using instrumental variable estimation. The bottom panel of 
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Table 3.13 shows regression estimates weighted by precision and number of observations. 
The results are not statistically significant at 5 percent level. Further, all the estimates show a 
small (< 0.07) effect size. Overall, results are consistent with baseline specification and 
confirm publication bias in the literature.  
Table 3.13 
 Heteroscedasticity-Corrected Funnel Asymmetry Tests  
Weighted by 
precision 
FE FE_Published Instrument Instrument_Published 
1/SE (effect beyond 
bias) 
0.005 0.068 0.018** 0.056*** 
Constant (Publication 
bias) 
-0.039 -3.192 -0.889 -2.560* 
No of estimates 546 332 546 332 
No of studies 31 21 31 18 
Weighted by 
precision and No. of 
observations 
FE FE_Published   
1/SE (effect beyond 
bias) 
0.014 0.049*   
Constant (Publication 
bias) 
-1.123 -3.803**   
No of estimates 546 332   
No of studies 31 21   
Note. The table presents the results of Heteroscedasticity-corrected FAT. Top panel presents 
weighted regressions by precision and the bottom panel presents weighted regressions by 
precision and number of observations. The standard errors are clustered at the study level. 
Fixed effects estimation uses study dummies and instrumental variable estimation uses 
logarithm of the number of observations as the instrumental variable.  *, **, and ***, indicate 
significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent significance levels. 
 
3.9 Re-estimate the Results for Linear Coefficients 
In total, 12 percent of the estimates use a quadratic specification to estimate the 
relationship between competition and financial stability. While Z&H combine the two 
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relevant coefficients to obtain a single estimate of effect size (see their equation 6), they are 
unable to include the respective covariance term in calculating SEPCC due to the 
unavailability of data. This section investigates whether removing the associated effect 
estimates affects the results.  
The analysis of this section removes the 70 quadratic estimates from the (corrected) 
sample of 546 estimates (cf. previous section), leaving a total sample size of 476 estimates 
based on linear specifications. 120 of these come from studies of developed countries, and 
another 143 come from studies of developing and transition countries. Table 3.14 reports 
estimates of the mean PCCs for the three country groupings. All the estimates are small in 
size, in line with previous estimates. Also consistent with previous results, the mean PCC 
values are only significant for developed countries.  
Table 3.14 
 Estimate of the Competition Effect for Different Country Groups 
Country 
Group 
Unweighted Weighted No of 
estimates 
Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI  
All 0.016 -0.013 0.045 0.005 -0.024 0.034 476 




0.010 -0.021 0.040 0.001 -0.049 0.051 143 
Note. The table presents the mean PCC of competition coefficient estimates for all estimates, 
estimates from developed (OECD) countries, and developing and transition (non-OECD) 
countries. The left side of the table presents, unweighted mean values and 95% confidence 
interval. In the right side of the table, estimates are weighted by inverse number of estimates 








 Funnel Asymmetry Tests  
Unweighted 
Regressions 
FE FE_Published Instrument Instrument_Published 
SE (Publication 
bias) 
-1.847** -1.979** -1.666*** -2.502*** 
Constant (effect 
beyond bias) 
0.067*** 0.093*** 0.062*** 0.112*** 
No of estimates 476 279 476 279 
No of studies 25 17 25 17 
Weighted 
Regressions 
FE FE_Published   
SE (Publication 
bias) 
-1.628*** -1.620***   
Constant (effect 
beyond bias) 
0.051*** 0.052***   
No of estimates 476 276   
No of studies 25 17   
Note. The table presents the results of the FAT. Top panel presents unweighted regressions 
and the bottom panel presents weighted regressions. The standard errors are clustered at the 
study level. Fixed effects estimation uses study dummies and instrumental variable estimation 
uses logarithm of the number of observations as the instrumental variable.  *, **, and ***, 
indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent significance levels. 
 
Table 3.15 reports the corresponding FAT results. The results indicate statistically 
significant publication bias in every regression. As expected, controlling for the negative 
publication bias causes the estimated effect size to increase (cf. “Constant – effect beyond 
bias”). However, even after controlling for publication bias, the estimated effect sizes 
continue to be relatively small, with most estimates remaining less than 0.07. The largest, 
publication-bias corrected estimate of the effect of competition on financial stability (as 
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measured by the associated PCC) is 0.112 (cf. “Instrument Published”). The average value 
across the six estimates in the table is 0.073. 
Finally, Table 3.16 reports heteroscedasticity-corrected FAT results using the sample 
of linear estimates. The analysis uncovers severe publication bias in published studies, but 
four of the six estimates are insignificant. Further, the bias-corrected effect sizes are now 
generally smaller. With one exception, they constitute “small” effects, where “small” is 
defined to be a PCC value less than 0.07 (Doucouliagos, 2011). 
Table 3.16 
 Heteroscedasticity-Corrected Funnel Asymmetry Tests  
Weighted by 
precision 
FE FE_Published Instrument Instrument_Published 
1/SE (effect beyond 
bias) 
0.004 0.078* 0.016 0.058** 
Constant (Publication 
bias) 
0.128 -3.138 -0.608 -2.241** 
No of estimates 476 279 476 279 
No of studies 25 17 25 17 
Weighted by 
precision and No. of 
observations 
FE FE_Published   
1/SE (effect beyond 
bias) 
0.014 0.054*   
Constant (Publication 
bias) 
-1.044 -3.615**   
No of estimates 476 279   
No of studies 25 17   
Note. The table presents the results of heteroscedasticity-corrected FAT. Top panel presents 
weighted regressions by precision and the bottom panel presents weighted regressions by 
precision and number of observations. The standard errors are clustered at the study level. 
Fixed effects estimation uses study dummies and instrumental variable estimation uses 
logarithm of the number of observations as the instrumental variable.  *, **, and ***, indicate 




3.10 Conclusion  
This chapter replicates Z&H’s meta-analysis on how bank competition affects 
financial stability. It performs a pure replication using Z&H’s dataset, and a verification of 
results conducted by re-coding the data using the same studies as Z&H. Both exercises 
confirm Z&H’s conclusions: It finds that bank competition has only a small effect on 
financial stability (less than 0.07). In addition, it finds evidence of moderate, negative 
publication bias, consistent with journals discriminating in favor of studies that estimate a 
negative relationship between competition and stability.  
There is great heterogeneity across studies that have examined this subject. As a 
result, this chapter investigates the extent to which study and data characteristics are 
systematically associated with estimated effect sizes. The large number of associated 
variables leads to the “model uncertainty problem”; i.e, there is uncertainty about the set of 
variables that should be included in an analysis of the determinants of effect sizes. Bayesian 
Model Averaging (BMA) provides an approach to handling this problem. Following Z&H, 
this chapter uses this approach, identifying a number of key contributing factors.  
It finds that sample size, country coverage, types of measures for stability and 
competition, estimation method, and publication characteristics are the key determinants of 
heterogeneity in estimated effect sizes across studies. Large sample size tends to produce 
smaller competition estimates. The estimates from studies of developed countries are slightly 
larger compared to the estimates for developing and transition countries. Studies using a 
dummy variable to measure financial crises tend to estimate larger competition effects. 
Compared to other measures of competition, H-statistic is associated with larger estimated 
effects, and the Boone index with smaller effects. The analysis finds evidence that studies 
that use logit estimation are more likely to produce smaller estimates of competition effects. 
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Further, all the publication characteristics (citations, year publication first appeared, impact 
factor) have high posterior inclusion probabilities in the baseline results and subsequent 
robustness checks. These study and data characteristics help explain different estimated effect 
sizes across studies. However, the main finding from this chapter is that there is little 
evidence to support the view that competition in the banking sector plays a major role in 





 Chapter Four 
4.1 Introduction 
In recent years, a number of studies have assessed the relationship between bank 
competition and financial stability. These present conflicting findings on bank competition 
and financial stability. Some studies support the view that competition increases financial 
stability (Amidu & Wolfe, 2013; Ashraf, Ramady, & Albinali, 2016; Fiordelisi & Mare, 
2014). While others find evidence that competition decreases financial stability (Ali, 2015; 
Amidu, 2013; Bretschger, Kappel, & Werner, 2012; Bushman, Hendricks, & Williams, 2016; 
Diallo, 2015). The previous chapter replicates the paper “Bank Competition and Financial 
Stability: Much Ado about Nothing?” (Zigraiova & Havranek, 2016). This chapter follows a 
similar line of Meta-Regression Analysis (MRA) and examines the findings from more recent 
studies of bank competition and financial stability. These include journal articles, working 
papers, and other studies that were not included in Zigraiova and Havranek’s (Z&H) sample.   
This chapter applies the same empirical methodology and model specifications as 
Z&H to a different sample of studies to estimate how bank competition affects financial 
stability. It collects estimates of bank competition on financial stability from 35 studies
10
. 
Findings of the chapter indicate that there is a small effect (-0.009) of bank competition on 
financial stability, providing further support for Z&H’s conclusion. Further, they confirm that 
the heterogeneity in estimated effects reported in the literature are systematically related to 
the use of different measures for competition and stability, different country categories, and 
different methods for estimating the relationship between competition and stability. In 
addition, the analysis finds no evidence of publication bias in the recent literature. 
                                                          
10
 Appendix 4 gives a list of additional studies. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the dataset, section 4.3 
explains the effect of bank competition on financial stability, and section 4.4 begins the 
analysis by testing for publication bias. Section 4.5 explores the determinants of effect 
heterogeneity in the literature. Section 4.6 applies Bayesian Model Averaging to address 
model uncertainty. Section 4.7 calculates a “best practice” estimate of the effect of 
competition on stability. Section 4.8 undertakes robustness checks. Section 4.9 estimates the 
relationship of bank competition and stability using linear estimates. Section 4.10 removes 
concentration measures and re-estimates the competition-stability relationship. Section 4.11 
summarizes the main findings of the chapter. 
4.2 The Dataset of Competition-Stability Estimates 
Z&H used 31 studies for their MRA. This chapter collects additional studies on bank 
competition and financial stability. Extra studies were collected from the Google Scholar and 
RePEc search engines. Six keyword combinations were used to collect relevant studies:  (i) 
Competition and stability; (ii) Competition and fragility/financial crisis; (iii) Concentration 
and stability; (iv) Concentration and fragility; (v) Market power and stability; and (vi) Market 
power and fragility. Of the 42 new studies found, 7 were eliminated as they did not report 
estimation results or standard error values (or any statistics relevant to calculating standard 
errors).  
All studies estimate specifications of the following general form: 
                                                     (4.1) 
When the study includes an interaction of competition with another control variable, the 
associated estimates are excluded from the sample. This is because the total effect is a linear 
combination of two coefficients. In addition to requiring statistical information about the 
control variable (usually the mean), one also needs to know the covariance of the respective 
coefficients in order to calculate the effect standard error. However, it does include estimates 
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that use a quadratic specification of the competition variable, following the same procedure 
as Z&H whenever sufficient data were available. 
Because the studies use specifications that make use of a wide variety of measures 
and functional forms, estimates were transformed to partial correlation coefficients (PCCs) to 
enable comparability (Doucouliagos, 2011). By converting estimates to a common scale of -1 
to 1, the strength of association across estimates becomes comparable, which also allows 
investigation of their systematic determinants.  The formulas for PCC and the standard error 
of PCC (SEPCC) are as follows: 
     
  
   
     
                     (4.2) 
         
       
 
   
                                         (4.3) 
where t is the t-statistic of the estimated coefficient, df is the degrees of freedom of the 
estimation, and i identifies the i
th
 estimated coefficient. The final sample consists of 762 
estimates from 35 studies, most of which were published after 2010
11
.  
Figure 4.1 presents a scatter graph of estimates over time (specifically, the associated 
PCCs).  The estimated PCC values are close to zero. Notably, they do not converge over 
time. The line shows a slightly positive linear relationship between the competition estimates 
and the year the study was first published.  
                                                          
11






Figure 4.1. The Median PCC Estimates of Bank Competition and Financial Stability  
Note. The horizontal axis measures the year when the studies appear in Google Scholar and 
the vertical axis represents median partial correlation coefficients corresponding to the effects 
of bank competition on financial stability. The line shows the linear fit.  
 
4.3 The Effect of Bank Competition on Financial Stability 
Beck (2008) presents a narrative survey of bank competition and financial stability 
that highlights the diversity on competition and stability in the literature. Researchers use 
various measures of competition and stability to estimate the relationship and there is no 
consistency in these measures.  
One of the challenges in comparing estimates across studies is that some of the 
competition measures are increasing in the degree of greater competition, while others are 
decreasing. For example, a large value of the Lerner index implies less competition, while a 
large value of H-statistic implies high competition. A similar challenge arises with measures 
of financial stability. A large value of distance-to-default indicates more stability, while a 
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4.3.1 Variability of the estimated effects (PCCs) 
The PCCs associated with the estimated competition effects range from -1 to +1. The 
smallest value is -0.8938 and the largest value is 0.9213. Figure 4.2 shows a box plot of the 
PCCs. It illustrates the variability of the estimated competition effects both within and across 
studies. 
 
Figure 4.2. Variability in the Estimated Competition Effects (PCCs) by Individual Studies 
While variability in the PCCs is evident, the majority of estimates are close to zero. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the distribution of partial correlation coefficients. The values are 
distributed around zero. The mean value of PCCs from all estimates is -0.009 and the median 
value is -0.012. There are 27 published studies in the sample and the mean of PCCs from 
these is -0.008. This indicates that there is little difference between PCCs for published and 
unpublished studies, though this will be explored in further detail below.  
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Figure 4.3. The Histogram of the Partial Correlation Coefficients 
Note. The solid vertical line (black line) denotes mean of all PCCs. Two dash lines (green and 
orange lines) represent median of PCCs and mean of PCCs from published studies.  
 
4.3.2 The effect of the competition  
Table 4.1 reports the effect of competition on financial stability. Results are reported 
for three groups. The first row reports results for all 762 estimates from 35 studies (“All”). 
The second row reports estimates for studies that focused on countries from the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), here equated with “Developed” 
countries. These comprise 333 estimates in total. The final row reports 185 estimates from 
“Developing and transition” (non-OECD) countries.  
The left side of the table presents unweighted PCCs, and the right side of the table 
shows weighted PCCs estimates, for the three groups. The weighted estimates use weights 
based on the inverse of the number of estimates reported per study. Thus, whereas 
unweighted estimates weight each estimate the same, ceteris paribus, weighted estimates give 
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estimates. This serves to assign equal weights to studies, as opposed to equal weights to 
estimates, so that studies that report more estimates do not have undue influence.  
According to Doucouliagos (2011), PCC values less than 0.07 are considered “small”. 
By that measure, all the estimated effects other than the weighted estimates for Developing 
and transition countries are “small”. Further, all the estimated effects are statistically 
insignificant.  
Table 4.1 
 Estimates of the Competition Effect for Different Country Groups 
Country 
group  
Unweighted Weighted No of 
estimates 
Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI 
All -0.009 -0.029 0.010 -0.016 -0.052 0.019 762 
Developed -0.006 -0.033 0.021 -0.006 -0.036 0.024 333 
Developing 
and transition 
0.001 -0.037 0.039 -0.024 -0.118 0.069 185 
Note. The table presents the mean PCCs of competition coefficient estimates for all estimates, 
estimates from developed (OECD) countries, and developing and transition (non-OECD) 
countries. The left side of the table presents, unweighted mean values and 95% confidence 
interval. The confidence intervals around the mean are constructed using standard errors 
clustered at the study level. In the right side of the table, estimates are weighted by the 
inverse number of estimates per study.  
 
4.4 Testing for Publication Bias 
Publication bias arises when editors, reviewers, and researchers give more 
prominence to statistically significant results and/or results that confirm theoretical priors 
(Stanley, 2007). This results in an over-representation of statistically significant/theoretically 
confirmatory results in the literature. Doucouliagos and Stanley (2013) find that publication 
bias exists in most of the empirical literature in economics and finance.  
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4.4.1 Funnel plots 
Funnel plots are graphical tools to identify the presence of publication bias (Egger et 
al., 1997; Stanley, 2007). The horizontal axis reports the PCC value, and the vertical axis 
reports either the standard error of the PCC or its inverse (precision), with more precise 
estimates (estimates with smaller standard errors) reported at the top of the plot. When there 
is publication bias in the literature, the funnel plot is asymmetrical because the publication 
process favours estimates of one sign (or size) over those of another (Egger et al., 1997).  
Figure 4.4 presents the funnel plot for PCCs using the full sample of estimates. Figure 
4.5 calculates the median PCC value for each study and plots those. In the first figure, there is 
one point for each estimate. In the second figure, there is one point for each study. Both plots 
fail to uncover any evidence of publication bias, as the respective plots are symmetric around 
the mean value of PCCs.  
 
Figure 4.4.  PCC of All Estimates 
Note. The figure shows a funnel plot of the PCCs of the competition coefficient estimates. 
The size of the estimated effect is on the horizontal axis and precision on the vertical axis. 
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Figure 4.5. Median Values of PCC Estimates
12
 
Note. The figure shows a funnel plot of the median values of PCCs of the competition 
coefficient estimates. The size of the estimated effect is on the horizontal axis and precision 
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FE FE_Published Instrument Instrument_Published 
SE (Publication 
bias) 
-1.837 -2.249 0.023 -0.112 
Constant (effect 
beyond bias) 
0.044 0.060 -0.010 -0.005 
No of estimates 762 598 762 598 
No of studies 35 27 35 27 
  Panel B   
Weighted 
Regressions 
FE FE_Published   
SE (Publication 
bias) 
-1.512 -3.123   
Constant (effect 
beyond bias) 
0.035 0.074   
No of estimates 762 598   
No of studies 35 27   
Note. The table presents the results of FAT. The standard errors are clustered at the study 
level. The panel A presents the unweighted regressions and panel B presents the weighted 
regressions. Fixed effects estimation uses study level fixed effects and for the instrumental 
variable estimation, logarithm of the number of observations uses as the instrumental 
variable.   
 
4.4.2 Funnel asymmetry test 
The Funnel Asymmetry Test (FAT) provides a more rigorous, statistical approach for 
testing for publication bias. It estimates the specification, 
                          ,                            (4.4) 
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where PCCi  is the partial correlation coefficient of the competition coefficient, SE(PCCi) is 
the standard error of the PCC, β0 is the mean PCC corrected for publication bias, β1 measures 
the degree of publication bias, and εi is the error term. A test of publication bias consists of a 
test of the null hypothesis, H0:     . Rejection of the null is interpreted as evidence of 
publication bias (Doucouliagos & Stanley, 2013; Egger et al., 1997; Stanley, 2007).  
Table 4.2 above presents the results of the FAT. Panel A reports the results for the 
unweighted regressions. Following Z&H, the left side of the panel reports panel fixed effects 
estimation with standard errors clustered at the individual study level. The right side of panel 
A shows instrumental variable estimates, where the logarithm of the number of observations 
is used as the instrumental variable. Panel fixed effects estimation controls for study-specific 
characteristics, and instrumental variable estimation handles the endogeneity issue. The table 
also separates out studies that were published in peer-reviewed journals (“Published”). 
Following Z&H, only coefficient estimates are reported, without standard errors. Across both 
estimation methods and both samples (All and Published), the publication bias term (“SE – 
Publication Bias”) is statistically insignificant at the 5-percent level. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis of no publication bias cannot be rejected. 
Panel B reports the results from regressions weighted by the inverse of the number of 
estimates per study. This reduces the influence of studies reporting many estimates. Weights 
are not allowed in instrumental variable estimation. As a result, estimates are only reported 
for panel fixed effects estimation. The results of panel B are similar to the unweighted 
regression results of panel A, with all the associated publication bias terms being statistically 
insignificant.  
One problem with the results in Table 4.2 is that the underlying specification of 
equation 4.4 is characterized by heteroscedasticity. To address this problem, Egger et al. 
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(1997) suggest an alternative specification for testing for publication bias. They propose the 
following specification: 
                          ,                 (4.5) 
where ti is the PCC t-statistic, β0 again measures mean PCC corrected for publication bias, 
and β1 continues to measure the degree of publication bias.   
Equation (4.5) is derived from Equation (4.4) by dividing the latter by         . 
This serves to correct the heteroscedasticity inherent in equation (4.4). OLS estimation of 
equation (4.5) produces efficient estimates of the parameters with consistent estimates of the 
associated standard errors. In the specification of equation (4.5), the independent variable is 
now the precision of the PCC estimate, and the intercept and slope coefficients are reversed 
from equation (4.4). The FAT is still carried out by testing       with rejection of this 
hypothesis taken as evidence for the existence of publication bias. Table 4.3 reports 
heteroscedasticity-corrected FAT results. As before, the results are statistically insignificant 
across the board, in both panels. The interpretation is that there is no evidence to support the 
existence of publication bias. Table 4.3 also provides estimates of the publication bias-
corrected, overall mean competition effect (cf. “1/SE – effect beyond bias”). With one 
exception, all the estimates show a small effect size, with the sole exception being the panel 
fixed effects estimate in Panel B. However, none of the estimates of the competition effect 









Heteroscedasticity-Corrected Funnel Asymmetry Tests  
  Panel A   
Weighted  by 
precision 
FE FE_Published Instrument Instrument_Published 
1/SE (effect beyond 
bias) 
0.030 0.025 -0.013 -0.008 
Constant 
(publication bias) 
-2.409 -1.918 0.837 0.222 
No of estimates 762 598 762 598 
No of studies 35 27 35 27 
     
  Panel B   
Weighted by 
precision and No. 
of observations 
FE FE_Published   
1/SE (effect beyond 
bias) 
0.150 0.053   
Constant 
(publication bias) 
-8.191 -3.282   
No of estimates 762 598   
No of studies 35 27   
Note. The table presents the results of heteroscedasticity-corrected FAT. The standard errors 
are clustered at the study level. Panel A presents the weighted regressions by precision and 
panel B presents the weighted regressions by precision and number of observations. Fixed 
effects estimation uses study level fixed effects and for the instrumental variable estimation, 
logarithm of the number of observations uses as the instrumental variable. 
 
4.5 Heterogeneity  
To investigate heterogeneity in the literature, this study employs 35 variables to 
categorize each estimate/study. The definitions of these variables are provided in Appendix 3. 
Table 4.4 reports the mean, standard deviation, and weighted mean for each variable, where 
155 
 
the weight consists of the inverse of the number of estimates per study. All variables are 
categorized into eight groups: data characteristics, countries examined, design of the analysis, 
treatment of stability, treatment of competition, estimation method, control variables, and 
publication characteristics. 
Group 1: Data characteristics 
The variables grouped into “Data characteristics” consist of PCC, the standard error of the 
PCC (“SEPCC”), the logarithm of the number of observations used in the regression 
(“Samplesize”), the logarithm of number of years in the sample period (“T”), and mean year 
of the sample period (“Sampleyear”).  
Group 2: Countries examined 
One possible reason why competition effects differ across studies is that the effect of 
competition may differ across countries depending on their degree of economic and financial 
development. Accordingly, estimates/studies are divided into three groups depending on the 
countries that were included in the samples of the respective studies. Dummy variables are 
created for developed (OECD) countries, developing and transition countries (non-OECD), 
and for a mixed category, consisting of both developed, and developing and transition 
countries. 44 percent of the estimates are from OECD countries; whereas, 24 percent of the 
estimates are from non-OECD countries and 32 percent belong to the mixed category.  
Group 3: Design of the analysis 
Studies also differ in their design. To capture the variation in design, this study uses four 
dummy variables. The dummy variable “Quadratic” distinguishes linear and non-linear 
estimates. Table 4.4 reports that 6 percent of the estimates are based on a non-linear 
relationship between competition and stability. “Endogeneity” equals 1 if the estimation 
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method used to produce the estimate corrected for endogeneity. Approximately 70 percent of 
the estimates attempted to correct endogeneity. Some regressions used aggregated country 
level data rather than bank- or sub-national data. The variable “Macro” takes the value 1 
when country-level data were used. 16 percent of the estimates were based on aggregated 
country-level data. “Averaged” indicates that the respective competition/stability data were 
averaged bank-level data. This applies to only a very small number of estimates, 
approximately 1 percent. 
Group 4: Treatment of stability 
There is no commonly accepted measure of financial stability in the literature. To address this 
heterogeneity, and to investigate whether how one measures stability affects estimates of the 
competition effect, measures are grouped into seven categories. Z-score is a popular measure, 
with 27 percent of the estimates coming from specifications where Z-score was used as the 
dependent variable in a study of competition and financial stability. Other common measures 
of financial stability are the non-performance loan ratio (“NPL”) and a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 when the banking system has suffered a systemic crisis (“Dummies”). These 
account for 16 and 21 percent of estimates, respectively. The reference group captures other 
stability measures not included in the previous categories. Examples include interest margin, 
liquidity risk, and costs to assets (Akins, Li, Ng, & Rusticus, 2016; Ali, 2015; Huljak, 2015; 
Tabak, Gomes, & da Silva Medeiros, 2015). A substantial number of estimates, 
approximately 21 percent, use these alternative measures.  
Group 5: Treatment of competition 
Like financial stability, many different measures are used to gauge the degree of competition 
in the banking sector. These are categorized by five dummy variables. The most popular 
measure of competition is the Lerner index. 36 percent of the estimates come from 
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regressions that use this measure.  The next most popular measure is the Concentration share, 
which serves as the competition measure for 24 percent of the estimates in the sample. 
Group 6: Estimation method 
A variety of estimation methods are used to study the relationship between competition and 
stability. It is possible that estimation method is systematically associated with estimates of 
the competition effect. To investigate this, the different estimation methods are represented 
by six dummy variables: Logit, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), panel fixed effects, panel 
random effects, Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), and two-stage least squares. Thirty 
one percent of the estimates derive from panel fixed effects, 23 percent from GMM, 12 
percent from Logit estimation, and 11 percent from panel random effects. 
Group 7: Control variables 
When estimating the competition-stability relationship, studies hold constant a variety of 
control variables to address omitted variable bias. Of these, three sets of control variables are 
relatively common. One concern is that the regulatory and supervisory environment can 
affect the estimate of the competition effect (“Regulation”). 9 percent of estimates come from 
regressions that control for these factors. The ownership nature of the bank (e.g., state-
owned) may also play a role. 10 percent of estimates come from regressions that include 
these variables. Most commonly, studies attempt to control for the macroeconomic conditions 
of the economies they are studying (“Global”). 68 percent of estimates come from regressions 
where some kind of macroeconomic control variables are included.   
Group 8: Publication characteristics 
It stands to reason that the quality of a study could affect estimates of the competition effect. 
Several variables are included to control for quality. These are the number of citations 
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received by the article from which the estimate comes, the year the study first appeared in 
Google Scholar (“Firstpub”), the journal’s RePEc (recursive) impact factor, and whether the 
study was published in peer-reviewed journal. 
 
Table 4.4 
 Overview and Summary Statistics of Regression Variables 
Variable Mean SD WMean 
Data characteristics    
PCC -0.009 0.134 -0.016 
SEPCC 0.029 0.024 0.034 
Samplesize 7.779 1.848 7.247 
T 2.425 0.615 2.352 
Sampleyear 9.644 6.076 10.509 
Countries examined    
Developed 0.437 0.496 0.324 
Developing and transition 0.243 0.429 0.343 
Reference case: Mixed 0.320 0.467 0.333 
Design of the analysis    
Quadratic 0.060 0.238 0.137 
Endogeneity 0.693 0.462 0.520 
Macro 0.163 0.370 0.143 
Averaged 0.012 0.108 0.004 
Treatment of stability    
Dummies 0.211 0.408 0.149 
NPL 0.160 0.370 0.199 
Z_score 0.270 0.444 0.335 
Profit volatility 0.039 0.195 0.054 
Profitability 0.058 0.233 0.041 
Capitalization 0.029 0.168 0.027 
DtoD 0.024 0.152 0.009 
Reference case: other stability 0.209 0.407 0.185 
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Variable Mean SD WMean 
Treatment of competition    
H-statistic 0.039 0.195 0.056 
Boone 0.038 0.191 0.040 
Concentration 0.244 0.430 0.213 
Lerner 0.357 0.479 0.357 
HHI 0.139 0.346 0.200 
Reference: other competition 0.182 0.386 0.133 
Estimation method    
Logit 0.119 0.324 0.090 
OLS 0.093 0.291 0.173 
FE 0.315 0.465 0.267 
RE 0.108 0.310 0.081 
GMM 0.232 0.423 0.263 
TSLS 0.056 0.231 0.041 
Reference: other method 0.076 0.265 0.087 
Control variables    
Regulation 0.089 0.285 0.100 
Ownership 0.102 0.303 0.149 
Global 0.678 0.467 0.740 
Publication characteristics    
Citations 0.643 0.516 0.599 
Firstpub 10.571 3.056 10.429 
IFrecursive 0.108 0.134 0.085 
Reviewed journal 0.785 0.411 0.771 
Note. The table presents summary statistics of regression variables. SD is the standard 
deviation and WMean is the mean weighted by the inverse of the number of estimates 
reported per study.  
 
4.6 Bayesian Model Averaging  
In a meta-regression analysis (MRA), the estimated effect sizes are regressed on 
estimate and study characteristics in order to identify and measure the influence of systematic 
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determinants. However, given the large number of variables typically involved in an MRA, 
there is a large degree of uncertainty about the “true” specification. While all possible 
variables could be included in an MRA, substantial multicollinearity is inevitable, making it 
difficult to identify significant determinants. For this reason, a number of meta-analysts have 
turned to Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA).  
There are 35 explanatory variables in this study (refer Appendix 3 for detailed 
descriptions of the variables). BMA runs multiple regressions with different subsamples of 
the 2
35 
possible combinations of explanatory variables. BMA reports the posterior mean and 
standard deviation by calculating a weighted average value from each estimation model, with 
weights calculated from the respective likelihood of the given regression model. BMA also 
calculates the posterior inclusion probability (PIP). The PIP can be interpreted as the 
probability that a specific variable belongs in the “true” model. Eicher et al. (2011) provide 
some guidelines on how to interpret the strength of a relationship based on the PIP value. PIP 
values between 0.50 and 0.75 are considered weak. PIP values between 0.75 and 0.95 are 
considered substantial. PIP values between 0.95 and 0.99 are considered strong. And PIP 
values that exceed 0.99 are considered decisive. 
Table 4.5 reports the results of the BMA analysis, where the respective regressions 
are weighted by the inverse number of estimates per study. The left side of the table reports 
the BMA analysis.  For this analysis, the following parameters were chosen: For the “unit 
information prior”, Zellner’s g-prior was selected. This is the default prior in BMA (Zeugner 
& Feldkircher, 2015). In addition, a uniform model prior is selected (Zeugner & Feldkircher, 
2015).  
The BMA analysis is used to select an amalgamated “best model.” Another approach 
consists of estimating the MRA using OLS. The middle three columns of the Table 4.5 report 
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results of the MRA using OLS estimation. The included explanatory variables were selected 
on the basis of having PIP values greater than 0.5. A comparison of the BMA and OLS 
results reveals generally similar estimates in both sign and size. The exception is the variable 
“Sampleyear”.   
The last three columns on the right side of the table report OLS estimates of the MRA 
where variable selection is based on the variables Z&H used in their analysis (Zigraiova & 
Havranek, 2016). These estimates are not so similar to the BMA and prior OLS estimates. 
This suggests that the variables important for explaining heterogeneity in the estimated 
effects in the supplementary sample of estimates are not the same as the determinants in Z&H 
sample of estimates.  
For example, the BMA analysis calculates a PIP of SEPCC of 0.0260. This indicates a 
very small degree of publication bias.  This contrasts with the OLS results from the last three 
columns of the table. The difference is due to the specification of the model. In this case, the 
OLS results appear spurious, driven by omitted variable bias caused by the omission of 
important variables as indicated in the BMA analysis.   
In fact, the BMA analysis identifies relatively few important determinants of 
competitive effects, where importance is measured by the respective PIPs. According to the 
BMA analysis, an increase in the duration of the sample period (T) by one year reduces the 
effect of competition by 0.04. Estimates for developed countries tend to produce more 
negative estimates of competition effects than estimates for mixed countries. Likewise, 
studies that employ country-level data (“Macro”) tend to find less evidence that competition 
enhances stability. The BMA estimates indicate that estimates based on country-level data 
have PCC estimates that are 0.13 less than other estimates.  
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BMA also identifies Z-score as an important determinant of estimated competition 
effects, with a PIP of 0.9026. The posterior mean estimate indicates that studies using this 
measure for financial stability have PCC values 0.05 less than studies using one of the 
measures included in the reference category of miscellaneous, other measures of stability.  
Concentration is the only competition measure with a decisive PIP. BMA estimates that PCC 
values are 0.13 higher for studies using this measure of competition. According to 
Doucouliagos (2011), this is a “medium” size effect. BMA also identifies HHI as an 
important competition measure. 
A number of estimation methods are identified by the BMA analysis as being 
important. Logit, OLS, panel fixed effects, and panel random effects are all associated with 
generally lower PCC values. Number of citations, year the study first appeared in Google 
Scholar, and whether the study was published in a peer-reviewed journal are important 
quality measures. The associated latter estimate indicates that studies that are published in 




 Explaining Heterogeneity in the Estimates of the Competition Coefficient 




Post. SD PIP Coeff Robust 
SE 
p-value Coeff Robust 
SE 
p-value 
Data characteristics          
SEPCC 0.0028 0.0715 0.0260    -2.1946 1.9596 0.263 
Samplesize -0.0003 0.0025 0.0395    -0.0341 0.0274 0.212 
T -0.0446 0.0228 0.9060 -0.0238 0.0246 0.335    
Sampleyear -0.0034 0.0037 0.5321 0.0017 0.0034 0.624    
Countries examined          
Developed -0.0776 0.0311 0.9335 -0.0351 0.0291 0.227 -0.0284 0.0400 0.478 
Developing and transition 0.0046 0.0151 0.1159    -0.0013 0.0365 0.972 
Design of the analysis          
Quadratic 0.0084 0.0205 0.1845    0.0092 0.0657 0.889 
Endogeneity -0.0180 0.0317 0.3042       
Macro -0.1327 0.0405 0.9797 -0.0874 0.0342 0.011    
Averaged 0.0001 0.0243 0.0174       
Treatment of stability          
Dummies 0.0577 0.0604 0.5488 0.0410 0.0325 0.208 0.0403 0.0399 0.313 
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Post. SD PIP Coeff Robust 
SE 
p-value Coeff Robust 
SE 
p-value 
NPL 0.0026 0.0118 0.0744       
Z_score -0.0487 0.0222 0.9026 -0.0326 0.0300 0.277    
Profit volatility 0.0036 0.0151 0.0772       
Profitability -0.0264 0.0483 0.2762       
Capitalization -0.0009 0.0087 0.0270       
DtoD -0.0028 0.0274 0.0268       
Treatment of competition          
H-statistic 0.0030 0.0130 0.0763    0.0396 0.0667 0.552 
Boone -0.0162 0.0362 0.2110    -0.1164 0.0578 0.044 
Concentration 0.1293 0.0218 1.0000 0.1001 0.0286 0.000    
Lerner -0.0009 0.0093 0.0559       
HHI 0.0637 0.0193 0.9729 0.0751 0.0495 0.129    
Estimation method          
Logit -0.1681 0.0590 0.9976 -0.0842 0.0445 0.058 -0.0817 0.0378 0.031 
OLS -0.2274 0.0297 1.0000 -0.1497 0.0523 0.004 -0.1297 0.0536 0.576 
FE -0.0797 0.0342 0.9507 -0.0359 0.0291 0.217    
RE -0.0981 0.0442 0.9451 -0.0390 0.0398 0.327    
GMM 0.0019 0.0115 0.0565       
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Post. SD PIP Coeff Robust 
SE 
p-value Coeff Robust 
SE 
p-value 
TSLS -0.0014 0.0111 0.0390       
Control variables          
Regulation -0.0003 0.0062 0.0245    -0.0216 0.0386 0.576 
Ownership -0.0121 0.0216 0.2876       
Global 0.0478 0.0338 0.7562 0.0421 0.0370 0.255    
Publication characteristics          
Citations 0.1456 0.0174 1.0000 0.1008 0.0356 0.001 0.0840 0.0253 0.001 
Firstpub 0.0215 0.0048 1.0000 0.0135 0.0045 0.003 0.0137 0.0064 0.032 
IFrecursive 0.0227 0.0670 0.1376    0.1760 0.1119 0.116 
Reviewed journal -0.2189 0.0209 1.0000 -0.1502 0.0481 0.002 -0.1226 0.0505 0.015 
Constant  0.0023 NA 1.0000 -0.0563 0.0836 0.501 0.2280 0.2378 0.337 
Studies   35   35   35 
Observations    762   762   762 
Note. First three columns present results from Bayesian model averaging. OLS estimation includes explanatory variables with PIP 
greater than 0.5. OLS (Z&H’s variable selection criteria) includes explanatory variables from Table 3.5.1 (page 93). The standard 
errors are clustered at the study level. Post. Mean is posterior mean, Post. SD is posterior standard deviation and PIP is posterior 





Figure 4.6.  Bayesian Model Averaging – Model Inclusion Probability 
Note. The figure illustrates results of BMA exercise. Columns represent individual models and rows represent explanatory variables. 
Explanatory variables are sorted by their PIP in descending order. The positive coefficient sign denoted by blue color, negative coefficients in 
red color and the excluded variables from a model is left blank.
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Figure 4.6 gives a different perspective of the BMA results of Table 4.5. It provides a 
graphical representation of how frequently each of the 35 variables appear in the top 5000 
models, where a model is defined as a unique variable combination. These 5000 models, out 
of 2
35 
models, account for a cumulative inclusion probability of 72 percent.   
 
Figure 4.7. Distribution of Model Sizes and Probabilities of Top 5000 Models 
The top figure of Figure 4.7 illustrates that, on average, there are 17 regressors in a 
model. This corresponds to the BMA analysis of Table 4.5, where it is seen that 17 variables 
have a PIP greater than 0.50. The bottom figure rank orders the top 5000 models in terms of 
their “model probability”, which can be loosely interpreted as the probability that a given 




4.7 Best Practice Estimate of the Competition Effect 
This section produces an estimate of the competition effect conditional on “best 
practice” estimation methods, where “best practice” is a subjective selection of data/study 
characteristics believed to produce the most reliable estimate of the competition-stability 
relationship. The best practice estimate is the predicted value of the PCC, based upon a given 
MRA estimated equation. With the associated variables set to their “best practice” values . 
Table 4.6 reports best practice estimates for each of the three country samples in two 
panels. Each panel reports the best practice estimate of PCC (“Estimate”), its 95% confidence 
interval, and the difference with the unconditional PCC mean reported in Table 4.1 (“Diff”). 
Panel A reports best practice estimates using the variables selected by Z&H (2016). The left 
hand side of the panel uses the (weighted) OLS coefficient estimates from Table 4.5. The 
right hand side of the panel uses the (unweighted) OLS coefficient estimates from Table 4.8 
below.  
All the best practice estimates in panel A are statistically insignificant and very small. 
Taking 0.07 as the measure of “small” (Doucouliagos, 2011), all the estimates come in well 
below that. This indicates that the best estimates of the competition effect are negligible, not 
only in terms of statistical significance, but also in terms of economic size. The only caveat to 
this is the 95% confidence intervals based on the weighted estimates display a wide range 
that includes values that achieve “moderate” in size. Despite the efforts spent to improve on 
the unconditional estimates of mean PCC, neither the weighted nor unweighted best practice 
estimates – using Z&H’s variables – resulted in much difference from the numbers reported 
in Table 4.1 (cf. “Diff”). 
Panel B also reports best practice PCC estimates, but these are based on the variables 
selected by the BMA analysis associated with Tables 4.5 (weighted) and 4.8 (unweighted). 
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Variables having a PIP greater than 0.50 in those tables were selected for the subsequent best 
practice calculations. As before, both weighted and unweighted regression coefficients were 
used to calculate the estimates.  
The first thing to note from panel B is that the estimates are larger. This is not 
surprising, because these variables were chosen precisely because BMA analysis had 
determined that they were important for explaining the observed heterogeneity in PCC 
values. In contrast, the Z&H variables were based on an entirely different sample of studies. 
As is clear from Tables 4.5 and 4.8, BMA chose very different variables for this new set of 
additional studies.   
Using the weighted OLS estimates from Table 4.5 produces best practice PCC 
estimates that range from 0.123 to 0.160 for the three different country groups. These values 
are moderate in size, and each of the estimates are significant at the 5 percent level. They 
suggest that competition is positively related to financial stability.  
A different story emerges if one uses the unweighted OLS estimates from Table 4.8. 
The associated regression coefficients produce best practice estimates that are moderate in 
size, but take on negative values ranging from -0.207 to -0.215. All are significant at the 5 
percent level. These estimates indicate that competition in the banking sector is negatively 
related to financial stability. Thus, on the one hand, the best practice estimates indicate that 
the effect of competition on financial stability is larger than indicated by the unconditional 
mean of PCC values. On the other hand, the sign of the estimates depend on the estimation 
procedure used to derive the respective coefficient estimates. An approach that weights 
studies equally leads to the conclusion that the relationship is positive. Alternatively, if one 





 Best-Practice Estimates of the Competition Coefficient 
Best Practice Weighted Unweighted 
 Estimate 95 % CI Diff Estimate 95 % CI Diff 
 Panel A - Variable selection is based on Z&H’s criteria 
All 0.015 -0.217 0.248 0.031 0.002 -0.080 0.084 0.011 
Developed -0.003 -0.203 0.196 0.003 0.002 -0.071 0.075 0.008 
Developing and 
transition 
0.024 -0.237 0.285 0.048 0.001 -0.100 0.102 0.000 
 Panel B - Variable selection is based on Table 4.5 and 4.8 
All 0.147*** 0.041 0.254 0.163 -0.215*** -0.379 -0.052 -0.206 
Developed 0.123** 0.026 0.221 0.129 -0.207*** -0.361 -0.052 -0.201 
Developing and 
transition 
0.160** 0.027 0.293 0.184 -0.215** -0.392 -0.039 -0.216 
Note. The table presents the mean PCCs of competition coefficient estimates for all pooled competition coefficient estimates, those from 
developed (OECD) countries, and those from developing and transition (non-OECD) countries. The left side of the table reports weighted 
estimates by inverse number of estimates per study. The right side of the table presents unweighted mean PCCs of competition coefficient 
estimates. Panel A reports the mean PCCs based on the variable selection used by Zigraiova and Havranek (2016). Panel B reports mean PCCs 




4.8 Robustness Checks  
This analysis follows Z&H (2016) and performs four robustness checks. Firstly, the 
BMA analysis is re-conducted with alternative priors. Secondly, BMA is completed using 
unweighted variables. Thirdly, OLS and panel fixed effects model are used to estimate a 
regression specification in which all variables are included. Finally, an alternative weighted 
least squares estimator is used that weights on the inverse of the variance of the estimated 
PCC. 
4.8.1 Alternative priors 
 
This section focuses on using a different g-prior and model prior for the BMA 
analysis.  It then repeats the analysis of Table 4.5, except that it selects variables from this 
alternative BMA analysis and calculates best practice estimates using the corresponding OLS 
estimates. The results are reported in Table 4.7, where the alternative BMA analysis uses the  
benchmark prior (BRIC) instead of Zellner’s g-prior and random for the model prior.  
The left side of Table 4.7 reports the BMA results, and the right side of the table 
reports the corresponding OLS estimation. The OLS regression includes 14 variables 
calculated by BMA to have PIPs greater than 0.50. The OLS regression coefficients are 
similar to the BMA Posterior Mean estimates in both size and sign. The PIP of SEPCC is 
negligible, consistent with there being no publication bias in the literature.  
The BMA results of Table 4.7 are similar to the baseline results of Table 4.5. The 
main difference is that the variables “Dummies” and “Sampleyear” have PIPs greater than 
0.50 in Table 4.5 but not in Table 4.7. As a result, the OLS estimation in Table 4.7 uses 14 
variables instead of 16. The resulting, estimated coefficients and associated statistical 
significances are similar to the baseline estimates in Table 4.5. This provides some evidence 
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that employing alternative priors for the BMA analysis does not substantially change the 
baseline results of the study. 
Table 4.7 
 Results with Alternative BMA Priors 
Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS 




PIP Coeff SE p-value 
Data characteristics       
SEPCC -0.0004 0.0592 0.0186    
Samplesize -0.0002 0.0020 0.0284    
T -0.0372 0.0239 0.8264 -0.0318 0.0220 0.149 
Sampleyear -0.0019 0.0032 0.3076    
Countries examined       
Developed -0.0778 0.0341 0.9040 -0.0372 0.0299 0.213 
Developing and transition 0.0052 0.0170 0.1104    
Design of the analysis       
Quadratic 0.0053 0.0174 0.1171    
Endogeneity -0.0121 0.0272 0.2148    
Macro -0.1256 0.0437 0.9534 -0.0813 0.0374 0.030 
Averaged 0.0000 0.0206 0.0123    
Treatment of stability       
Dummies 0.0324 0.0523 0.3233    
NPL 0.0012 0.0084 0.0413    
Z_score -0.0556 0.0225 0.9293 -0.0341 0.0303 0.261 
Profit volatility 0.0023 0.0122 0.0503    
Profitability -0.0176 0.0412 0.1864    
Capitalization -0.0007 0.0076 0.0197    
DtoD -0.0021 0.0237 0.0193    
Treatment of competition 
H-statistic 0.0017 0.0098 0.0467    
Boone -0.0141 0.0362 0.1665    
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Response variable Bayesian model averaging OLS 




PIP Coeff SE p-value 
Concentration 0.1269 0.0225 0.9998 0.0975 0.0293 0.001 
Lerner -0.0018 0.0102 0.0576    
HHI 0.0609 0.0204 0.9533 0.0766 0.0495 0.122 
Estimation method       
Logit -0.1452 0.0573 0.9784 -0.0581 0.0315 0.065 
OLS -0.2287 0.0301 1.0000 -0.1519 0.0521 0.004 
FE -0.0730 0.0353 0.9117 -0.0380 0.0313 0.224 
RE -0.0826 0.0462 0.8685 -0.0249 0.0400 0.533 
GMM 0.0017 0.0103 0.0492    
TSLS -0.0004 0.0083 0.0238    
Control variables       
Regulation -0.0002 0.0057 0.0191    
Ownership -0.0116 0.0216 0.2655    
Global 0.0348 0.0348 0.5749 0.0404 0.0350 0.249 
Publication characteristics 
Citations 0.1423 0.0174 1.0000 0.1014 0.0300 0.001 
Firstpub 0.0195 0.0044 1.0000 0.0136 0.0041 0.001 
IFrecursive 0.2074 0.0646 0.1196    
Reviewed journal -0.2192 0.0216 1.0000 -0.1472 0.0485 0.002 
Constant  0.0022 NA 1.0000 -0.0184 0.0827 0.824 
Studies   35   35 
Observations    762   762 
Note. The table presents results of BMA exercise and OLS estimation. Post. Mean is 
posterior mean, Post. SD is posterior standard deviation and PIP is posterior inclusion 
probability. OLS estimation includes explanatory variables with PIP greater than 0.5. The 
standard errors are clustered at the study level. The inverse number of estimates per study is 
taken as the weight. 
 
4.8.2 Unweighted regressions 
The second robustness check uses the same priors in the BMA analysis but does not 
weight the included variables. The baseline results of Table 4.5 weighted the variables by the 
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inverse of the number of estimates per study. In these unweighted regressions, the results are 
dominated by the studies with many competition coefficient estimates. As previously, the left 
side of the table reports BMA results and the right side reports the corresponding OLS 
estimation – first using variables with PIPs greater than 0.50 from the BMA analysis, then 
using the same variables selected by Z&H in their analysis.  
The first OLS regression includes 6 variables, compared to the 16 variables that were 
included in the baseline estimation. The PIP value of SEPCC is slightly less than 0.5, thus 
classifying it as a weak effect according to (Eicher et al., 2011). This supports the baseline 
finding of no publication bias in the literature. While the second set of OLS results include 
SEPCC, the associated coefficient estimate and p-value (0.970) show that there is a reason 





Results for Unweighted Regressions 
Response Variable Bayesian model averaging  OLS OLS (Z&H’s variable 
selection criteria) 
Competition Effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-value 
Data characteristics          
SEPCC -0.4471 0.4942 0.4998    -0.0354 0.9455 0.970 
Samplesize 0.0053 0.0070 0.4217    0.0035 0.0122 0.777 
T 0.0005 0.0035 0.0349       
Sampleyear 0.0044 0.0019 0.9473 0.0026 0.0014 0.062    
Countries examined          
Developed 0.0000 0.0016 0.0141    -0.0007 0.0206 0.973 
Developing and transition -0.0000 0.0014 0.0122    -0.0014 0.0212 0.948 
Design of the analysis          
Quadratic 0.0012 0.0077 0.0392       
Endogeneity -0.0002 0.0026 0.0208       
Macro -0.0006 0.0049 0.0305       
Averaged -0.0000 0.0048 0.0107       
Treatment of stability          
Dummies 0.0003 0.0028 0.0207    -0.0114 0.0209 0.956 
NPL 0.0551 0.0197 0.9619 0.0331 0.0213 0.120    
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Response Variable Bayesian model averaging  OLS OLS (Z&H’s variable 
selection criteria) 
Competition Effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-value 
Z_score -0.0001 0.0020 0.0153       
Profit volatility 0.0000 0.0028 0.0115       
Profitability -0.0103 0.0218 0.2223    -0.0697 0.0220 0.002 
Capitalization -0.0052 0.0179 0.0998       
DtoD -0.0701 0.0507 0.7352 -0.1000 0.0129 0.000    
Treatment of competition          
H-statistic 0.0127 0.0272 0.2151    0.0664 0.0294 0.024 
Boone -0.0568 0.0494 0.6486 -0.0643 0.0553 0.245    
Concentration 0.0064 0.0158 0.1809       
Lerner -0.0158 0.0224 0.3759       
HHI 0.0463 0.0316 0.7495 0.0567 0.0457 0.215    
Estimation method          
Logit 0.0000 0.0020 0.0121    -0.0158 0.0232 0.495 
OLS -0.0037 0.0125 0.1057       
FE -0.0003 0.0028 0.0226    -0.0181 0.0202 0.371 
RE 0.0002 0.0030 0.0171       
GMM -0.0088 0.0168 0.2530       
TSLS 0.0006 0.0049 0.0305    -0.0027 0.0241 0.909 
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Response Variable Bayesian model averaging  OLS OLS (Z&H’s variable 
selection criteria) 
Competition Effect Post. 
mean 
Post. SD PIP Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE p-value 
Control variables          
Regulation -0.0000 0.0019 0.0112       
Ownership 0.0001 0.0020 0.0123    0.0235 0.0465 0.613 
Global 0.0003 0.0028 0.0246       
Publication characteristics          
Citations -0.0001 0.0017 0.0156    0.0087 0.0197 0.659 
Firstpub 0.0004 0.0013 0.1027    0.0045 0.0024 0.064 
IFrecursive -0.0696 0.0742 0.5348 -0.0472 0.0536 0.379 -0.0514 0.0606 0.396 
Reviewed journal -0.0044 0.0132 0.1259       
Constant  -0.0787 NA 1.0000 -0.0379 0.0156 0.015 -0.0751 0.1144 0.512 
Studies   35   35   35 
Observations    762   762   762 
Note. This table presents results from unweighted regressions. First three columns present results from Bayesian model averaging. OLS 
estimation includes explanatory variables with PIP greater than 0.5. OLS (Z&H’s variable selection criteria) includes explanatory variables 
from Table 3.8.1 (page 114). The standard errors are clustered at the study level. Post. Mean is posterior mean, Post. SD is posterior 
standard deviation and PIP is posterior inclusion probability.  
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4.8.3 Frequentist methods 
The third robustness check follows a different approach. It includes all 35 variables. 
Estimation of the respective coefficients is done first with pooled OLS, then with panel fixed 
effects. The panel fixed effects method attributes any differences between studies to the 
intercept, imposing a common slope coefficient (Halcoussis, 2005).   
Table 4.9 reports the results. The left side of the table shows the pooled OLS 
estimates, and the right side shows the panel fixed effects estimates. The panel fixed effects 
estimation omits five variables from the estimation equation (Macro, Citations, Firstpub, 
IFrecursive, and Reviewed journal), because these are the same for all estimates from the 
same study, and thus cannot be included with study fixed effects.  
The coefficient values of SEPCC are statistically insignificant and support previous 
conclusions of no publication bias. Overall, the results of the pooled OLS estimation are 
similar to the baseline results of Table 4.5. Profitability, distance-to-default (DtoD), 
Concentration, OLS estimation, controls for macroeconomic variables (Global), the number 
of citations, year of first publication, and study published in a reviewed journal are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
In contrast, the panel fixed effects results are somewhat different from both the pooled 
OLS and baseline OLS results. For the panel fixed effects model, Endogeneity, Profitability, 
Capitalization, distance-to-default, OLS, and GMM are statistically significant. Studies that 
control for endogeneity are estimated to have competition effects (PCCs) that are 0.07 larger 
than studies that do not control for endogeneity. Studies that measure financial stability using 
profitability, capitalization, or distance-to-default measures are more likely to find that 





Results for Frequentist Methods 
Response variable OLS Fixed effects 
Competition effect Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE 
p-
value 
Data characteristics       
SEPCC -0.4588 1.9175 0.811 -4.8242 5.0451 0.346 
Samplesize -0.0014 0.0252 0.956 -0.1182 0.0948 0.221 
T -0.0433 0.0251 0.084 -0.0233 0.0247 0.352 
Sampleyear 0.0005 0.0038 0.892 -0.0092 0.0052 0.084 
Countries examined       
Developed -0.0257 0.0421 0.542 0.0254 0.0226 0.269 
Developing and transition -0.0161 0.0421 0.701 -0.0047 0.0123 0.702 
Design of the analysis       
Quadratic 0.0124 0.0649 0.848 0.1231 0.1533 0.427 
Endogeneity -0.0003 0.0337 0.993 0.0735 0.0282 0.013 
Macro -0.0520 0.0398 0.192 omitted   
Averaged 0.0210 0.0305 0.490 0.0023 0.0250 0.926 
Treatment of stability       
Dummies 0.0383 0.0605 0.527 -0.0514 0.0337 0.137 
NPL 0.0084 0.0466 0.857 -0.0001 0.0479 0.999 
Z_score -0.0297 0.0281 0.290 -0.0488 0.0321 0.138 
Profit volatility 0.0202 0.0328 0.538 -0.0540 0.0330 0.111 
Profitability -0.0769 0.0249 0.002 -0.0743 0.0221 0.002 
Capitalization -0.0554 0.0463 0.232 -0.1235 0.0313 0.000 
DtoD -0.0917 0.0338 0.007 -0.1018 0.0142 0.000 
Treatment of competition       
H-statistic 0.0976 0.0889 0.272 -0.0481 0.1090 0.662 
Boone -0.0842 0.0736 0.253 -0.0951 0.0869 0.281 
Concentration 0.1321 0.0440 0.003 0.0505 0.0324 0.129 
Lerner 0.0279 0.0410 0.496 -0.0411 0.0375 0.281 
HHI 0.0942 0.0540 0.081 0.0994 0.0552 0.080 
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Response variable OLS Fixed effects 
Competition effect Coeff SE p-value Coeff SE 
p-
value 
Estimation method       
Logit -0.1082 0.0657 0.099 0.0010 0.0194 0.960 
OLS -0.1758 0.0619 0.004 -0.0891 0.0303 0.006 
FE -0.0730 0.0414 0.078 -0.0510 0.0274 0.071 
RE -0.0707 0.0507 0.163 -0.0593 0.0427 0.175 
GMM -0.0513 0.0327 0.117 -0.1429 0.0441 0.003 
TSLS -0.0513 0.0462 0.267 -0.0207 0.0275 0.457 
Control variables       
Regulation -0.0532 0.0334 0.111 0.0238 0.0160 0.146 
Ownership -0.0134 0.0506 0.792 -0.0084 0.0102 0.419 
Global 0.0657 0.0327 0.045 -0.0581 0.0339 0.096 
Publication characteristics       
Citations 0.1037 0.0273 0.000 omitted   
Firstpub 0.0175 0.0058 0.002 omitted   
IFrecursive 0.0763 0.1295 0.556 omitted   
Reviewed journal -0.1475 0.0433 0.001 omitted   
Constant  -0.0249 0.2531 0.922 1.2322 0.8916 0.176 
Studies   35   35 
Observations    762   762 
Note. The OLS and fixed effects estimation includes all the explanatory variables in the 
equation. The inverse number of estimates per study is taken as the weight. The standard 
errors are clustered at the study level. 
 
4.8.4 Specifications weighted by inverse variance 
The final robustness check introduces a different weighting specification. The 
baseline estimation model uses a weighting method that weights by the inverse of the number 
of estimates per study. Table 4.10 weights variables by the inverse variance of the respective 
PCC estimates for the subsequent BMA and OLS estimation. This produces some differences 
in the estimated coefficient values and the statistical significance of the variables.  
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Note that weighting by the inverse variance of the PCC estimate means that the 
constant term represents the SEPCC coefficient in the transformed equation. As a result, it is 
included in every model evaluated in the BMA analysis. This is evidenced in Table 4.10 by 
the fact that SEPCC has a PIP of 1.0000, and its corresponding posterior standard deviation 
(Post. SD) is reported as “NA”.  However, in the corresponding OLS estimation, while the 
estimated coefficient for SEPCC is relatively large, it is statistically insignificant at the 5 
percent level. This again supports the conclusion of no publication bias in the literature. 
It is noteworthy that other variables can have a high PIP value but be insignificant in 
the corresponding OLS estimation. For example, the recursive impact factor (IFrecursive) has 
a PIP of 0.6314, but its estimated coefficient in the OLS estimation is very small (-0.0227), 
with a p-value of 0.777. Of particular interest in Table 4.10 are the results for Quadratic. This 
variable, which identifies estimates where the original study specified a nonlinear (quadratic) 
relationship for competition and financial stability, has a PIP equal to 1.0000 in the BMA 
analysis. The corresponding OLS estimate of the coefficient is 0.2106, suggesting that 
quadratic specifications of the competition-stability relationship generally produce results 





 Results for Specifications Weighted by Inverse Variance of the Estimates 




Post. SD PIP Coeff SE 
p-
value 
Data characteristics       
SEPCC -2.3230 NA 1.0000 -3.7988 2.9350 0.196 
Samplesize -0.0002 0.0014 0.0882 -0.0121 0.0203 0.553 
T 0.0014 0.0038 0.1892 0.0154 0.0107 0.151 
Sampleyear 0.0101 0.0013 1.0000 0.0137 0.0027 0.000 
Countries examined       
Developed -0.0204 0.0277 0.3997 -0.0398 0.0315 0.208 
Developing and transition 0.0016 0.0078 0.0596 0.0131 0.0244 0.593 
Design of the analysis       
Quadratic 0.2486 0.0282 1.0000 0.2106 0.0454 0.000 
Endogeneity 0.0049 0.0093 0.2706 0.0093 0.0173 0.590 
Macro 0.0006 0.0052 0.0300 0.0142 0.0371 0.702 
Averaged -0.0003 0.0087 0.0177 0.0132 0.0216 0.542 
Treatment of stability       
Dummies 0.0000 0.0020 0.0340 -0.0156 0.0199 0.431 
NPL 0.0013 0.0044 0.1031 0.0134 0.0145 0.358 
Z_score 0.0000 0.0008 0.0211 0.0050 0.0123 0.684 
Profit volatility 0.0000 0.0010 0.0172 0.0065 0.0123 0.599 
Profitability -0.0001 0.0014 0.0251 -0.0017 0.0154 0.912 
Capitalization -0.0007 0.0041 0.0465 -0.0227 0.0228 0.320 
DtoD -0.0963 0.0741 0.7021 -0.1106 0.0250 0.000 
Treatment of competition       
H-statistic 0.0046 0.0146 0.1199 0.0103 0.0352 0.769 
Boone 0.0009 0.0041 0.0714 0.0041 0.0087 0.633 
Concentration 0.0002 0.0019 0.0238 -0.0000 0.0114 0.999 
Lerner -0.0035 0.0068 0.2589 -0.0144 0.0100 0.152 
HHI -0.0001 0.0013 0.0293 -0.0065 0.0086 0.449 
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Post. SD PIP Coeff SE 
p-
value 
Estimation method       
Logit 0.0008 0.0037 0.0697 0.0029 0.0057 0.613 
OLS -0.0061 0.0119 0.2499 -0.0405 0.0186 0.029 
FE -0.0032 0.0073 0.2028 -0.0356 0.0185 0.055 
RE -0.0558 0.0154 0.9965 -0.0725 0.0292 0.013 
GMM -0.0683 0.0158 0.9981 -0.0806 0.0392 0.040 
TSLS 0.0001 0.0014 0.0220 -0.0100 0.0071 0.161 
Control variables       
Regulation 0.0001 0.0021 0.0217 0.0026 0.0170 0.877 
Ownership -0.0038 0.0107 0.1453 -0.0093 0.0228 0.684 
Global -0.0001 0.0014 0.0255 -0.0088 0.0109 0.416 
Publication characteristics       
Citations -0.0267 0.0179 0.7452 -0.0259 0.0128 0.043 
Firstpub 0.0024 0.0028 0.5407 0.0053 0.0035 0.127 
IFrecursive -0.0931 0.0749 0.6314 -0.0227 0.0802 0.777 
Reviewed journal -0.0378 0.0490 0.4042 -0.1007 0.0473 0.033 
Constant 0.0012 0.0092 0.0810 0.1084 0.1951 0.578 
Studies   35   35 
Observations   762   762 
Note. The table presents results of BMA and OLS estimation. Post. Mean is posterior mean, 
Post. SD is posterior standard deviation and PIP is posterior inclusion probability. The 
standard errors are clustered at the study level. 
 
4.9 Estimate the Results for Linear Coefficients 
This section re-analyses the data by considering only those estimates that use a linear 
specification for the competition variable in the original study. It excludes all non-linear 
competition coefficients. It does that because the previous analysis ignored the covariance of 
the two estimated coefficients when calculating the standard error of the competition effect. It 
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is not clear how much this changes the results. Given the substantial impact for Quadratic 
identified in the previous section, this becomes a topic of interest. Of the 716 linear 
coefficient estimates available, 318 are from developed countries, 156 are from developing 
and transition countries, with the remaining 242 coming from the mixed country category. 
The subsequent analysis focuses on the estimates of mean PCC and the identification of 
publication bias via the FAT. 
Table 4.11 reports the estimates of mean PCC for the three country groups. For all sub 
groups the estimated competition coefficient is statistically insignificant and the effect size is 
small (< 0.07). 
Table 4.11 
 Estimates of the Competition Effect for Different Country Groups 
Country 
group 
Unweighted Weighted No of 
estimates 
Mean 95% CI 
 
Mean 95% CI 
 
All -0.0122 -0.0323 0.0079 -0.0157 -0.0430 0.0116 716 




-0.0161 -0.0505 0.0183 -0.0319 -0.1059 0.0422 156 
Note. The table presents the mean PCC of competition coefficient estimates for all estimates, 
estimates from developed (OECD) countries, and developing and transition (non-OECD) 
countries. The left side of the table presents, unweighted mean values and 95% confidence 
interval. In the right side of the table, estimates are weighted by inverse number of estimates 
per study. 
Table 4.12 follows the same procedure as Table 4.2 and reports FAT results for the 
sample of linear estimates using weighted (panel A) and unweighted regressions (panel B). 
The results of Table 4.12 are statistically insignificant everywhere and confirm the baseline 




 Funnel Asymmetry Tests 
  Panel A   
Unweighted 
Regressions 





-0.0747 -0.6393 -0.1178 -0.3178 
Constant (effect 
beyond bias) 
-0.0101 0.0100 -0.0089 0.0006 
No of estimates 716 560 716 560 
No of studies 31 24 31 24 
  Panel B   
Weighted 
Regressions 
FE FE_Published   
SE (Publication 
bias) 
1.1511 -0.7584   
Constant (effect 
beyond bias) 
-0.0525 0.0058   
No of estimates 716 560   
No of studies 31 24   
Note. The table presents the results of FAT. Panel A presents unweighted regressions and 
panel B presents weighted regressions. The standard errors are clustered at the study level. 
Fixed effects estimation uses study dummies and instrumental variable estimation uses the 
logarithm of the number of observations as the instrumental variable.   
 
Table 4.13 repeats the analysis, this time correcting for heteroscedasticity, as in Table 
4.3. Consistent with previous results, the associated FAT parameters (Constant – publication 
bias) are statistically insignificant, once again producing no evidence of publication bias. 
Further, the bias-corrected estimates of mean PCC (1/SE – effect beyond bias) are small, less 
than 0.07. Overall, Tables 4.12 and 4.13 produce results similar to Tables 4.2 and 4.3. It 
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confirms that previous results were not driven by the inclusion of estimates derived from non-
linear specifications of the competition effect.  
Table 4.13 
 Heteroscedasticity-Corrected Funnel Asymmetry Tests  
  Panel A   
Weighted by 
precision 
FE FE_Published Instrument Instrument_Published 
1/SE (effect beyond 
bias) 
-0.0062 -0.0025 -0.0122 -0.0069 
Constant 
(publication bias) 
0.1590 -0.2344 0.6330 0.0556 
No of estimates 716 560 716 560 
No of studies 31 24 31 24 
  Panel B   
Weighted by 
precision and No. 
of observations 
FE FE_Published   
1/SE (effect beyond 
bias) 
-0.0037 0.0016   
Constant 
(publication bias) 
-0.2196 -0.5713   
No of estimates 716 560   
No of studies 31 24   
Note. The table presents the results of Heteroscedasticity-corrected FAT. Panel A presents 
weighted regressions by precision and panel B presents weighted regressions by precision 
and number of observations. The standard errors are clustered at the study level. Fixed effects 
estimation uses study dummies and instrumental variable estimation uses the logarithm of the 




4.10 Removal of Concentration Measures 
Some researchers have argued that concentration ratio and HHI are not pure measures 
of competition (Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Schaeck et al., 2009). This section follows up that 
concern by investigating the consequences of excluding estimates that use these measures. 
Tables 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16 repeat the immediately preceding analyses of mean PCC, FAT, 
and heteroscedasticity-corrected FAT, except this time they exclude all competition effects 
that are based on concentration ratio and HHI. This leaves a total of 470 estimates. 243 
estimates are associated with developed countries, 120 with developing and transition 
countries, and 107 with a mix of country types.  
Table 4.14 reports the first set of results for mean PCC. Of the 6 estimates of mean 
PCC, only one -- for developed countries and using the weighted method of estimation – is 
statistically significant. All are economically small, with effect sizes less than 0.07. This is 
consistent with previous conclusions that the relationship between competition and financial 
stability is weak at best.  
Table 4.14 
 Estimates of the Competition Effect for Different Country Groups 
Country 
group 
Unweighted Weighted No of 
estimates 
Mean 95% CI 
 
Mean 95% CI 
 
All -0.0168* -0.0366 0.0031 -0.0378* -0.0805 0.0049 470 




-0.0085 -0.0537 0.0368 -0.0594 -0.1653 0.0465 120 
Note. The table presents the mean PCCs of competition coefficient estimates for all estimates, 
estimates from developed (OECD) countries, and developing and transition (non-OECD) 
countries. The left side of the table presents, unweighted mean values and 95% confidence 
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interval. In the right side of the table, estimates are weighted by inverse number of estimates 
per study. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent significance 
levels. 
 
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 report the FAT and heteroscedasticity-corrected FAT results 
after excluding competition estimates using concentration ratio and HHI. Across both tables, 
the associated FAT coefficients are everywhere statistically insignificant. There is once again 
no evidence of publication bias.  
 
Table 4.15 
Funnel Asymmetry Tests 
  Panel A   
Unweighted 
Regressions 





-2.6876 -2.6905 -1.1234 -0.8654 
Constant (effect 
beyond bias) 
0.0495 0.0562 0.0109 0.0064 
No of estimates 470 375 470 375 
No of studies 27 22 27 22 
  Panel B   
Weighted 
Regressions 
FE FE_Published   
SE (Publication 
bias) 
-2.6611 -2.6816   
Constant (effect 
beyond bias) 
0.0460 0.0457   
No of estimates 470 375   
No of studies 27 22   
Note. The table presents the results of FAT. Panel A presents unweighted regressions and 
panel B presents weighted regressions. The standard errors are clustered at the study level. 
Fixed effects estimation uses study dummies and instrumental variable estimation uses the 




 Heteroscedasticity-Corrected Funnel Asymmetry Tests  
  Panel A   
Weighted by 
precision 
FE FE_Published Instrument Instrument_Published 
1/SE (effect beyond 
bias) 
0.0104 0.0332 -0.0002 -0.0001 
Constant 
(publication bias) 
-1.1507 -2.8162 -0.1576 -0.3882 
No of estimates 470 375 470 375 
No of studies 27 22 27 22 
  Panel B   
Weighted by 
precision and No. 
of observations 
FE FE_Published   
1/SE (effect beyond 
bias) 
0.0370 0.0766   
Constant 
(publication bias) 
-2.9271 -4.9265   
No of estimates 470 375   
No of studies 27 22   
Note. The table presents the results of Heteroscedasticity-corrected FAT. Panel A presents 
weighted regressions by precision and panel B presents weighted regressions by precision 
and number of observations. The standard errors are clustered at the study level. Fixed effects 
estimation uses study dummies and instrumental variable estimation uses the logarithm of the 
number of observations as the instrumental variable.   
 
4.11 Conclusion 
Much research has attempted to determine the relationship between bank competition 
and financial stability, no doubt stimulated by policymakers’ desire to avoid a recurrence of 
the global financial crisis. Despite a plethora of studies, there is no consensus about the 
nature of this relationship. This chapter performs a MRA on bank competition and financial 
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stability from recent literature. A total of 762 estimates are extracted from 35 studies. A 
variety of variable specifications, sample selection, and estimation procedures are employed. 
The generally consistent finding across all of these is that the relationship between 
competition and financial stability, if it exists at all, is small and economically unimportant. 
Further, the literature appears to present a representative picture of this relationship, with no 
evidence of publication bias.  
A closer examination of the respective competition effects reveals that there is 
substantial heterogeneity across estimates. This chapter uses BMA to identify factors that 
systematically influence the estimated relationship between competition and financial 
stability. It finds that country coverage, the type of measures used for stability and 
competition, the type of estimation methods employed, and measures of publication quality 






The relationship between competition and financial stability is highly contested in the 
banking literature. The previous chapters on meta-regression-analysis of bank competition 
and financial stability present reasons for the heterogeneity in the literature. The selected 
sample of countries, sample period, type of measure used to assess the degree of competition 
and stability, and type of estimation methods are all associated with different estimates for 
the relationship of competition and stability. This chapter brings new data to bear on the 
subject. It uses bank-level data in the USA for the period between 2000 and 2017.   
The results of Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) indicate that the effect of competition 
on stability is larger in developed countries (though even there they conclude that the effect is 
not very large). Accordingly, bank level data from the USA would seem to be a good place to 
find a significant competition effect if it exists. Z&H report that there are systematic 
differences in estimated competition effects depending on the type of measure used for 
competition and stability. This chapter uses three measures of bank competition: H-statistic, 
the Lerner index and the Boone indicator. Bank-level stability is also measured using three 
different variables: Z-score, non-performing loans, and distance-to-default. In addition, 
logistic R-squared and the change in conditional value at risk (CoVaR) are used to measure 
systemic stability. 
Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) find that the selected sample of countries, sample 
period, proxy measures of competition and stability, and estimation method are the main 
reasons for the conflicting evidence in the literature. The findings of the chapter empirically 
confirm their conclusions. The effect of competition on stability varies with the empirical 
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measure of competition and stability. When the measure of stability is Z-score, all the 
competition measures are negatively associated with stability. A similar relationship is 
observed when the measure of stability is distance-to-default, though the associated estimates 
are not statistically significant. However, different results obtain when non-performing loans 
(NPL) are used to measure bank-level stability. In that case, the Lerner index and the Boone 
indicator are estimated to be positively associated with stability. Nevertheless, even when the 
competition measures are statistically significant, the economic effects of competition on 
financial stability implied by the respective estimates are negligible. 
This chapter performs several robustness checks. The results change little when the 
sample excludes the global financial crisis. Further, while other studies report that bank 
concentration affects the estimated relationship between competition and stability, little 
evidence of that is found here. Finally, when the relationship between competition and 
systemic stability is estimated, all the competition variables are found to be statistically 
insignificant.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized into ten sections. Section 5.2 presents a 
review of related literature. Section 5.3 explains the different competition measures and 
section 5.4 describes the different stability measures used in this study. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 
discuss the estimation method and data, respectively. The results are reported in section 5.7. 
A variety of robustness tests are performed in section 5.8. Section 5.9 discusses systemic 
stability and section 5.10 summarizes the results and concludes. 
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5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Competition-fragility hypothesis 
Until the late 1960s, the banking sector in the USA was protected by state laws with 
the aim of limiting branches, multi-bank holdings, and interstate expansions. These laws were 
liberalized in the 1970s and 1980s and reduced barriers to entry, encouraging competition in 
the banking sector. In addition, technological changes and developments in the money market 
also contributed to a rise in competition (Vives, 2001).  
Keeley (1990) explains that when there is a competition in the banking sector, it 
reduces the incentive to undertake prudent banking businesses and increases the risk of bank 
failures. Apart from competition, a decline in the capital to assets ratio is another reason for 
bank failures. Keeley (1990) describes two reasons for the decline in capital to asset ratio. 
Firstly, when the asset risk is constant, holding a lower capital level increases the risk of bank 
failure. Secondly, as explained by Furlong and Keeley (1989), low capital requirements 
imposed by the regulatory authorities create an incentive for banks to increase asset risk. If 
banks hold high amounts of capital they can internalize the risk of their business activities 
(Hellmann et al., 2000). The relaxation of capital regulations during liberalization has 
indirectly supported risk taking. Allen and Gale (2004); Keeley (1990); Marcus (1984) find 
that increases in competition reduce the charter value of a bank and hence increase the risk of 
bank failure. This has led to the “competition-fragility” hypothesis. 
Many empirical studies find evidence to support the competition-fragility hypothesis 
(Agoraki et al., 2011; Beck et al., 2013; Berger et al., 2009; Fernandez & Garza-Garciab, 
2012; Fu et al., 2014; Tabak, Fazio, & Cajueiro, 2012; Yeyati & Micco, 2007). These studies 
present their results based on various measures of stability and competition. A full discussion 
of the different measures of competition and stability is done in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. For 
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example, Tabak et al. (2012) use the Boone indicator as the competition measure . Other 
studies use the Lerner index as the competition measure (Agoraki et al., 2011; Beck et al., 
2013; Berger et al., 2009; Fernandez & Garza-Garciab, 2012; Fu et al., 2014). Yeyati and 
Micco (2007) present their evidence using the H-statistic as a measure of competition. 
5.2.2 Competition-stability hypothesis 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) revisit Keeley’s view and introduce an opposing 
theoretical explanation known as the competition-stability hypothesis. According to their 
view, banks compete in both deposits and lending markets. In a less competitive market, 
banks pay low deposit rates and charge high interest from borrowers. That allows them to 
make more profits. At the same time, high loan rates increase the cost of borrowing and 
decrease the profit margin of borrowers. This raises the probability to default the loan 
repayment, which in turn increases the non-performing loan ratio/credit risk of banks.  
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) explain that in a competitive banking system, banks offer 
lower borrowing rates to their clients and this works to reduce the level of credit risk. As a 
result, they promote the argument that competition in the banking system contributes to 
financial stability. Caminal and Matutes (2002) take a different tack to this issue and argue 
that monopolists accept more risk and have a greater tendency go bankrupt compared to 
competitive banks. Increasing competition reduces the power of individual players, and this 
reduces the risk of bank failure.  
Proponents of the competition-stability hypothesis also use a variety of measures to 
assess the degree of competition and stability in their empirical analyses (Amidu & Wolfe, 
2013; Goetz, 2016; Jeon & Lim, 2013; Liu, Molyneux, & Wilson, 2013; Schaeck & Cihak, 
2008, 2014; Schaeck et al., 2009). The estimation results of Schaeck et al. (2009) are based 
on the H-statistic and a dummy variable to represent the occurrence of a systemic crisis. 
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Results indicate that there is a positive relationship between competition and stability. They 
explain that time to crisis increases with an increase in competition. Schaeck and Cihak 
(2008, 2014) assess the relationship between the Boone indicator and Z-score. Their analysis 
supports the view that competitive banks are efficient and stable. Amidu and Wolfe (2013) 
use both the Lerner index and H-statistic as competition measures; and Z-score, NPL, bank 
profitability as stability measures. They find that more competition is associated with greater 
stability.   
5.2.3 Bank level competition and financial stability: empirical findings  
Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) report that empirical studies focused on individual 
countries do not find strong evidence for either the competition-fragility hypothesis or the 
competition-stability hypothesis. Heterogeneity of bank-level studies leads to inconclusive 
evidence. 
 Fungáčová and Weill (2013) analyse the impact of bank competition on the financial 
stability of Russian banks for the time period 2001 to 2007. They find support for the 
competition-fragility hypothesis. Jiang et al. (2017) examine the relationship between 
regulation-induced competition and market risk of US bank-holding companies. They find 
that competition increases bank risk. Fernandez and Garza-Garciab (2012) examine the 
Mexican banking sector. Their evidence supports the competition-stability view. Liu and 
Wilson (2013) find that the relationship between competition and stability varies based on the 
different types of Japanese banks. For regional-level banks, increased competition appears to 
increase risk level. On the contrary, for national banks, increased competition reduces risk 
level. Similarly, Jeon and Lim (2013) also find that the relationship between competition and 
stability in Korea varies based on the type of bank.  
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5.3 Competition Measures 
There is no consensus regarding the best measure to capture the competition effect. 
This section presents evidence for the use of various measures of competition in empirical 
studies. In the early 1990s, empirical researchers used structural measures of competition. 
Structural measures are based on the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis (Berger et al., 
2004). Structural measures assume that greater concentration represents decreased 
competition.  
Two historical measures of bank competition are the bank concentration ratio and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). The bank concentration ratio is defined as total assets of 
the three or five largest banks as a percentage of total assets of the entire banking system. 
HHI is the sum of the squared market share of each bank (Bikker & Haaf, 2002b). However, 
the empirical literature has come to the conclusion that these are not good measures for bank 
competition (Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Schaeck et al., 2009). As explained by Leon (2014)  
“the new empirical industrial organization” proposes that competition can be directly 
estimated using the conduct of firms in the market. These, non-structural measures of 
competition focus on input costs and output prices of firms. The prominent non-structural 
measures of competition are H-statistic, the Lerner index, and the Boone indicator. These 
measures capture different characteristics of the banking system (Leon, 2015). Therefore, this 
study focuses on these three measures of competition.  
5.3.1 H-statistic 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic assesses the competitiveness of the market based 
on revenue and costs. It is the sum of the elasticities of a bank’s total revenue with respect to 
its input prices. It is negative for a monopolist, equal to 1 for a competitive price-taking firm 
and varies from 0 to 1 for monopolistic competition. The H-statistic assesses the ability of a 
197 
 
bank to pass on increases in factor input prices to customers. As explained by Bikker and 
Haaf (2002a), under monopoly, an increase in input prices leads to an increase in marginal 
costs, which reduces equilibrium output, and consequently reduces the revenue of the 
monopolistic firm. This gives a value of the H-statistic less than 0 for a monopolistic firm. In 
a perfectly competitive situation, H-statistic = 1. A firm’s output level remains constant and 
the increase in firm’s price is proportionate to the increase in both average and marginal cost. 
Under monopolistic competition, H-statistic is 0 < and < 1. Banks produce more output and 
price is less than the optimal condition. Revenue of the individual firm depends on the degree 
of product differentiation among the rival firms within the industry.  
Claessens and Laeven (2004) empirically estimate the H-statistic using the following 
method;  
                                                                        
                                        ,                                                               
(5.1) 
where Pit is the ratio of interest revenue to total assets (a proxy for output price), W1 is the 
ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market funding (a proxy for the input 
price of deposits), W2 is the ratio of personnel expense to total assets (a proxy for the price of 
labour), and W3 is the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to total assets (a 
proxy for price of fixed capital), with i denoting bank i and t denoting time t. Y1 is a control 
variable for the ratio of equity to total assets, Y2 controls for the ratio of net loans to total 
assets, and Y3 is the log of total assets to capture size effects. All variables enter the equation 
in natural logarithms. The H-statistic for firm i is calculated as β1i + β2i + β3i. Equation (5.1) is 
estimated using OLS with time dummies, and alternatively with GLS and time dummies. An 
alternative dependent variable is also used to estimate H-statistic, as shown in equation (5.2). 
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(5.2) 
where Rit is the ratio of total revenue to total assets (a proxy for output price), and the 
remaining variables are defined as above. Equation (5.2) is also estimated using OLS with 
time dummies, and GLS with time dummies. The overall H-statistic is an average calculated 
from these four estimation models. 
The interpretation of the H-statistic is only valid if the country is in long-run 
equilibrium. The long-run equilibrium condition is determined from equation (5.3) using the 
E-statistic = β1i + β2i + β3i. 
                                                                          
                                                                                       (5.3) 
In long-run equilibrium position, returns on bank assets should be unrelated to input 
prices (Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Goddard & Wilson, 2009; Schaeck et al., 2009). 
Accordingly, a test for long-run equilibrium is given by H0: E-statistic = 0. When this 
hypothesis is rejected, the market is concluded to not be in long-run equilibrium.  
The estimation of the H-statistic is based purely on bank-level information. No 
market-based information is required to compute it. This is an advantage of the H-statistic 
(Leon, 2014). The pitfalls of the H-statistic are that it can be positive for a monopoly and 
negative for a competitive firm in the short term, or for a firm with constant average costs 
(Bikker et al., 2012). Goddard and Wilson (2009) explain that the static equilibrium condition 
of Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic is not practical because there are many situations 
where markets will be out of long-run equilibrium.  
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5.3.2 The Lerner index 
The Lerner index captures the market power of a bank. It compares the bank’s output 
price with its associated marginal costs. The marginal cost of a bank is estimated from a 
translog cost function (Spierdijk & Zaouras, 2016). This chapter follows the methodology of 
Anginer et al. (2014); Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez-Peria (2010) to estimate the marginal 
cost of each bank. Price and marginal cost are equal in perfect competition, but diverge in 
less competitive conditions. A larger value indicates a wider gap between output price and 
marginal costs and, thus, greater monopoly power (Leon, 2014).  The marginal cost of each 
bank is estimated by using equations (5.4) – (5.6), and then the Lerner index is computed 
from equation (5.7). 
                                           
                             
                                                             
                                          
                  
 
                 
                                                    
                                     
                     (5.4) 
where     is the sum of total costs,     is the quantity of total assets in million dollars,      is 
the ratio of interest expenses to total assets,      is personnel expenses as a percentage of 
total assets, and      is administrative and other operating expenses as a percentage of total 
assets.   indicates time dummies. The subscripts   and   denote bank and quarter, 
respectively. All variables in equation (5.4) are specified in natural logarithms.  Estimation 
uses ordinary least squares with five restrictions imposed on the regression coefficients as 
shown in equation (5.5). 
200 
 
              ;  
                 
                ; 
                 ; and  
                                   (5.5) 
The Lerner index is calculated using equations (5.6) and (5.7) below. In equation (5.6) 
and (5.7),      is marginal cost, and     is the ratio of total revenue to total assets. The 
subscripts   and   denote bank and quarter, respectively.  
     
      
      
 
          
    
     
                                                              ]          (5.6) 
                        ,                (5.7) 
The Lerner index is a flexible measure. It measures market power for individual 
banks. More importantly, it can be calculated with a limited number of observations, which is 
particularly important given limited data availability. Unlike the H-statistic, the Lerner index 
does not require a banking system to be in the long-run equilibrium.  
On the other hand, it does have some drawbacks.  It is a static measure based on the 
price of the bank for a given time period. Further, some would argue that pricing power is not 
a good proxy for competition (Leon, 2014, 2015). Also, Spierdijk and Zaouras (2016) argue 
that the Lerner index is one-dimensional, and that maximum revenue is subject to a minimum 
profit constraint. Oliver, Fumás, and Saurina (2006) point out that market power differs 
across loan products and an overall Lerner index does not capture real market power.  
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5.3.3 The Boone indicator 
Boone (2008) introduces a new non-structural measure of competition. This measure 
considers the impact of efficiency on performance. According to Boone (2008), competition 
tor is defined by two key characteristics. Firstly, firms produce close substitutes and 
secondly, there are low barriers to entry.  
When there is an increase in product substitution, consumers will obtain products and 
services from the firms that charge the least. This leads to a negative relationship between 
profits and costs. Boone (2008) argues that this effect will be stronger for firms in 
competitive markets. Equation (5.8) shows the estimation of the Boone indicator (  .  
                     ,                 (5.8) 
where     indicates return on assets of bank i at time t, and C is the cost.    is referred to as 
the Boone indicator. 
As noted, profits are expected to be higher for banks with lower marginal costs 
(     . The inverse relationship between marginal costs and profits should be stronger for 
banks in more competitive environments. As a result, banks in more competitive markets 
should have   values that are more negative than banks in less competitive markets. 
Schaeck and Cihak (2014) use an average cost to estimate the Boone indicator. Tabak 
et al. (2012); van Leuvensteijn, Bikker, van Rixtel, and Sørensen (2011) use marginal cost to 
estimate the Boone indicator. This chapter uses both the average cost and marginal cost. This 
allows to observe the estimation difference based on the average cost and the marginal cost.  
Marginal cost is calculated from the estimated translog function in equation (5.4). 
Equations (5.9) and (5.10) estimate the competitive condition (   of each bank for the full 
sample period.  
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                                 ,                (5.9) 
                                 ,              (5.10) 
where       indicates return on assets of bank i at time t,    is average cost,   is marginal 
cost, and   is the Boone indicator. Time dummies are included to control for the timely 
changes in the US banking system.  
The main advantage of the Boone indicator is that it estimates the relationship 
between costs and profits in a continuous market. It only requires information about profits 
(or market shares) and costs, and it is a non-price measure. Both the Lerner index and the H-
statistic require static price when estimating competition. But the Boone indicator has its 
limitations. The model used to calculate the Boone indicator assumes that efficiency is one 
dimensional, ignoring other aspects. Banks may convert their efficiency gains into future 
investments. In that case, the efficiency gains of banks from competition do not show up in 
lower costs and/or higher profits in the short term (Leon, 2015). 
5.4 Stability Measures 
This chapter considers both accounting-based and market-based measures of stability. 
Accounting-based measures are computed using historical accounting data. Market-based 
measures use stock market data to calculate stability measures. Market-based measures are 
more forward-looking compared to accounting-based measures. 
5.4.1 Accounting-based measures 
Z-score is a widely used, accounting-based risk measure and it is computed using 
individual, bank-level data. It compares the capital buffer and returns of the bank with the 
volatility of returns, and interprets it as the inverse probability of default (Boyd et al., 1993; 
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Boyd & Runkle, 1993). A higher Z-score indicates a lower probability of default and hence 
more stability. It is estimated as follows; 
           
      
        
        
       
 ,               (5.11) 
where       indicates the return on assets of the bank i at time t,          is the total equity 
of the bank i at time t,           is the total assets  of the bank i at time t , and         is the 
standard deviation of ROA, or the volatility of returns.  
Lepetit and Strobel (2013) explain different approach to calculating time-varying Z-
scores. They recommend computing time-varying standard deviation rather than one standard 
deviation for the full sample period. The most common approach is a twelve-quarter rolling 
time window to calculate the standard deviation of ROA (Beck et al., 2013; Boyd et al., 2006; 
Leroy & Lucotte, 2017). This approach is the most preferred approach for unbalanced panel 
data. It avoids using different lengths of time period for different banks when computing the 
denominator of the equation. This chapter follows the same approach and use a twelve-
quarter rolling time window.  
The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is another accounting-based measure 
for measuring the credit risk of the bank. The higher percentage of NPLs indicates an 
increase in credit risk and less stability (Berger et al., 2009; Jiménez, Lopez, & Saurina, 
2013; S. Kasman & A. Kasman, 2015).    
The accounting-based measures are easy to calculate and can be used for any banking 
system. However, they only consider the stability of individual banks. They ignore the 
spillover risk that a defaulting bank may cause other interconnected financial institutions. 
Furthermore, if a bank is able to manipulate its accounting information, these measures will 
misrepresent its financial stability (The World Bank, 2016). 
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5.4.2 Market-based measures 
The Merton (1974) distance-to-default measure is a market-based measure that 
estimates the insolvency risk of a bank. The measure consists of an estimate of the probability 
of default for each bank at any given point in time. It takes the difference between the current 
market value of bank assets and the face value of its debt, and divides by the volatility of its 
assets (Bharath & Shumway, 2008). A higher value results either from an increase in the 
bank’s assets and/or a decrease in the volatility of its assets (Kliestik, Misankova, & 
Kocisova, 2015). As such, it indicates a lower probability of default, and thus greater 
stability.  
Distance-to-default is interpreted as the market’s perception about the bank’s stability 
in the future (Anginer et al., 2014). This chapter uses the computational method outlined by 
Bharath and Shumway (2008); Fu et al. (2014). Equations (5.12) to (5.16) explain the 
computational method of the distance-to-default measure. 





   
     
   
            
     
 
 
   




             (5.12) 
where    is the distance-to-default,   is the cumulative normal distribution function,    is 
the value of total assets,   is total liabilities as measure of the face value of debt,   is the 
expected return,   is the total dividend as a percentage of total value of the bank,    is the 
standard deviation of total assets, and   is the time to maturity. The subscripts   and   denote 
each bank and quarter respectively. These are further defined below. 
                                             (5.13) 
       
     
     
       
   
     
                      (5.14) 
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                                               (5.15) 
                             (5.16) 
where    is the market value of common equity,    is the standard deviation of equity 




In terms of the calculation of volatility of debt (     Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
assume that the risk of debt is correlated with the risk of equity. Therefore, they include five 
percentage points in the equation (5.15) to represent the term structure volatility and 25 
percent of the equity volatility to allow for volatility associated with risk of equity. This 
chapter follows the same procedure to calculate the volatility of debt.  
The next two market-based measures focus on systemic stability instead of stability at 
the individual bank level. They take into account the interconnectedness of financial 
institutions. The logistic transformation of R-squared (logistic R-squared) and the change in 
conditional value at risk (CoVaR) are derived from the distance-to-default measure and 
examine each bank’s contribution to the distress of the entire banking system as a whole. The 
logistic R-squared measures the total variation of default risk of a given bank explained by 
default risk of all the other banks in a given country. R-squared is obtained from regressing 
change in default risk for bank   in quarter   on average change in default risk of all other 
banks in quarter   excluding bank   (Anginer & Demirguc-Kunt, 2011, 2014; Anginer et al., 
2014; Karolyi, Lee, & van Dijk, 2012; Morck, Yeung, & Yu, 2000).  
               
 
 
      
 
                          (5.17) 
                                                          
13
 When the stock returns of the previous quarter are negative, replace the expected return with the treasury bill 
rate (risk-free rate) of the respective quarter (Fu et al., 2014). 
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The R-squared is obtained from estimation of equation (5.17) and the logistic R-
squared is computed by making the transformation      
   
     
 . High R-squared values 
indicate that banks are exposed to similar sources of risks and that banks are inter-connected 
in a given country. Both interconnectedness and common exposure to risk makes the banking 
sector more unstable (Anginer et al., 2014).  
The second systemic stability measure is the CoVaR. It estimates the contribution of 
each bank to overall systemic risk by following the CoVaR methodology of Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2016). For each bank in the sample, a value at risk (VaR) measure is 
calculated at the first and fiftieth percentiles by the change in distance-to-default at those 
percentiles. The first percentile is when each bank is in the distress level, and the fiftieth 
percentile is of course the median. The change in distance-to-default/VaR variable is 
regressed on lagged state variables. Five state variables are used for the regression as outlined 
by Anginer et al. (2014): change in the term spread, change in the default spread, the implied 
volatility index (VIX), the S&P500 return, and change in the 3 month Treasury bill rate. 
Equations (5.18) to (5.20) explain the associated computational method. 
     
                  ,  P = 1, 50;             (5.18) 
                                 
                           .            (5.19) 
                             
       
                 (5.20) 
In equation (5.18), the VaR/change in distance-to-default variable of each bank is 
regressed on the lagged state variables        -- first for a VaR measure calculated at the 
first percentile, then for a VaR measure calculated at the fiftieth percentile. In equation 
(5.19), the change in value-weighted, total distance-to-default of all banks is regressed on the 
change in distance-to-default of each bank   calculated at its first percentile (when a bank is 
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in the distress level) and on the lagged state variables. Equation (5.20) computes the CoVaR 
of the system for bank i at time t as a function of the change in the estimated distance-to-
default of bank i when the bank is at the 1
st
 percentile minus its estimated distance-to-default 
when the bank is at the median percentile, where the estimated distance-to-default values 
come from equation (5.18).  
5.5 Estimation Methods  
This chapter uses fractional logistic estimation, correlated random effects, and 
ordinary least squares to estimate the relationship between financial stability and competition. 
Equation (5.21) specifies the respective regression equation. The estimation equations 
independently use five stability measures: Z-score, NPL, distance-to-default, logistic R-
squared, and CoVaR.   
                  =                                              
                                                                                           (5.21) 
Z-score, NPL, and distance-to-default are all fractional variables. Z-score and 
distance-to-default produce inverse probabilities of default. NPL is a ratio of non-performing 
loans as a percentage of total loans. All three measures are restricted to the interval between 0 
and 1. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) developed a fractional logistic estimation method for 
estimating models with dependent variables that represent shares or probabilities.  
Four competition measures are used as the main explanatory variables in the 
estimation equations: H-statistic, the Lerner index, the Boone indicator based on marginal 
costs (Boone MC), and the Boone indicator based on average costs (Boone AC). H-statistic 
and the Boone indicator are time-constant competition measures for each bank. Hence, 
correlated random effects estimation is also used to estimate the regressions. According to 
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Wooldridge (2013), the correlated random effects procedure provides a way of including 
time-constant variables in a fixed effects framework. 
Bank-level control variables are the total assets of the bank, non-interest income as a 
percentage of total income, and the ratio of net loans to total assets. The natural logarithm of 
total assets is used to control for the size of the bank. Large banks have the advantage of 
exploiting economies of scale and thus are expected to be more stable compared to small 
banks (Liu & Wilson, 2013; Schaeck & Cihak, 2014). The diversification of revenue is 
measured by the ratio of non-interest income to total income. The expansion into non-
traditional financial services is associated with an increase in the volatility of revenue 
generation and believed to contribute to increasing operational risk (Kick & Prieto, 2015; Liu 
& Wilson, 2013). Banks with relatively high loans to assets ratios are more illiquid 
(Chronopoulos, Liu, McMillan and Wilson, 2015). This is supported by some papers that 
present evidence that an increase in loans to assets decreases stability (Leroy & Lucotte, 
2017; Liu & Wilson, 2013). On the other side are papers that argue that an increase in loans 
to assets can contribute to greater stability if this indicates the acquisition of high-quality 
assets (Amidu, 2013; Soedarmono, Machrouh, & Tarazi, 2013; Turk-Ariss, 2010). Time 
dummies are included to capture unobserved factors that change over time and that are 
common across all the banks in the sample. 
5.6  Data 
This chapter collects data from multiple sources. Quarterly accounting data of 
commercial banks in the USA are obtained from the Standard & Poor’s Global Market 
Intelligence platform SNL Financial (SNL)  The SNL is selected over other databases since it 
provides wider coverage to access data for last 17 years. The other available databases such 
as Bloomberg, Orbis allowed obtaining data for 10 years. In SNL, the availability of 
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observations prior to year 2000 is very limited and due to that reason the sample period of the 
study is restricted from 2000 to 2017. Historical data are available for active commercial 
banks in 2017 and the final sample consists of 883 banks for 72 quarters. This is an 
unbalanced sample.  The bank-level competition measures are calculated using time series 
regressions and an adequate number of observations are required to calculate all competition 
measures for each bank. Hence, this chapter uses quarterly data for each bank instead of 
annual data. All the variables are winsorized to reduce the influence of outliers.  
Market-based data are collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP). It provides an accurate, survivor bias-free historical stock market data. Quarterly 
averages of the 3-month Treasury bill rate, the default spread (TED spread), and long term 
government bond yields are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The 
volatility index (VIX) is collected from Chicago Board Options Exchange. S&P 500 prices 
are obtained from Yahoo Finance. The concentration ratio for the USA is available from the 




5.7.1 Pairwise correlations 
H-statistic, Lerner index, Boone MC, and Boone AC are the four measures of 
competition used in this analysis. The H-statistic assumes that the market is in equilibrium. 
The long-run equilibrium condition for the H-statistic is tested via estimation of equation 
(5.3) (Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Goddard & Wilson, 2009; Schaeck et al., 2009). The p-
value of the associated F-test is 0.3778 (see above). As a result, one cannot reject the null 
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hypothesis that the banking system in the USA was in long-run equilibrium during the period 
of study of this analysis. 
Tables 5.1A, 5.1B and 5.1C report pairwise correlations for the four competition 
measures. In Table 5.1A, the sample sizes differ for each pair of correlations. In tables 5.1B 
and 5.1C, correlations are calculated over a common set of observations.  Tables 5.1A and 
5.1B use the Boone indicator calculated with marginal costs. Table 5.1C repeats the analysis, 
replacing the Boone indicator using marginal costs with the Boone indicator calculated with 
average costs. While the pairwise correlations are small in size, they are all highly significant, 
no doubt due in part to the large sample sizes. The low correlations indicate that these 
measures, though all intended to measure the same thing, are at best picking up different 
aspects of competition, or at worst are in one or more instances poorly measuring competition 
(Leon, 2015).  
The Lerner index is constructed to decrease as competition increases, while H-statistic 
is designed to increase as the degree of competition increases. Accordingly, as expected, the 
Lerner index is negatively correlated with H-statistic in all three tables. Like the Lerner 
index, the Boone indicator is constructed to decrease in value with increasing competition. As 
also expected, both versions of the Boone indicator are positively associated with the Lerner 
index. Interestingly, both Lerner and Boone MC are based on marginal costs and the 
associated pairwise correlation between these two variables (approximately 0.24 in tables 
5.1A and 5.1B) is larger than the pairwise correlation using the average costs version of the 
Boone indicator (approximately 0.13, see table 5.1C). However, contrary to expectations, the 
Boone indicator – both versions -- are positively correlated with H-statistic. While it is 
somewhat unusual that two variables are positively associated with each but have a 
differently signed correlations with a third variable, it is certainly possible, and 




Pairwise Correlations  
























Note. This table considers the H-statistic, Lerner index and Boone MC as the competition 
measures. H-statistic, Lerner, and Boone MC are described in the text. Number of pairwise 
observations differ because the availability of data. 
 
Table 5.1B  
Pairwise Correlations with Common Observations  
























Note. This table considers the H-statistic, Lerner index and Boone MC as the competition 





Pairwise Correlation with Common Observations 
























Note. This table considers the H-statistic, Lerner index and Boone AC as the competition 
measures. H-statistic, Lerner, and Boone AC are described in the text. 
 
5.7.2 Evaluating the impact of competition on stability 
The impact of bank competition on financial stability is estimated using both 
fractional logistic estimation and correlated random effects. Tables 5.2 to 5.7 report the 
results using three stability measures as the dependent variable: Z-score, NPL ratio, and 
distance-to-default. 
5.7.2.1 Z-score as the stability measure 
Table 5.2 reports estimates of various specifications of the relationship between 
stability and competition. In each specification, the dependent variable is Z-score, with 
increases in Z-score indicating greater financial stability. Columns (1) through (4) report the 
results of specifications that include each competition variable separately. Columns (5) and 
(6) combine H-statistic, Lerner, and Boone in a single specification. Column (5) uses Boone 
MC as the Boone indicator, and column (6) uses Boone AC as the Boone indicator. The H-
213 
 
statistic measure is designed to increase with greater competition. The Lerner and Boone 
measures are decreasing in greater competition.   
Beginning with column (1) and H-statistic, the sign of the coefficient suggests a 
negative association between competition and stability. However, the associated t-statistic is -
0.63, so this is a weak result. The results for the other competition measures are stronger. The 
estimated coefficients for Lerner, Boone MC, and Boone AC, are statistically significant at 
the 5-percent level in columns (2)-(6). The positive coefficients indicate that these 
competition measures are also negatively associated with financial stability. These findings 
are in line with those reported in Agoraki et al. (2011); A. Kasman and S. Kasman (2015).  
Bank size (“Assets”) is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets and is 
positively associated with bank stability, consistent with previous studies (Beck et al., 2013). 
Income diversification, represented by “Non-interest”, shows a negative association with Z-
score, also consistent with previous studies (Beck et al., 2013; Leroy & Lucotte, 2017; Liu et 
al., 2013). When a bank expands into non-traditional financial services, this can increase the 
volatility of revenue generation, which in turn can contribute to instability (Kick & Prieto, 
2015; Liu & Wilson, 2013). A negative coefficient of loans to total assets (“Loans”) can 
signal illiquidity problems associated with higher debt. Liu and Wilson (2013) report a 
similar finding for the Japanese banking sector, confirming that a higher proportion of loans 





 Effect of Bank Competition on Financial Stability (Z-score as the Stability Measure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
H-statistic -0.0478 
(0.0758) 





































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 41,252 41,094 41,315 41,315 41,030 41,030 
Banks  880 874 882 882 871 871 
Note. The table reports estimation results from the fractional logistic estimation. The 
dependent variable is the Z-score. The numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients 
are cluster robust standard errors, clustered on bank. Column (1) uses H-statistic; column (2) 
uses Lerner index; column (3) uses Boone MC; and column (4) uses Boone AC as 
competition variable in the respective specifications. Columns (5) and (6) estimate the 
regression with all the competition measures. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 
5-, and 1-percent significance levels.  
 
Table 5.3 follows the same specifications as Table 5.2 but estimates the models with 
correlated random effects. The results are generally similar to those in Table 5.2, with two 
exceptions. The first exception is that H-statistic is now statistically significant in some of the 
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specifications. This confirms the results from Table 5.2 that showed a consistently negative 
relationship between competition and stability.  
The second exception concerns the Loans variable. Unlike the previous estimation, 
the estimated coefficient for this variable is positive, indicating that an increase in the ratio of 
loans to total assets is positively associated with stability. Other studies have also found this 
on occasion and explain it by saying that this suggests that the bank’s loan portfolio contains 
high-quality loans, and more high-quality loans contribute to greater financial stability 
(Amidu, 2013; Soedarmono et al., 2013; Turk-Ariss, 2010).  
According to the results of Tables 5.2 and 5.3, when Z-score is used as the stability 
measure, the associated estimation finds that competition is negatively associated with 

















 Effect of Bank Competition on Financial Stability (Z-score as the Stability Measure)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
H-statistic -0.0009* 
(0.0005) 






































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 41,252 41,094 41,315 41,315 41,030 41,030 
Banks  880 874 882 882 871 871 
Note. The table reports estimation results from the correlated random effects estimation. The 
dependent variable is the Z-score. The numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients 
are cluster robust standard errors, clustered on bank. Column (1) uses H-statistic; column (2) 
uses Lerner index; column (3) uses Boone MC; and column (4) uses Boone AC as 
competition variable in the respective specifications. Columns (5) and (6) estimate the 
regression with all the competition measures. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 




5.7.2.2 NPL as the stability measure  
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 repeat the analysis of Tables 5.2 and 5.3 except they use the NPL 
ratio as the dependent variable. Increases in NPL indicate decreased financial stability. In 
Table 5.4, the estimated coefficient for H-statistic is positive, suggesting that competition is 
negatively associated with stability, however the estimated coefficient never achieves a 5-
percent significance level.  
In contrast, the positive and significant coefficients for Lerner and Boone MC indicate 
that banks in less competitive banking sectors tend to have a greater proportion of non-
performing loans, and thus are less stable. This supports the competition-stability hypothesis 
and is in line with the empirical findings of Berger et al. (2009). The Boone AC coefficients, 
while differently signed from the Boone MC coefficients, have large standard errors so that 
little can be concluded from these. 
With respect to the control variables, bank size (“Assets”) again displays a positive 
and significant association with financial stability. This is consistent with large banks being 
able to maintain stable loan portfolios, resulting in a low credit risk (Agoraki et al., 2011). 
The other control variables never achieve statistical significance. 
The correlated random effects results of the same specifications are reported in Table 
5.5. While most of the results are qualitatively the same, there are three differences. First, H-
statistic, while still indicating a negative association with financial stability, is now 
significant at the 5-percent level in two of the regressions. The second difference is that 
Lerner now falls to statistical insignificance in all the regressions in which it appears. And the 
last difference is that Loans is now statistically significant across all six regressions. The 
negative coefficient indicates that a higher loan to assets ratio is associated with fewer non-
performing loans. This is consistent with the findings from table 5.3.  
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In summary, the results using NPL as a dependent variables are somewhat different 
from those using Z-score as a measure of stability, particularly with respect to the Lerner and 
Boone competition variables. This confirms the findings of Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) 
who found that the sign of the estimated relationship between bank competition and stability 
depends on the measure of stability, among other things. 
Table 5.4  
Effect of Bank Competition on Financial Stability (NPL as the Stability Measure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
H-statistic 0.2037* 
(0.1074) 





































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 44,008 43,876 44,072 44,072 43,811 43,811 
Banks  877 872 879 879 869 869 
Note. The table reports estimation results from the fractional logistic estimation. The 
dependent variable is the NPL. The numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients are 
cluster robust standard errors, clustered on bank. Column (1) uses H-statistic; column (2) uses 
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Lerner index; column (3) uses Boone MC; and column (4) uses Boone AC as competition 
variable in the respective specifications. Columns (5) and (6) estimate the regression with all 
the competition measures. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent 
significance levels.  
 
Table 5.5 
Effect of Bank Competition on Financial Stability (NPL as the Stability Measure)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
H-statistic 0.0055** 
(0.0021) 





































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 44,008 43,876 44,072 44,072 43,811 43,811 
Banks 877 872 879 879 869 869 
Note. The table reports estimation results from the correlated random effects estimation. The 
dependent variable is the NPL.  The numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients are 
cluster robust standard errors, clustered on bank. Column (1) uses H-statistic; column (2) uses 
Lerner index; column (3) uses Boone MC; and column (4) uses Boone AC as competition 
variable in the respective specifications. Columns (5) and (6) estimate the regression with all 
the competition measures. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent 




5.7.2.3 Distance-to-default as the stability measure 
The measure of stability used in the estimation of Tables 5.6 and 5.7 is distance-to-
default. These tables follow the same specifications and estimation methods as the previous 
tables. Like Z-score, distance-to-default measures the inverse probability of default, so that 
increases in this variable are associated with greater financial stability. Distance-to-default is 
a market-level measure requiring stock market data. As not all banks are listed, this limits the 
number of observations available for estimation. The analysis here uses 359banks. 
 As in previous tables, H-statistic is negatively associated with financial stability in 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7. However, the respective coefficients are never significant at the 5-percent 
level. Similarly, decreases in competition as measured by Lerner, Boone MC, and Boone AC 
are associated with increased stability, though again none of the estimated coefficients are 
significant. From the bank-level control variables, only size of bank (“Assets”) is statistically 
significant, and that only in some of the specifications of table 5.6. As before, the results 
indicate that larger banks are more stable.  
In summary, the results from regressions using distance-to-default as a measure of 
financial stability are generally statistically insignificant. The only variable which achieves 
significance, and that only in a few regressions, is bank size. None of the competition 
variables achieve statistical significance at the 5-percent level, though the signs of the 








 Effect of Bank Competition on Financial Stability (Distance-to-default as the stability 
measure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
H-statistic -0.0904* 
(0.0494) 





































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 10,032 10,032 10,032 10,032 10,032 10,032 
Banks 359 359 359 359 359 359 
Note. The table reports estimation results from the fractional logistic estimation. The 
dependent variable is the distance-to-default. The numbers in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, clustered on bank. Column (1) uses H-statistic; 
column (2) uses Lerner index; column (3) uses Boone MC; and column (4) uses Boone AC as 
competition variable in the respective specifications. Columns (5) and (6) estimate the 
regression with all the competition measures. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 






 Effect of Bank Competition on Financial Stability (Distance-to-default as the stability 
measure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
H-statistic -0.0174* 
(0.0098) 





































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 10,032 10,032 10,032 10,032 10,032 10,032 
Banks 359 359 359 359 359 359 
Note. The table reports estimation results from the correlated random effects estimation. The 
dependent variable is the distance-to-default. The numbers in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, clustered on bank. Column (1) uses H-statistic; 
column (2) uses Lerner index; column (3) uses Boone MC; and column (4) uses Boone AC as 
competition variable in the respective specifications. Columns (5) and (6) estimate the 
regression with all the competition measures. *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10-, 




5.7.3 Estimation of the effect size 
This section translates the estimation results of the previous section into economically 
meaningful numbers. Table 5.8 reports estimated effects for the fractional logistic regression 
model, and Table 5.9 does the same for the correlated random effects model. In each table, 
the economic effects associated with H-statistic, Lerner, Boone MC, and Boone AC are 
calculated from columns (1) through (4) of the respective regressions in Table 5.2 through 
5.7. In other words, the economic effects come from specifications in which the respective 
competition variable is the only competition variable in the regression. To estimate the 
economic effects, each of the competition variables are increased from their 25
th
 percentile 
value to their 75
th
 percentile value, while the control variables are held constant at their mean 
values. The economic effect is calculated as the associated change in the predicted value of 
the dependent variable. Each table has three panels, depending on the respective measure of 
stability: Z-score (panel A), NPL (panel B), and distance-to-default (panel C). The mean of 
the respective dependent variables are reported in each panel to provide a numerical context 
for the size of the associated change in the dependent variable. 





value reduces the inverse probability of default by 0.01 percentage points. In panel B, a 
similarly-sized change in H-statistic is associated with an increase in NPL of 0.13 percentage 
points. And in panel C, the same change in H-statistic is associated with a decrease in 
distance-to-default of 0.66 percentage points. The associated mean values for Z-score, NPL, 
and distance-to-default are 0.58, 1.82, and 72.77 percent, respectively. These provide a 
numerical context for assessing the respective size of the changes. As such it is clear that the 





 percentile value are very, very small. Further, the underlying coefficient estimates 
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for H-statistic that are used to calculate these are in each instance statistically insignificant, so 
that one cannot reject the possibility that the associated economic effects are nil.  
Table 5.8 calculates the economic effects for the other three competition variables 





percentile values. If anything, the estimated effects are even smaller. For the Lerner index, 
the change in the stability measure, rounded to two significant digits, is 0.00 percentage 
points for all three panels. For Boone MC, they range from 0.07 to 0.18 percentage points; 
and for Boone AC, they range from -0.02 to 0.06 percentage points. In terms of economic 
significance, these changes are negligible. 
Table 5.9 repeats the same exercise as Table 5.8, except that the underlying effects are 
calculated from the correlated random effects regression models. While the numbers change 
somewhat, the overall conclusion is identical: The predicted, economic effects on financial 


















 Percentile Values of H-statistic, Lerner, Boone 
MC, and Boone AC 
 
 H-statistic Lerner Boone MC Boone AC 
Panel A: Stability measure = Z-score 
(Mean = 0.0058) 
25
th
 percentile 0.0058 0.0059 0.0055 0.0054 
50
th
 percentile 0.0057 0.0059 0.0059 0.0057 
75
th
 percentile 0.0057 0.0059 0.0062 0.0060 
  75th - 25th  -0.0001 0.0000 +0.0007 +0.0006 
Obs 41,252 41,094 41,315 41,315 
Panel B: Stability measure = NPL 
(Mean = 0.0182) 
25
th
 percentile 0.0176 0.0185 0.0179 0.0183 
50
th
 percentile 0.0182 0.0185 0.0188 0.0182 
75
th
 percentile 0.0189 0.0185 0.0197 0.0181 
  75th  - 25th +0.0013 0.0000 +0.0018 -0.0002 
Obs  44,008 43,876 44,072 44,072 
Panel C: Stability measure = Distance-to-default 
(Mean = 0.7277) 
25
th
 percentile 0.7311 0.7283 0.7274 0.7275 
50
th
 percentile 0.7282 0.7283 0.7281 0.7278 
75
th
 percentile 0.7245 0.7283 0.7288 0.7279 
  75th  - 25th  -0.0066 0.0000 +0.0014 +0.0004 
Obs  10,032 10,032 10,032 10,032 
Note. The predicted probabilities are derived from the fractional logistic model of Table 5.2, 
5.4, and 5.6. The dependent variable in Panels A, B, and C are Z-score, NPL and the 
distance-to-default. All probabilities are calculated at the mean values of the regression 
covariates, except for the variable of interest (H-statistic, Lerner, Boone MC, or Boone AC) 

















 Percentile Values of H-statistic, Lerner, Boone 
MC, and Boone AC 
 
 H-statistic Lerner Boone MC Boone AC 




 percentile 0.0058 0.0058 0.0056 0.0054 
50
th
 percentile 0.0057 0.0058 0.0058 0.0057 
75
th
 percentile 0.0055 0.0058 0.0060 0.0060 
  75th - 25th  -0.0003 0.0000 +0.0004 +0.0006 
Obs 41,252 41,094 41,315 41,315 
Panel B: Stability measure = NPL 
(Mean = 0.0182) 
25
th
 percentile 0.0166 0.0175 0.0175 0.0175 
50
th
 percentile 0.0175 0.0175 0.0184 0.0176 
75
th
 percentile 0.0185 0.0175 0.0193 0.0177 
  75th  - 25th +0.0019 0.0000 +0.0018 -0.0002 
Obs  44,008 43,876 44,072 44,072 
Panel C: Stability measure = Distance-to-default 
(Mean = 0.7277) 
25
th
 percentile 0.7292 0.7272 0.7257 0.7258 
50
th
 percentile 0.7262 0.7272 0.7263 0.7259 
75
th
 percentile 0.7225 0.7272 0.7269 0.7260 
  75th  - 25th  -0.0067 0.0000 +0.0012 +0.0002 
Obs  10,032 10,032 10,032 10,032 
Note. The predicted probabilities are derived from the correlated random effects estimation of 
Table 5.3, 5.5, and 5.7. The dependent variable in Panels A, B, and C are Z-score, NPL and 
the distance-to-default. All probabilities are calculated at the mean values of the regression 
covariates, except for the variable of interest (H-statistic, Lerner, Boone MC, or Boone AC) 






 percentile values.  
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5.8 Robustness Tests 
This section performs two robustness checks. The first robustness test excludes the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) period from the analysis. The second robustness test includes 
bank concentration in the respective regression specifications. The analysis restricts itself to 
three competition measures: H-statistic, the Lerner index, and Boone MC.  
5.8.1 Exclusion of the Global Financial Crisis Episodes 
Calderon and Schaeck (2016) describe the effect of government aid programmes on 
competition in the banking sector during the GFC period. Their findings indicate that, during 
this period, government aid programmes contributed to an increase in bank competition. 
Furthermore, they affected the relationship between competition and stability. To eliminate 
the impact of massive bailout programmes, Section 5.8.1 excludes the GFC period and post-
GFC period and re-estimates the key models for a restricted sample period. The recession in 
US started in fourth quarter of 2007. Due to that the pre-crisis sample period ending in third 
quarter of 2007.     
Table 5.10 re-estimates the specification of column (5) in Tables 5.2-5.7. Panel A 
reports results from the fractional logistic estimation, and panel B reports results from the 
correlated random effects estimation. Most of the competition variables are not significant. 
There are four regressions where they are: Boone MC in the Z-score regressions of columns 
(1) and (4), Lerner in the Z-score regression of column (1), H-statistic in the Z-score 
regression of column (4), and  Boone MC in the NPL regressions columns (2) and (5). In the 
Z-score regressions, the signs of the estimated coefficients indicate a negative relationship 
between competition and stability. In the NPL regressions, they indicate a positive 
relationship. Thus, the exclusion of the GFC and post-GFC periods confirm the same, 





 Exclusion of the GFC Period  
 
 

















































Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 28,969 27,615 6,350 28,969 27,615 6,350 
Banks  866 864 355 866 864 355 
Note. The table restricts the sample period from Q1-2000 to Q3-2007. The numbers in parentheses below estimated coefficients are cluster 




Competition and Concentration Interaction 
 Z-score NPL Distance-to-default 































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 35,342 35,224 35,389 38,594 38,475 38,642 8,263 8,263 8,263 
Note. The table reports estimation results from the correlated random effects estimation. The numbers in parentheses below estimated 




5.8.2 Inclusion of bank concentration 
As a further robustness check, this section includes an interaction of the three-bank 
concentration ratio with each of the three competition variables. The purpose is to see if 
concentration mediates the relationship between competition and stability in line with the 
findings of Schaeck et al. (2009). They report evidence that concentrated banking sectors 
accentuate the positive effects of competition on stability. Data on the three-bank 
concentration ratio are available from the Global Financial Development Database through 
2015. As a result, the empirical analysis for this section only extends through that year.  
Table 5.11 reports the results of this analysis. In each column, interaction terms for 
concentration were added to the specifications of columns (1) to (3) in Tables 5.2 through 
5.7, respectively. Of the nine interaction terms, only one is statistically significant – the 
interaction term for Boone in column (6). One should not make too much out of a single 
significant coefficient (out of 9). However, it can be noted that the direction of the effect is 
the same as what Schaeck et al. (2009) found: concentrated banking sectors accentuate the 
positive effects of competition on stability, at least when competition is measured by the 
Boone indicator and stability is measured by NPL.   
5.9 Systemic Stability 
This section examines the effect of competition on systemic stability. Logistic R-
squared and the change in CoVaR estimate the interconnectedness of banks and the common 
exposure to the risk (Anginer et al., 2014).  
The dependent variable in Table 5.-12 is logistic R-squared. The main explanatory 
variables in specifications (1) to (4) are H-statistic, Lerner, Boone MC, and Boone AC, 
respectively. Specifications (5) and (6) include all the competition measures in one 
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specification. Column (5) uses Boone MC as the Boone indicator, and column (6) uses Boone 
AC as the Boone indicator.  
Anginer et al. (2014) find that the relationship between Lerner and Logistic R-squared 
is positive and support competition-stability hypothesis. The results of Table 5.12 do not 
support their finding. All the competition coefficients are statistically insignificant at the 5-
percent level. Further, all the control variables are also insignificant, with the exception of 
Assets, which is negatively and significantly associated with systemic stability in -four of the 
six regressions. Here, a negative coefficient here indicates that bank size is positively 




















Effect of Bank Competition on Systemic Stability (Logistic R-squared as the Systemic Stability 
Measure) 
 








































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 20,555 20,555 20,555 20,555 20,555 20,555 
Banks 350 350 350 350 350 350 
Note. The table reports estimation results from the ordinary least squares estimation. The 
dependent variable is the logistic R-squared. The numbers in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients are cluster robust standard errors, clustered on bank. *, **, and ***, indicate 
significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent significance levels.     
 
Table 5.13 employs the same specifications as Table 5.1-2 except that CoVaR is used 
as the dependent variable. Once again, none of the competition variables are statistically 
significant. Further, now not even any of the control variables are significant. One possible 
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reason for this null finding is the large reduction in the sample size, which reduces the 
statistical power of the regressions. 
Table 5.13 
 Effect of Bank Competition on Systemic Stability (CoVaR as the Systemic Stability Measure) 








































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 8,753 8,753 8,753 8,753 8,753 8,753 
Banks 315 315 315 315 315 315 
 Note. The table reports estimation results from the correlated random effects estimation. The 
dependent variable is the change in CoVaR. The numbers in parentheses below estimated 





This chapter examines the relationship between bank competition and financial 
stability using bank-level data for the USA for the period 2000 and 2017. The analysis uses 
three common measures of bank competition: H-statistic, the Lerner index and the Boone 
indicator. Bank-level stability is also measured using alternative measures: Z-score, NPL, and 
distance-to-default. Logistic R-squared and the change in CoVaR are used as measures of 
systemic stability.  
Interestingly, this chapter finds that the different measures of competition are only 
weakly correlated. Further, it finds that the effect of competition on stability varies with the 
measure of stability. When Z-score is used as the stability measure, the competition measures 
H-statistic, Lerner, and Boone generally evidence a negative relationship between 
competition and financial instability. This is also true when distance-to-default is used to 
measure stability, though the estimated coefficients are never significant at the 5-percent 
level. However, when NPL is used to measure bank-level stability, the results differ. Both the 
Lerner and Boone measures are associated with a positive relationship between competition 
and stability. H-statistic is consistently insignificant. The results using systemic stability 
measures are also statistically insignificant.  
Bank size is positively associated with stability and the findings are consistent 
irrespective of the measure used for stability. Income diversification is statistically significant 
only when Z-score is used to measure stability. The estimates indicate that an increase in the 
volatility of revenue generation reduces stability. The loan to assets ratio is positively 
associated with stability in most of the estimations. However, it shows a negative association 
when fractional logistic estimation is used. 
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To determine the economic significance of the respective estimates, the estimated 
equations were used to predict the effect on stability of an increase in the respective 
competition variables from their 25
th
 to their 75
th
 percentile values. Across the board, the 
associated economic effects were very, very small. Even when the competition variables were 
statistically significant, the size of their economic effects was negligible.  
This chapter performs two robustness checks. It excludes the GFC period from the 
analysis, and includes bank concentration. Excluding the GFC and following years does not 
change the conclusions obtained from the full sample. Further, while previous research found 
that concentration mediated the relationship between competition and stability (Schaeck et 
al., 2009), little evidence was found in this study to support that. Finally, expanding the 
analysis to estimate the relationship between bank competition and systemic stability did not 
produce any significant findings.  
Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) show that the relationship between bank competition 
and financial stability changes with the definition of the measure used for stability. This 
chapter presents clear evidence supporting their finding. Overall, no consistent evidence 
relating bank competition and financial stability was found using these data on US banks.            
5.11 Limitations of the study 
There are two limitations in this chapter. First, due to the data availability, this 
study limits its focus to active banks in 2017. Therefore, the selected sample of the study 
includes banks which survived during the GFC period or any bank which commenced its 
operations at any date prior to 2017. This sample is affected with survivorship bias and 
the results of the chapter are derived from a survivor sample. Previous empirical 
investigations based on bank level data also highlight that the survivorship bias as a 
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limitation of bank level studies (Delis & Kouretas, 2011; Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache, & 
Gupta, 2000).  
Second, the measures of competition are constructed using time series data. That 
generates time constant competition measures for each bank. The data availability issue 
prevents the computation of time varying competition measures. The empirical literature 
on bank competition use a constant measure of competition to examine the relationship 
between bank competition and financial stability (Berger et al., 2009; Bikker & Haaf, 
2002a; Schaeck et al., 2009) and this study follows the same approach. It restricts the 















This chapter presents a brief summary of the thesis. The main aim of the thesis was to 
examine the relationship between bank competition and financial stability. This goal was 
categorised into three specific research questions; (i) Are competitive banking systems really 
more stable? (ii) What is the effect of bank competition on financial stability? (iii) How does 
competition affect financial stability? The remainder of this chapter explains the findings for 
each question. 
6.2 Are Competitive Banking Systems Really More Stable? 
Chapter 2 of this thesis attempted to respond to the first question doing a replication 
of Schaeck et al. (2009).  This is a country-level analysis of bank competition and financial 
stability. The main explanatory variables are Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic and the 
three-bank concentration ratio. The replication consisted of six steps.  
Firstly, the results were re-estimated with data provided by the authors. The replicated 
results closely matched the published results. In the second step, the control variables were 
updated using multiple data sources, and the replication was continued using the updated 
data. It was discovered that many variables had values different from the original data 
provided by the authors. In contrast to Schaeck et al. (2009), this analysis found that H-
statistic was not statistically significant.  However, there was a positive association between 
concentration and stability.  
Thirdly, this chapter expanded the sample period of study. The original sample period 
of 1980-2005 was extended to 2011. The extension of the sample period raised a number of 
issues concerning whether to use constant or time-varying values for H-statistic and 
Concentration over the duration of the period. Schaeck et al. (2009) used constant values. A 
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number of combinations of constant and time-varying values for the respective variables were 
estimated. H-statistic was consistently insignificant. Fourthly, an alternative measure of 
financial stability, Z-score, was employed. Neither H-statistic nor Concentration were 
statistically significant for this analysis.  
The fifth step incorporated two alternative measures of competition, the Lerner index 
and the Boone indicator. The estimated results for these alternative competition variables 
were statistically insignificant in more than half the specifications. Finally, this chapter 
removed the effect of the global financial crisis and re-estimated the results. The competition 
measures continued to be statistically insignificant, though the concentration variable was 
found to be positively associated with stability.  
The conclusion of this replication exercise is that it did not find evidence to support 
Schaeck et al.’s (2009) claim that competitive banking systems are more stable. It did, 
however, find some support for the assertion that concentration is positively associated with 
financial stability.  
6.3 What is the Effect of Bank Competition on Financial Stability? 
Chapters three and four addressed this question by performing Meta-Regression-
Analysis (MRA). Chapter three is a replication of Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) meta-
analysis on the effect of bank competition on stability. This chapter performed a pure 
replication using the authors’ dataset and codes. A verification exercise examined 31 studies 
used by Zigraiova and Havranek (2016)  and recoded the estimates, using the same categories 
that they used.  Both exercises confirmed the conclusion of Zigraiova and Havranek (2016), 
that there is a small effect from bank competition on financial stability. Furthermore, it also 
confirmed that there is moderate publication bias, with journals favouring estimates 
supporting the bank competition and financial fragility hypothesis.  
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A large number of study and data characteristics are associated with the heterogeneity 
of estimates observed in the literature. This leads to uncertainty about which variable 
specification is most appropriate for relating characteristics to estimates. Bayesian Model 
Averaging was used to handle this “model uncertainty problem”. The associated results show 
that sample size, country coverage, measures for stability and competition, estimation 
method, and publication characteristics were the main contributory factors for heterogeneity.  
Large samples generally produced small estimates of competition effects. The 
estimates for developed countries were slightly larger than those for developing and transition 
countries. Non-linear estimates were generally smaller when explanatory variables were 
weighted by the inverse number of estimates per study. Using a dummy variable to indicate a 
financial crisis generally produced larger estimates of the relationship between competition 
and stability than other measures of stability. With respect to competition measures, H-
statistic was generally associated with larger estimated competition effects, and the Boone 
indicator with smaller estimated effects.  Studies that used logit estimation produced smaller 
estimates than other studies. Number of citations, year the study first appeared in Google 
Scholar, the recursive impact factor, and whether a study was published in a peer-reviewed 
journal were all selected as important determinants of estimated competition effects.  
Chapter four extended Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) work by updating the list of 
studies that estimated the relationship between bank competition and financial stability. This 
analysis found a total of 35 additional studies with 762 estimates. The exact same procedures 
employed by  Zigraiova and Havranek (2016) were used to confirm whether their original 
findings would hold up with the new data. The associated partial correlation coefficients were 
usually less than -0.07 in absolute value, indicating a small negative effect from bank 
competition on financial stability. There was no statistical evidence in favour of publication 
bias. The meta-regression analysis identified country coverage, measures of stability and 
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competition, estimation method, and publication characteristics as important factors when 
estimating the competition-stability relationship. 
Overall, both chapters confirmed a small negative effect from bank competition on 
financial stability, with no evidence of publication bias in the more recent studies. 
6.4 How Does Competition Affect Financial Stability? 
Chapter five assessed this question. The previous two chapters revealed that the 
relationship between competition and stability varied due to country coverage, and the types 
of measures used to capture competition and stability, among other things. This chapter 
estimated the competition-stability relationship using US, bank-level data for the period 
2000-2017. In light of findings from the previous chapters, this analysis used multiple proxies 
of competition and stability. Bank competition was measured by H-statistic, the Lerner index, 
and the Boone indicator. Bank-level stability was measured by Z-score, non-performing 
loans, and distance-to-default. Logistic R-squared and the change in conditional value at risk 
were used as measures of systemic stability. 
This analysis found that the three measures of competition had low pairwise 
correlations and appeared to address different aspects of competition. The effect of 
competition on stability varied with the measure of stability. When Z-score was used as the 
stability measure, H-statistic, the Lerner index, and the Boone indicator found competition to 
be negatively associated with financial instability, supporting the competition-fragility 
hypothesis. Regressions with distance-to-default as the dependent variable also supported the 
competition-fragility hypothesis, however the associated estimated competition effects were 
generally insignificant.  
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However, other regressions produced inconsistent findings. When NPL was used as a 
measure of stability, regressions with H-statistic indicated a negative relationship between 
competition and stability. In contrast, both the Lerner index and the Boone indicator indicated 
a positive association. The results based on logistic R-squared and change in CoVaR were 
statistically insignificant. Therefore, the evidence for the final research question of the thesis 
is ambivalent. Most, but not all, of the empirical analysis indicates that competition is 
negatively associated with stability. Certainly, there is not much evidence to support the 
competition-stability hypothesis.   
In summary, these findings suggest that competition in the banking sector does not 
have a large impact on financial stability. The main policy implication of the findings is that 
the relaxation of regulatory restrictions and the promotion of competition is unlikely to 
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 Description of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Data Sources 
GDP growth (lag) 
Rate of growth of the gross domestic 
production (GDP) lagged by one 
year 
World Bank Development 
Indicators*, International 
financial Statistics  
Inflation Rate of change of the GDP deflator 
World Bank Development 
Indicators*, International 
financial Statistics  
Real interest rate Inflation adjusted rate of inflation 
World Bank Development 
Indicators, Datamarket 
Depreciation Change in the foreign exchange rate 
International financial 
Statistics*, World Bank 
Development Indicators 
Terms of trade 
Change in the net barter terms of 
trade 
DataMarket, World Bank 
Development Indicators* 
Credit growth 
Rate of growth of domestic credit to 
the private sector, adjusted for 
inflation with GDP deflator 
World Bank Development 
Indicators, Global Financial 
Development Database 
Moral hazard index 
Indicator of generosity of design 
features of deposit insurance 
schemes. It is calculated as the first 
principal component of the following 
design features: no co-insurance, 
unlimited explicit coverage, explicit 
coverage limit, coverage of foreign 
currency and interbank deposits 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 
2002)   
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2014) 
Deposit Insurance Database 
German legal origin 
Dummy variable that takes the value 
one if the country’s legal system is of 
German origin or zero otherwise 
Schaeck et al. (2009) (same 






Dummy variable that takes the value 
one if the country’s legal system is of 
Scandinavian origin or zero 
otherwise 
Schaeck et al. (2009) (same 





Variable Definition Data Sources 
British legal origin 
Dummy variable that takes the value 
one if the country’s legal system is of 
British origin or zero otherwise 
Schaeck et al. (2009) (same 




Percentage of total assets held by the 
three largest institutions in a country 
(averaged over the sampling period) 
Schaeck et al. (2009) (same 
data collects from the 





H1 is calculated as the average of 
four models estimated for each 
country for the period 1998–2005 
based on Section2.4.1, whereby two 
models employ OLS with time 
dummies and GLS with fixed bank 
effects and time dummies  
Schaeck et al. (2009) (same 
data from the original paper) 




Private credit by deposit money 
banks as a percentage of GDP 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Foreign ownership 
Proportion of bank assets owned by 
foreign entities in a country 




Proportion of bank assets owned by 
government banks in a country 
Barth et al. (2013) 
Entry restrictions 
The indicator is constructed as an 
index and it takes on values between 
1 and 8, whereby a higher index 
value indicates greater entry 
restrictions  




An index of the stringency of bank 
capital regulations  
Barth et al. (2013) 
Official supervisory 
power 
A measure of the degree to which the 
country’s bank supervisory body to 
take actions to prevent banking 
problems 
Barth et al. (2013) 
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Variable Definition Data Sources 
Private monitoring 
index 
This index contains information 
regarding external auditing of banks, 
which proportion of banks is rated by 
international agencies, if an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme is present, 
whether subordinated debt is allowed 
as a part of capital, and if risk 
management procedures and off-
balance sheet items are disclosed to 
the public.  it takes values between 0 
and 12, where a larger value 
indicates greater degree of private 
monitoring 
Barth et al. (2013) 
 
Z-score 
It measures the probability of default 
of a country's banking system. Z-
score compares capitalization and 





This is a measure of market power of 
the bank. It is the difference between 
output prices and marginal costs. 
Prices are calculated as total bank 
revenue over assets, whereas 
marginal costs are calculated from a 
translog cost function with respect to 
output costs. Higher values of the 
Lerner index indicate less bank 
competition. This database uses the 
methodology of Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Martínez Pería (2010) to calculate 





Variable Definition Data Sources 
Boone indicator 
This is a measure of degree of 
competition, calculated as the 
elasticity of profits to marginal costs. 
To estimate the elasticity, the log of 
profits is regressed on the log of 
average costs. The estimated 
coefficient is the Boone indicator. 
According to the interpretation of the 
Boone indicator, higher profits are 
achieved by more-efficient banks. 
Hence, the more negative the Boone 
indicator, the higher the degree of 
competition. This database uses the 
methodology of Schaeck and Cihák 



















 Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
Data characteristics  
PCC The transformed coefficient estimate of the effect of bank 
competition on financial stability  
SEPCC The estimated standard error of the partial correlation 
coefficient 
Samplesize The logarithm of the number of observations used in the 
competition-stability regression 
T The logarithm value of the number of time periods (years) 
Sampleyear The mean year of the sample period (base year:1992)  
Countries examined  
Developed Equals 1 if primary studies examine only OECD countries 
Developing and transition Equals 1 if primary studies examine only non-OECD 
countries 
Reference case: mixed Equals 1 if primary studies examine both OECD and non-
OECD countries 
Design of the analysis  
Quadratic Equals 1 if squared term of the competition coefficient is 
included in the competition-stability regression 
Endogeneity Equals 1 if the estimation method includes an instrument, 
a lagged value of competition, or a dummy variable to 
account for endogeneity 
Macro Equals 1 if the competition-stability regression is 
estimated based on aggregated country-level data 
Averaged Equals 1 if the competition-stability regression is 
estimated based on the country-level data, which are 
calculated as the average of bank-level data 
Treatment of stability  
Dummies Equals 1 if proxy measure of stability is a dummy variable 
for bank crisis 





Z_score Equals 1 if proxy measure of stability is Z-score 
Profit volatility Equals 1 if proxy measure of stability is ROA volatility 
/ROE volatility 
Profitability Equals 1 if proxy measure of stability is ROA/ROE 
Capitalization Equals 1 if proxy measure of stability is Capital Adequacy 
(CAR)/Equity to total assets 
DtoD Equals 1 if proxy measure of stability is Logistic R
2
, 





Equals 1 if any other measure of stability is used by 
primary studies  
Treatment of competition  
H-statistic Equals 1 if bank competition is measured using the H-
statistic 
Boone Equals 1 if bank competition is measured using the Boone 
indicator 
Concentration Equals 1 if bank competition is measured using a three 
bank or five bank concentration ratio 
Lerner Equals 1 if bank competition is measured using the Lerner 
index 
HHI Equals 1 if bank competition is measured using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
Reference case: Equals 1 if any other measure of competition is used by 
primary studies 
Estimation method  
Logit Equals 1 if Logit or Probit model is used to estimate the 
competition-stability regression 
OLS Equals 1 if OLS is used to estimate the competition-
stability regression 
FE Equals 1 if fixed effects are used to estimate the 
competition-stability regression 
RE Equals 1 if random effects are used to estimate the 
competition-stability regression 





TSLS Equals 1 if two-stage least squares are used to estimate the 
competition-stability regression 
Reference case: Equals 1 if any other estimation method is used to estimate 
the competition-stability regression 
Control variables  
Regulation Equals 1 if  regulatory or supervisory variables are 
included in the estimation equation  
Ownership Equals 1 if bank ownership variables are included in the 
estimation equation 
Global Equals 1 if macroeconomic variables are included in the 
estimation equation 
Publication characteristics  
Citations The logarithm of the number of Google Scholar citations 
normalized by the difference between 2015 and the year 
the study is first appeared in Google Scholar (collected in 
July 2014 by Z&H) 
Firstpub The year when the study is first appeared in Google 
Scholar (base year: 2003) 
IFrecursive The recursive impact factor values from RePEc (collected 
in July 2014 by Z&H) 
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bank or five bank concentration ratio 
Lerner Equals 1 if bank competition is measured using the Lerner 
index 
HHI Equals 1 if bank competition is measured using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
Reference case: Equals 1 if any other measure of competition is used by 
primary studies 
Estimation method  
Logit Equals 1 if Logit or Probit model is used to estimate the 
competition-stability regression 
OLS Equals 1 if OLS is used to estimate the competition-
stability regression 
FE Equals 1 if fixed effects are used to estimate the 
competition-stability regression 
RE Equals 1 if random effects are used to estimate the 
competition-stability regression 





TSLS Equals 1 if two-stage least squares are used to estimate the 
competition-stability regression 
Reference case: Equals 1 if any other estimation method is used to estimate 
the competition-stability regression 
Control variables  
Regulation Equals 1 if  regulatory or supervisory variables are 
included in the estimation equation  
Ownership Equals 1 if bank ownership variables are included in the 
estimation equation 
Global Equals 1 if macroeconomic variables are included in the 
estimation equation 
Publication characteristics  
Citations The logarithm of the number of Google Scholar citations 
normalized by the difference between 2017 and the year 
the study is first appeared in Google Scholar (collected in 
June 2017 by Z&H) 
Firstpub The year when the study is first appeared in Google 
Scholar (base year: 2003) 
IFrecursive The recursive impact factor values from RePEc (collected 
in June 2017) 
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